NATO Enlargement


A. Official Documents
______I. Background
______II. North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace
______III. The Madrid NATO Summit and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
______IV. Washington Summit and Membership Action Plan
______V. Next Round of Enlargement
B. Government and other Official Reports 
______I. U.S. Administration
______II. Congressional Documents
___ _ _III. UK House of Commons
___ _ _IV. NATO Parliamentary Assembly
C. Speeches and Statements
D. Research and Policy Reports 


A. Official Documents

I. Background

In the 1990s NATO transformed itself, expanding its collective defense mission to include conflict prevention and conflict management throughout Europe, including areas beyond the boundaries described by the NATO treaty. To stabilize Central Europe, the alliance practised a strategy of inclusion and collaboration towards the Middle and Eastern European countries and decided to include new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999. Today, ten central and eastern European countries are seeking admission in 2002, including former Soviet allies Bulgaria and Romania and the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, once Soviet republics. 

General criteria for NATO membership include a functioning democratic system, a free-market economic system, the absence of civilian conflict coupled with observance of internationally recognized human rights laws, civilian control of the military and certain levels of defense spending and defense readiness. NATO enlargement will not be based not only on technical progress in defense or on successful democratic and market reforms, but also on consensus among current member states as well as strategic and geopolitical aspects. For Russia, enlargement is the main issue and central background for all other problems related to NATO. From the Russian perspective it is critical whether a second round of newly-initialted states will include any former Soviet republics. 

II. North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace

In the wake the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland began to voice a desire to join NATO. At the 1991 Rome Summit, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to serve as a forum for the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to develop a formal dialogue with the alliance. Later in July 1997, the functions of the NACC were translated into the newly created Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to strengthen the role of partners in PfP decision making and planning.

In January 1994, at a summit in Brussels, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was established to develop cooperative military relations between NATO and the newly democratized countries of Eastern Europe. PfP was also intended as a precursor for the preparation of perspective states interested in eventual NATO membership. By the end of 1994, 23 states were participating in the the program, although many of the partner states criticized PfP as postponement policy. NATO outlined its expectations of new members in more detail in a 1995 study on enlargement which established a set of political and military criteria for aspiring states. 

Work Plans/Action Plans (pdf all) 

PfP Documents and NATO Study on Enlargement The 1994 Brussels Summit also established the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) as the basic working body with responsibility for PfP matters. The PMSC coordinates the Partnership Work Program (PWP) that lists activities by NATO agencies, members and partner nations in the PfP framework. The generic section of the PWP defines objectives for all PfP areas over the following two years and serves as a guidance for specific national activities. In January 1995, NATO introduced the First Planning Cycle of the Planning and Review Process (PARP) under the aegis of PfP. The aims of PARP are to ensure the interoperability of the defence structures of NATO and partner states and to coordinate the defence planning of the partner states with that of the Alliance.  The December 1995 North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Berlin launched enhanced dialogues with those partners interested in joining the alliance. At the 1996 ministerials, NATO members agreed to invite "one or more" candidate states to begin formal accession negotiations in 1997. The alliance would remain open to the accession of further members. The Berlin Communiqué stated that the goal to admit new members was by the time of NATO's 50th anniversary in April 1999.  Parallel to the enlargement process, the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act established a new consultation mechanism between NATO and the Russian Federation, the Permanent Joint Council. NATO reiterated to Russia that it had "no intention, no plan, and no reason" to station nuclear weapons on new members' soil (but may do so should the need arise). 

III. The Madrid NATO Summit and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 

At the July 1997 NATO summit meeting in Madrid, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were officially invited to begin accession talks. NATO reiterated its open-door policy, created a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to strengthen the role of partners in PfP decision making and planning, and adopted new terms of reference under enhanced PfP programs in order to broaden cooperation beyond peace enforcement operations. The Madrid Declaration also recognised the progress made by other countries aspiring to join the Alliance in the areas of stability and co-operation, namely Romania, Slovenia and the Baltic states.  The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO on March 12, 1999. The Political-Military Steering Committee continued to manage PfP programs, and the PARP became more significant when NATO allies suggested major enhancements to it at a June 1998 Defense Ministerial. In addition, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council provided a forum for greater partner participation in deliberations on operations to which partners contribute forces.  Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) IV. The Washington Summit and the Membership Action Plan

