<DOC>
[105 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:46832.wais]
S. Hrg. 105-285
THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Hearing of October 7, 1997
Page
Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement......................... 1
Albright, Hon. Madeleine, Secretary of State..................... 6
Prepared statement.......................................... 12
Hearing of October 9, 1997
Pros and Cons of NATO Enlargement................................ 41
Brzezinski, Hon. Zbigniew, Counselor, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC.......................... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Dean, Hon. Jonathan, Senior Arms Control Advisor, Union of
Concerned Scientists, Washington, DC........................... 67
Prepared statement........................................... 70
Kirkpatrick, Hon. Jeane J., Senior Fellow and Director, Foreign
Policy and Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 47
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Mandelbaum, Dr. Michael, Professor and Director of American
Foreign Policy, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, DC................................................. 72
Roth, Hon. William V. Jr., United States Senator from Delaware,
Chairman, Senate NATO Observer Group, and President, North
Atlantic Treaty Assembly....................................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Hearing of October 22, 1997
Qualifications of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for NATO
Membership..................................................... 91
Prepared statement of:
Cambone, Dr. Stephen A., Senior Fellow, Political-Military
Studies Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC.................................... 108
Grossman, Marc, Assistant Secretary of State, European and
Canadian Affairs........................................... 91
Kramer, Franklin D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs............................. 94
Larrabee, Dr. Stephen F., RAND, Washington, DC............... 115
Micgiel, Dr. John S., Director, East Central European Center,
Columbia University........................................ 119
Hearing of October 28, 1997
Costs, Benefits, Burdensharing and Military Implications of NATO
Enlargement.................................................... 123
Eland, Dr. Ivan, Director of Defense Policy Studies, CATO
Institute, Washington, DC...................................... 165
Prepared statement........................................... 167
Hadley, Hon. Stephen, partner, Shea and Gardner, Washington, DC.. 170
Prepared statement........................................... 172
Kugler, Dr. Richard, Distinguished Research Professor, Institute
For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.... 152
Prepared statement........................................... 154
Slocombe, The Hon. Walter, Undersecretary of Defense For Policy.. 124
Prepared statement........................................... 131
Hearing of October 30, 1997, Morning Session
NATO-Russia Relationship--Part I................................. 183
Kissinger, Hon. Henry A., President, Kissinger and Associates,
New York, New York............................................. 183
Prepared statement........................................... 186
Hearing of October 30, 1997, Afternoon Session
NATO-Russia Relationship--Part II................................ 207
Matlock, Ambassador Jack F. Jr., George F. Kennan Professor,
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey............ 230
Prepared statement........................................... 236
Odom, William E., Lt. Gen., USA, retired, Director of National
Security Studies, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC............. 238
Prepared statement........................................... 242
Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R., Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs.............................................. 207
Prepared statement........................................... 214
Simes, Dimitri K., President, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom,
Washington, DC................................................. 245
Prepared statement........................................... 248
Hearing of November 5, 1997
Public Views on NATO Enlargement................................. 261
Acheson, David C., President, The Atlantic Council of the United
States, Washington, DC......................................... 294
Prepared statement........................................... 296
Ciccolella, Charles S., Assistant Director, National Security and
Foreign Relations Division, American Legion, Washington, DC.... 305
Prepared statement........................................... 306
Doubek, Robert W., President, American Friends of the Czech
Republic, Washington, DC....................................... 277
Prepared statement........................................... 279
Harmon, Col. Herbert N., USMCR, National President, Reserve
Officers Association of the United States, Washington, DC...... 315
Prepared statement........................................... 317
Harris, David A., Executive Director, American Jewish Committee,
New York, New York............................................. 310
Prepared statement........................................... 312
Joyce, John T., President, International Union of Bricklayers and
Allied Craftworkers, Washington, DC............................ 313
Prepared statement........................................... 314
Karatnycky, Adrian, President, Freedom House, New York, New York. 297
Prepared statement........................................... 298
Koiva, Mati, member, Board of Directors, Joint Baltic American
National Committee, Incorporated, and President, Estonian
American National Council, Rockville, Maryland................. 283
Prepared statement........................................... 284
Koszorus, Frank, Jr., board member, Hungarian American Coalition,
Washington, DC................................................. 270
Prepared statement........................................... 272
Moskal, Edward J., President, Polish American Congress,
Washington, DC................................................. 266
Prepared statement........................................... 269
Nowak, Jan, Representative, Central and Eastern European
Coalition, Annandale, Virginia................................. 262
Prepared statement........................................... 264
Plesch, Daniel T., Director, British American Security
Information Council, Washington, DC............................ 290
Prepared statement........................................... 292
Rubinstein, Dr. Alvin Z., Political Science Department,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania......... 318
Prepared statement........................................... 320
Shanahan, Adm. Jack, USN (Ret.), Director, Center for Defense
Information, Washington, DC.................................... 303
Prepared statement........................................... 304
Stern, Hon. Paula, President, The Stern Group, New York, New
York, on behalf of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO........... 286
APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Additional material received for the October 7 hearing record:
``Hearing on the Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement,''
a staff memorandum to the members of the Foreign Relations
Committee.................................................. 331
``Meeting the Challenges of a Post-Cold War World: NATO
Enlargement and U.S.-Russia Relations,'' A Report to the
Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted by Senator Joseph
R. Biden, Jr............................................... 338
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold............ 404
Letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary, Legislative
Affairs, Department of State, to Chairman Helms............ 405
Responses of Secretary Albright to Questions Asked by Senator
Helms...................................................... 405
Responses of Secretary Albright to Questions Asked by Senator
Feingold................................................... 413
Appendix 2
Additional material received for the October 9 hearing record:
``NATO Expansion; A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century,''
submitted by Michael Mandelbaum............................ 418
Appendix 3
Additional material received for the October 22 hearing record:
``Hearing on the Qualifications of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic for NATO Membership,'' a staff memorandum to
the members of the Foreign Relations Committee............. 439
Excerpts from ``Nations in Transit: 1997--Civil Society,
Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly
Independent States:''
Czech Republic: Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997.. 446
Hungary: Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997......... 463
Poland: Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997.......... 475
Appendix 4
Additional material received for the October 28 hearing record:
``Hearing on the Costs, Benefits, Burdensharing, and Military
Implications of NATO Enlargement,'' a staff memorandum to
the members of the Foreign Relations Committee............. 488
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold............ 499
``The High Cost of NATO Expansion,'' a policy analysis by
Ivan Eland................................................. 500
Responses of Mr. Slocombe to Questions Asked by Senator Helms 519
Responses of Mr. Eland to Question Asked by Senator Biden.... 522
Prepared statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Senior Fellow,
Political-Military Studies Program, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, DC.................. 523
Appendix 5
Additional material received for the October 30 hearing record:
``Hearings on NATO-Russian Relations,'' a staff memorandum to
the members of the Foreign Relations Committee............. 531
Appendix 6
Additional material received for the November 5 hearing record:
Letter from Alexandr Vondra, Ambassador of the Czech
Republic; Gyorgy Banlaki, Ambassador of the Republic of
Hungary; and Jerzy Kozminski, Ambassador of the Republic of
Poland; to Chairman Helms.................................. 537
Paula Stern, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO, supplemental
submissions................................................ 537
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., prepared statement...... 546
Armand Scala, President of the Congress of Romanian
Americans, prepared statement.............................. 549
U.S.-Baltic Foundation, prepared statement................... 549
John E. Moon, Commander-in-Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars of
the United States, letter and attachment................... 551
STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:14 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the
committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Thomas,
Ashcroft, Grams, Frist, Biden, Sarbanes, Robb, Feingold,
Feinstein, and Wellstone.
Also Present: Senator Warner.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Madam Secretary, as you know, we welcome you. We appreciate
your being our lead-off witness as the Foreign Relations
Committee begins its consideration of NATO expansion.
For nearly 50 years, NATO has defended democracy against
communism and other forms of tyranny in Europe. Despite that
success, many Americans will never forget the betrayal at Yalta
which left millions of Europeans behind enemy lines.
Today, with the expansion of the NATO alliance, we have an
historic opportunity to right that wrong by accepting Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. All Americans should
welcome these nations as they finally become equal partners in
a community of democratic nations, thereby ensuring that their
new democracies shall never again fall victim to tyranny.
Now, if Europe and the United States are to enjoy a century
of peace, upcoming, one that does not replicate the bloody wars
of the past century, we must embrace these democracies and
guide them and show them away from their tragic histories of
ethnic division and war.
That said, there's a right way and a wrong way to proceed
with NATO expansion. We in the Senate recognize that this vital
undertaking is not without cost to the United States, and I am
convinced that the three new democracies are willing and eager
to bear their fair share, but we must now make certain that our
present NATO allies are likewise willing to fulfill their end
of the bargain.