The Washington Summit in April 1999 named Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as serious aspirants for NATO membership. The Washington Summit also introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to assist the nine aspirants to develop forces and capabilities that could operate with NATO under its new Operational Capabilities Concept. This program included requirements to help candidate countries in their preparations for joining NATO, namely political and economic issues, defence/military issues, resource issues, security issues and legal issues. The MAP is more challenging than the 1995 Enlargement Study in defining what aspirants need to accomplish membership. It includes the submission of an Annual National Plan (ANP) that covers political, economic, defense, resource, security, and legal aspects of membership, a clearinghouse for the coordination of security assistance and enhanced defense planning that reviews agreed planning targets. MAP also includes plans to allow aspiring Eastern States to undertake peace enforcement operations through PfP. MAP provides neither a timeframe nor a guarantee for eventual NATO membership to the Eastern European states. In autumn 2000, applicants handed in to NATO their first ANPs, which outline their strategies and progress made on membership requirements. 

V. Next Round of Enlargement

Two years after the Washington Summit, enlargement has been demoted from NATO's agenda. Although the alliance remains officially committed to expansion, recent movements in this direction have been tentative. NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo clearly dominate the agenda. (In the Final Communique of NATO's May 2000 ministerial meeting in Florence, the commitment to enlarge was preceded by 33 other concerns.) While the official policy is clear, the next round of NATO expansion is developing into a contentious issue, with differing views among the allies. On May 18-19th, 2000 nine foreign ministers of MAP countries launched a political initiative in Vilnius, Lithuania, to remind NATO to invite their countries to join the alliance at the next NATO Summit in 2002, which will be held in Prague in late November 2002, and which is expected to produce a decision regarding the further enlargement of the alliance. In Bratislava May 10-12th, 2001, the Vilnius group was joined by Croatia in reconfirming their commitment to becoming NATO members at the earliest possible date. 

North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting

B. Government and Other Official Reports 

I. U.S. Administration

II. U.S. Congressional Documents

Bills and Resolutions Hearings  Others

III. UK House of Commons

IV. NATO Parliamentary Assembly

V. Institute for Security Studies (WEU)

C. Speeches and Statements

D. Research and Policy Reports
    The strategic rationale for the next round is not clear, and which candidate will be invited to join still is undecided. And in contrast to the first round, there is no strong European leader on whom the U.S. can rely to do the heavy lifting. 
    Discusses vital European security interests and objectives within the NATO enlargement process. The fundamental issue which needs to be resolved before 2002 is whether the emphasis is placed on consolidating and supporting Europe's growing community of liberal states or on maintaining a powerful military alliance.
    The most serious test for the future relations between Russia and NATO will be connected with the next phase of the Alliance's enlargement, which could sensitive in terms of Russia's domestic politics. Russia still oscillates between hostility and pragmatism towards NATO. 
    At the start of his first trip to Europe, President Bush was haunted by a negative and European tone. Meanwile transatlantic relations seem to be less confrontational, and the future will offer opportunities to introduce the new U.S. policy to their allies and partners. 
    This report summarizes the findings of an international conference organised by SIPRI and held at Frösundavik, Sweden, on 20–21 April 2001. The conference focussed on the consequences of NATO and EU enlargement for European security, on the impact of the developing ESDP on conflict prevention and crisis management beyond the EU territory and the redefinition of the transatlantic partnership.
  • The new, bigger NATO: Fears v. Facts, Helle Bering, Policy Review, April-May 2001

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  • NATO Enlargement – Time For A New Paradigm? Dimitrij Rupel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, February 3, 2001 

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    Although the principles behind NATO enlargement will remain valid, there also have been evolved some new factors since the Madrid round of enlargement: the military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the peace support operation in Kosovo and the formation of common European forces as part of a common European security and defense policy. These factors will have an important influence on further discussion on NATO enlargement. 

  • NATO Enlargement: The Article 5 Angle, Lawrence Kaplan, ACUS Bulletin, February 2001 (pdf) 

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    Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that an attack on one member shall be considered an attack on all has not beena major issue in the U.S. debate about enlargement in 1998/99 although enlargement involves an extension of the Article 5 commitment. This issue might reappear in discussion after the Alliance's 2002 summit. 

  • Putting Europe First, Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, Survival, February 2001 

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    Although America today enjoys unrivalled military, economic and political power, it lacks the capacity to deal with many challenges without support from Europe. Despite Europe’s internal weaknesses and divisions, the United States cannot afford to ignore Europe. Only a strong Europe is capable of being a strategic partner of the United States. 

    This report rates each of the twelve aspirant's readiness for and likelihood of NATO accession, based upon political, strategic and military criteria. 
    The Baltic republics are not ready to become NATO members, and if they were, NATO would not be ready for them. The Clinton administration left U.S. objectives regarding the Baltic republics in uncertainty, creating unrealistic expectations for the Baltic states, anxiety for Russia, and confusion among NATO allies. America should encourage improved Baltic-Russian relations and establish a long-term strategy for membership based solely on NATO's strategic and geopolitical needs. 
    The political environment for the next round of NATO enlargement is challenging. No state or group of states commands a favored position among all allies, although favorites are clearly developing within most member states. 
    Argues that the American commitment to remain a European power is based upon a bipartisan consensus.The second round of NATO enlargement therefore will have a significant political impetus in the United States. 
    American policy on the next round of NATO enlargement has to be devised soon after the next administration takes office. The policy options will be framed by political, geostrategic, and technical factors. 
    The next U.S. administration has to devise a comprehensive policy agenda on NATO enlargement in preparation for the 2002 summit meeting. Political, geostrategic, and technical factors will frame policy options on enlargement. 
    The engagement and inclusion of Russia in the expanding transatlantic community is the necessary component of any long-term U.S. strategy to consolidate stability in Eurasia. The enlargement of NATO, has already proven beneficial for European security, including Russia. In the future, the West should consider an even more comprehensive association of Russia, which precise form and extent will have to be negotiated. 
    An extended European security order will not only need to address military issues, but will also have to act to substantially reduce socioeconomic disparities, although NATO's primary attraction to East European leaders is that it ties American military strength into a joint defense arrangement for its member states. 
    European security must include both the United States and Russia if it is to be reliable over time. While there can be considerable flexibility about how the European security community arranges itself, NATO enlargement needs to be worked with Russia. 
  • The Future of the American Military Presence in Europe, Lloyd Matthews (ed.), Strategic Studies Institute, April 2000 (pdf) 

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    The end of the Cold War brought into question the rationale for America’s continued deep involvement in European security affairs. This anthology examines the issue in which strategic and military direction NATO should be headed and what will be America’s future role within the alliance. 

    It would be a mistake to believe that Russia is not capable to act in an obstructionist manner toward NATO enlargement. Russia remains a major challenge to the evolution of NATO strategy in European Security affairs. 
    Analyzes NATO's role in developing new forms of security governance in post-cold war Europe, focusing on the Baltic Sea region. While the enlargement of NATO has already facilitated the emergence of new forms of cooperation and integration in the Baltic Sea region, a durable security order in the Baltic lies in processes of societal convergence and integration.
    From Russian perspective, the critical whether the second round of NATO enlargement will include any of the former Soviet republics, namely Baltic states or Ukraine. If expansion may be limited to include Romania and Slovenia, it probably would not upset Moscow too much.
  • NATO-Russia Relations and Next Steps for NATO Enlargement, Peter Viggers, North Atlantic Assembly Report, September 28, 1999

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    It is best to commit at a deliberate, measured pace towards NATO expansion because NATO's post-Cold War transformation is not complete and the state of affairs in many applicant countries is another reason to be cautious towards a rapid enlargement. 

    This compilation provides country-specific analyses and case-studies in the context of the changing European security environment in the post-Cold War period. 
  • NATO Enlargement to the East and Ukraine, CPCFPU Occasional Paper 1/1999

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    NATO enlargement has positively affected the international position of Ukraine as it stimulated the normalization of relations with the Russian Federation, influenced the political climate between Ukraine and and Romania and sirred up the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue. The most significant midterm effect will likely result from the progress in the field of military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO members. 