Just last week our allies made clear to us that they expect
the United States, meaning the American taxpayers, to pay the
lion's share of the cost of expansion. Now, Madam Secretary,
ratification of NATO expansion by the U.S. Senate may very well
succeed or fail on the question of whether you can dissuade our
allies of that notion.
Further, we must resist any temptation by the leadership of
our country to rush forward into an ill-considered NATO
partnership with Russia. Now, while the United States is
willing to take steps to demonstrate that NATO represents
absolutely no threat to a democratic Russia, NATO's relations
with Russia must be restrained by the reality that Russia's
future commitment to peace and democracy, as of this date, is
far from certain. In fact, I confess a fear that the United
States' overture toward Russia may have already gone a bit far.
I believe, Madam Secretary, that it's fair to expect the
administration to outline a clear, strategic rationale for NATO
expansion and to explain clearly to the U.S. Senate what
potential threats NATO may face in the 21st century and why an
expanded NATO alliance is necessary to counter such threats.
To illustrate, it is self-evident I think that one such
potential threat will manifest itself if and when Russia takes
a turn for the worse. In your testimony today, Madam Secretary,
I hope that you will address this and other possible threats to
Europe's security.
We live in a time when the United States finds few allies
within NATO or elsewhere in the struggle for freedom. Too many
expect the American taxpayers to pay the bills and to leave the
driving force up to these other nations.
For example, France boasts of investments to prop up the
terrorist regime in Iran, a regime that has spilled the blood
of American and French citizens alike. In fact, the European
Union waits with baited breath for Iran to allow their
Ambassadors to return to Tehran.
Denmark and the Netherlands, both having courageously
condemned China's human rights record in Geneva earlier this
year, now find themselves in the incomprehensible position of
being sanctioned by the Chinese while their opportunistic
European Union partners rush to enrich themselves with new
business opportunities.
Somehow an understanding must be made clear that the United
States did not create the NATO alliance and prepare for war and
send our troops to fight and die in Europe and spend our
country into debt for 50 years simply to defend European real
estate or European economic interests. Our commitment was first
and foremost to the defense of democracy and the preservation
of human liberty and it must remain so.
So many of our cold war allies have so quickly forgotten
how close they came to losing their freedoms, but you, Madam
Secretary, more than most, know that freedom cannot be taken
for granted because your family personally suffered the peril
of tyranny, ignored or tolerated by those entrusted with
leadership at that time.
NATO has yet to fight a war because NATO was thoroughly
convinced and convincing all along that NATO has been prepared
to fight a war, if necessary. But with the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the American people have turned their attention
to problems at home. There is no audible demand by the American
people to play the role of international referee or world
policeman.
Together we must explain to the American people that NATO
enlargement is vital precisely because it will secure peace and
security into the next century and ensure, at the same time,
that America will not be called upon once again to save Europe
from the advance of tyranny.
Now, Madam Secretary, as I conclude, I want to share with
you and others here today a passage written by the man I
consider the greatest statesman of the 20th century, Winston
Churchill. In his 1929 book, The Aftermath, Mr. Churchill tried
to warn the world about the slide down the slippery slope
toward the next world war.
At first his apprehensions fell on deaf ears, and in
connection with that, Mr. Churchill years later wrote the
following, with which I shall conclude.
He said: ``To the faithful, toiled, burdened masses, the
victory was so complete that no further efforts seemed
required. Germany had fallen and with her the combination that
had crushed her. Authority was disbursed. The world unshackled.
The weak became the strong. The sheltered became the
aggressive. The contrast between victors and vanquished tended
continually to diminish. A vast fatigue,'' he said, ``dominated
collective action and, through every subversive element,
endeavored to insert itself. Revolutionary rage, like every
other form of psychic energy, burnt low. Through all five acts,
the drama had run its course,'' he said. ``The light of history
is switched off. The world stage dims. The actors shrivel. The
chorus sings. The war of the giants has ended. The quarrels of
the pygmies has begun.''
I think that just about says it all. Senator Biden?
[Material submitted by Chairman Helms follows:]
The Madrid Summit--New Members, Not New Missions
[By Jesse Helms]
WASHINGTON, D.C.--As NATO leaders meet in Madrid today to discuss
the enlargement of the Alliance, some words of caution are in order.
The Clinton administration's egregious mishandling of NATO expansion is
raising serious concerns in the U.S. Senate, which must approve any
enlargement treaty.
There is growing distress among supporters of enlargement (like
myself) that the administration's plan for NATO expansion may be
evolving into a dangerous and ill-considered plan for NATO
transformation: that we are not inviting new nations into the NATO that
won the Cold War, but rather into a new, diluted NATO, converted from a
well-defined military alliance into a nebulous ``collective security''
arrangement.