    Papers presented at a conference organized by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in January 1998, covering regional security and military aspects. 
    Despite its palpable desperation to keep the out of NATO, Russia has not much to offer to Baltic and Nordic states except to denounce to denounce their policies of NATO accession. Europe and NATO have filled the security vacuum in Northeast Europe and lead the search for security systems where Russia will have a much more limited part than might otherwise have been the case. 
    An ever-expanding NATO trying to transform itself into a genuine security organization will lose American support because this NATO will not match America's role in European security to American interests there. The United States will not engage in settling European regional disputes in which it no longer has a unique and decisive role to play. 
    Describes the 1998 U.S. Senate debate on the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty. 
    The U.S. Senate's vote on NATO enlargement ratification is one of the most far-reaching foreign policy decision since the end of the Cold War which will shape not only the future of European security, but also America's leadership role in the transatlantic alliance. How Senate answers the questions surrounding the issue of NATO enlargement will determine whether this historic first round is to be concluded successfully. 
    Expansion of the alliance risks provoking a new and even more dangerous version of the Cold War. An especially worrisome flashpoint is the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, and an even more dangerous situation will develop if a subsequent round of NATO expansion brings in the Baltic republics. Kaliningrad would then be separated from the rest of Russia by a belt of NATO countries. That would create a "mirror image" of West Berlin during the Cold War. 
    Hungary has long-standing problems with three of its neighbors because of discrimination against ethnic Hungarians living in those countries. Tensions are especially acute between Hungary and Serbia over Belgrade's continuing mistreatment of Hungarian citizens in Serbia's province of Vojvodina. If those tensions escalate, NATO could find itself entangled in an armed conflict between Hungary and Serbia. 
    The decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join NATO creates the prospect of far-reaching, for the United States in Eastern Europe. Part of NATO's expanded and dangerous security obligations will lie along the border between Poland and Belarus. That should greatly concern all Americans, because Belarus is a political and economic volcano waiting to erupt. If Belarus explodes, Poland is going to expect help from its NATO allies to contain the effects and protect Polish security. 
    The Senate debate on NATO enlargement will be focussed on the costs, the burden-sharing issue, strategic implications of EU enlargement, the relationship with Russia, and the size and timing of further enlargement.
    Major political and military reforms are being undertaken as part of Romania's preparation for NATO membership. Military modernisation and integration are the guiding principles for Romania's ambition to become a NATO member. 
    NATO enlargement confronts the U.S. Senate with some fundamental policy choices. The Clinton administration has attempted to blur these choices and to obscure the contradictory goals it is pursuing. American progressives should help to clarify those choices for the Senate and the American public. 
  • PfP Enhancement: Springboard to Greater Security in Europe, Frank Cook, North Atlantic Assembly Report, September 1, 1997 (pdf) 

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    A key component of the current debate about the extension of NATO is an enhanced PfP, coupled with the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. PfP has to be enhanced as to achieve a more stable, democratic and integrated Europe. 

    Describes the Clinton administration's proposals on NATO enlargement costs, and presents the findings of two other cost estimates. It also discusses some of the major factors that likely will affect the cost of expansion, compares the assumptions of the three studies, and presents some longer-term issues. 
    Describes PfP history and functions and contains some details on Swiss participation in PfP. 
    Presents public opinion results from Central Europe and the Baltic states that are drawn from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, published by the European Commission in March 1997. 
    NATO enlargement could complicate the alliance's ability to achieve consensus, weaken the security of those countries not brought in, increase demands on already overstretched defense budgets and alienate Russia. Legitimate Russian interests need to be reflected though the establishment of a standing consultation mechanism, and NATO should take steps to build the confidence of countries not included. 
    NATO expansion puts the entire post Cold War arms control settlement in jeopardy, as it violates the principles this settlement rests on: consensus, inclusion, and transparency. 
    An expert discussion about the means and ends of NATO enlargement. 
    The United States and its European allies should not take action that might worsen the domestic situation in Russia. Enlarging NATO to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe would be dangerous. Neither America nor Western Europe are prepared to fulfill the security commitments NATO expansion would require.
    NATO enlargement is a potential diplomatic debacle. From the Russian point of view, NATO expansion is seen as a sign that the West regards Russia as a defeated enemy. Russians fear that NATO expansion will ultimately mean the inclusion of the Baltic States and Ukraine within NATO's sphere of power and the loss of any Russian influence over these states and the deployment of NATO forces within the distance of Russia. 
    Analyzes a range of NATO expansion questions and NATO and American policy options. 
    The democratic political control of NATO armed forces is a process of which parliamentarian institutions form an integral part. At the governmental level, PfP and its activities will create the necessary for convergence in this area. 
    After the creation of the NACC in 1991, NATO's economic functions have been restructured to cover joint activities with partner countries. This article describes and assesses economic cooperation during the first 18 months of the NACC. 
  • NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit, Manfred Wörner, NATO Review, December 1991 


    • The main achievement of the Rome Summit was to raise the relationship between NATO and Eastern Europe to a new qualitative level, recognizing the the democratic progress made by the central and eastern European nations.