No Rationale
To date, the Clinton administration has failed to present the
Senate with any credible strategic rationale for NATO expansion--that
is, no explanation of the threat posed to the Atlantic Alliance, nor
why an expanded NATO is needed to counter it. Instead, all sorts of
misguided proposals are floating around for transforming NATO's mission
and purpose, in an effort to justify Alliance expansion.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the Clinton
administration's pointman on NATO expansion, argues that while ``during
the Cold War, military and geopolitical considerations mainly
determined NATO's decisions . . . today, with the end of the Cold War,
other non-military goals can and should help shape the new NATO.''
NATO's primary mission, Mr. Talbott is saying, should no longer be the
defense of Europe, but rather ``promoting democracy within NATO states
and good relations among them''--in other words, nation-building.
Others see this ``new NATO'' serving as a stand-in peacekeeper for
a United Nations discredited by its failures in Somalia and Bosnia.
Indeed, the NATO-Russia ``Founding Act,'' largely negotiated by the
Clinton administration, enshrines this new role for NATO, hailing
NATO's ``historic transformation'' in making ``new missions of
peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the U.N.'' primary
Alliance functions.
Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the
Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N.
as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan-
European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. NATO has
proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely
because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited
mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial
integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and
prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this
century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the
beginning of the next century is also Russia. A central strategic
rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible
return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear
missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement,
as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian
leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and
discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of
important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its
borders.''
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration does not see this as a
legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of
Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force
behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to
understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's
former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an
endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of
its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes
clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial
integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another
Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again
at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate
states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to
protect the democracies they have already established from external
aggression.
Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic,
Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have
been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite,
the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the
appeasement of Russia.
After admitting East Germany in 1990 (and giving the Soviet Union
neither a ``voice'' nor a ``veto'' in the process), the U.S. delayed
NATO expansion for nearly seven years in a misguided effort to secure
Russian approval. Russia, knowing an opportunity when it sees one, has
used its opposition to NATO expansion to gain all sorts of concessions,
ranging from arms-control capitulations to the NATO-Russia ``Founding
Act.''
That agreement concedes ``primary responsibility . . . for
international peace and security'' to the U.N. Security Council, where
Russia has a veto. It gives Russia (the very country NATO is
constituted to deter) a voice at every level of the Alliance's
deliberations. And it gives Russia a seat at the table before any new
candidate members (those being brought in to protect them from
aggression) get a seat at the table.
It is my sincere hope that the U.S. Senate can approve NATO
expansion. But if we are to do so, some dramatic changes must be made.
As chairman of the Senate committee that must approve the resolution of
ratification, I urge the administration to take the following steps
before presenting NATO expansion to the Senate:
<bullet> Outline a clear, complete strategic security rationale for
NATO expansion.
<bullet> Agree that no limitations will be placed on the numbers of
NATO troops or types of weapons to be deployed on territory of
new member states (including tactical nuclear weapons)--there
must be no second-class citizens in NATO.
<bullet> Explicitly reject Russian efforts to establish a ``nuclear
weapons-free zone'' in Central Europe.
<bullet> Explicitly reject all efforts to tie NATO decisions to U.N.
Security Council approval.
<bullet> Establish a clear delineation of NATO deliberations that are
off-limits to Russia (including, but not limited to, arms
control, further Alliance expansion, procurement and strategic
doctrine).
<bullet> Provide an immediate seat at the NATO table for countries
invited to join the Alliance.
<bullet> Reject Russian efforts to require NATO aid for Russian arms
sales to former Warsaw Pact militaries joining the Alliance, as
a quid pro quo for NATO expansion--NATO must not become a back
channel for new foreign aid to Russia.
<bullet> Reject any further Russian efforts to link concessions in
arms control negotiations (including the antiquated ABM treaty
and the CFE Treaty) to NATO expansion.
<bullet> Develop a plan for a NATO ballistic missile defense system
to defend Europe.
<bullet> Get clear advance agreement on an equitable distribution of
the cost of expansion, to make certain American taxpayers don't
get stuck with the lion's share of the bill.
Strategic Threats
Is renewed Russian aggression the only strategic threat NATO must
consider? Of course not. There are many potential threats to Europe,
including the possibility of rogue states like Libya and Iran one day
threatening the continent with weapons of mass destruction. But the
Clinton administration has failed to define NATO expansion in terms of
any strategic threat.
If the Clinton administration views NATO not as a tool to defend
Europe, but as a laboratory for social work, then NATO should not only
eschew expansion, it should declare victory and close shop. The costs
of maintaining NATO, much less expanding it, cannot be justified if its
mission is democracy-building and peacekeeping. There are other, less
expensive and more appropriate forums for such ventures (such as the
European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe). NATO is a military alliance--it must remain so or go out of
business.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, welcome. It is always a pleasure to have
you here.
Mr. Chairman, I have stated my support for NATO enlargement
many times on the floor of the U.S. Senate and in private
forums. So, today I will only summarize my rationale for this
policy.
Europe remains a vital interest for the United States.
Other than North America, no other region can match Europe's
combination of political, economic, military, and cultural
power and significance to the United States. The European
Union, for example, has a population one-third larger than ours
and a combined GDP slightly greater than ours.
A large percentage of the world's democracies are in
Europe. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe
for American interests if instability were to alter the current
situation in Europe.
After the cold war, there are new threats to Europe: Ethnic
and religious conflicts, one nation crossing the borders of
another as Yugoslavia did in Bosnia, international crime and
drugs; also I might note a possible future threat to Mideast
oil supplies.
For this reason, enlargement is being combined with a new
strategic doctrine and a force posture that provides a more
mobile and capable force projection capability in event of any
of those crises.
In the 20th century, Europeans have proven incapable, left
to themselves, of settling their differences peacefully. The
United States it seems to me must continue to lead the new
security architecture for that continent, for if we do not, I
do not know who will.
In this context, admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary into NATO will extend the zone of security to central
Europe in a way that, if left undone, will leave a gray zone
and insecurity in that region.
The question, I would emphasize, is not whether to enlarge
NATO or remain the same. The status quo, Madam Secretary, in my
view is not an option. If we were not to enlarge, the countries
between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to
protect themselves, creating bilateral or multilateral
alliances as they did in the 1930's with, I predict, similar
results.
There is also a powerful moral argument for enlargement:
Redeeming our pledge to former captive nations to rejoin the
west. I mean both NATO and the EU when I say the west because
the Europeans will have to step up to that ball plate as well.
When they are fully qualified to join both, their security
will be fully secured. This fall's final accession talks
between NATO and each of the three candidate countries, Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary, will reveal whether each of
them meets the alliance's demanding qualifications. Based on
what I saw in my travels, I believe they do.
Enlargement, Mr. Chairman, need not adversely affect our
relations with Russia. We must redouble our political and
economic engagement with that country in my view, and the NATO-
Russia Founding Act of May 1997 is a significant step in the
right direction and the Partnership for Peace arrangement is
equally as important.
The NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council created by the
founding act has begun functioning. I especially look forward
to the fourth in our series of hearings on October 30th when we
will examine the new NATO-Russian relationship.
Mr. Chairman, in my view two big issues must be solved
before the Senate considers ratification. One is directly
related, one not as directly, but they're both important:
Bosnia and cost sharing. If Bosnia is the prototypical European
crisis of the 21st century, then in the coming weeks--and I
mean weeks--the United States and its NATO allies had better
come up with a workable post-SFOR scenario.
Similarly, while the United States must continue to
exercise its leadership role in NATO, our European and Canadian
alliance partners must agree, as you indicated, to step up to
the plate and bear their fair share of enlargement costs.
The definitive NATO study on cost will come out in
December. In anticipation of the report, this committee will
hold its third hearing on NATO enlargement on October 22nd when
we will examine the cost and burden sharing items. So, today I
will not speak much to those items in my questioning.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that admitting Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary to NATO, if they meet the qualifications,
which they appear to meet, will be in the security interest of
the United States of America. I believe to do otherwise would
be to extend a zone of instability rather than one of
stability.
I look forward to the Secretary's testimony.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for setting up an aggressive
series of hearings prior to the requirement for us to decide
whether or not to expand the Washington Treaty. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Now we will hear from you,
Madam Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, it
is with a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come
before you to urge support for the admission of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO.
Each of us is playing our part today in the long unfolding
story of America's modern partnership with Europe. That story
began not at the Madrid summit, nor when the Berlin Wall fell,
but half a century ago when your predecessors and mine
dedicated our Nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.
It was then that we sealed a peacetime alliance open not
only to the nations which shared our victory in World War II,
but to our former adversaries. It was then that this committee
unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the North
Atlantic Treaty. On that day, the leaders of this body rose
above partisanship and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal
moment in history.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition.
I thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for
the bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are
conducting them, and for the serious way in which you have
framed our discussion.
I am honored to be a part of what you have rightly called
the beginning of the process of advice and consent.
As I said, I am very conscious of history today. I hope we
can take a moment to remember what was said half a century ago
about the alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary
predecessor, predicted that NATO would become the greatest war
deterrent in history. He was right. American forces have never
had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally.
This committee predicted that NATO would free the minds of
men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity and
enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the
future, which is essential to economic recovery and progress.
Your predecessors were also right.
President Truman said that the NATO pact will be a
positive, not a negative influence for peace, and its influence
will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but
throughout the world. He was right too.
Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different
world. Our Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has
been unfurled from the Baltics to Bulgaria. As I speak to you
today, our immediate survival is not at risk.
Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense
at NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and
freer Europe. You may ask why, in this time of relative peace,
are we so focused on security.
The answer is we want the peace to last. We want freedom to
endure, and we believe there are still potential threats to our
security emanating from European soil.
You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I
want to answer as plainly as I can.
First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy
to forget this, but for centuries virtually every European
nation treated virtually every other nation as a military
threat. That pattern was broken only when NATO was born and
only in the half of Europe NATO covered. With NATO, each
member's security came to depend on cooperation with others,
not competition.
That is one reason why NATO remains essential. It is also
one reason why we need a larger NATO which extends its positive
influence to Europe's other half.
A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because
of the conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union,
Europe has already buried more victims of war since the Berlin
Wall fell than in all the years of the cold war. It is sobering
to recall that this violence has its roots in the same problems
of shattered states and of ethnic hatreds that tyrants
exploited to start this century's great wars.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider
the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats
against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact
is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon, such
as the threat posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons.
Others may not seem apparent today, but they are not
unthinkable.
Within this category lie questions about the future of
Russia. We want Russian democracy to endure. We are optimistic
that it will, but one should not dismiss the possibility that
Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging
Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to
deepen its commitment to peaceful relations with neighbors,
while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.
We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even
50 years from now. We do know that whatever the future may
hold, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger
alliance with those European democracies that share our values
and our determination to defend them.
We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of
American responsibilities in Europe. As Americans, we take our
commitments seriously and we do not extend them lightly. Mr.
Chairman, you and I certainly agree that any major extension of
American commitments must serve America's strategic interests.
Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland into NATO meets that test.
First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the
area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. By making clear
that we will fight if necessary to defend our allies, it makes
it less likely our troops will ever be called upon to do so.
Now you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate
threat or armed attack today. That is true. The purpose of
enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it
in 1949: NATO is not built to stop a war after it starts,
although its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is
built to stop wars before they start.
It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to
prevent conflict in Central Europe. Some have implied it is
not. I am sure you have even heard a few people trot out what I
call the consonant cluster clause, the myth that in times of
crisis Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant
city with an unpronounceable name, that we will protect the
freedom of Strasbourg but not Szczecin, Barcelona but not Brno.
Let us not deceive ourselves. We are a European power. We
have an interest in the fate of the 200 million people who live
in the nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the
cold war in part because these nations were held captive. We
fought World War II in part because these nations had been
invaded. If there were a major threat to the security of their
region, we would want to act, enlargement or no enlargement.
Our aim must be to prevent that kind of threat from arising.
The second reason why enlargement passes the test of
national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more
cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs are passionately
committed to NATO and its principles of shared responsibility.
Their forces have already risked their lives alongside ours
from the Gulf War to Bosnia.
I know you have expressed concern that enlargement could
dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involving the
alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we
invited only the strongest candidates to join and nothing about
enlargement will change NATO's core mission which remains the
collective defense of NATO soil.
At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has
always served a political function too. It binds our allies to
us just as it binds us to our allies. So, when you consider the
candidacy of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, I ask you
to consider this. On the issues that matter, from
nonproliferation to human rights, to U.N. reform, here are
three nations we have been able to count on and will continue
to be able to count on.
Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our
interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of
central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own
problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries
have strengthened their democratic institutions, made sure
soldiers serve civilians, signed 10 major accords that resolve
virtually every old ethnic and border dispute in the region.
I have been a student of central European history and I
have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and
Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of
enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians forming
joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see
Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, when I see
central Europeans confident enough to improve their political
and economic ties with Russia, I know something remarkable is
happening.
NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what this NATO
predicted it would do for Europe's west after World War II.
This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want
our troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes,
and social unrest, are far more easily avoided with NATO
enlargement than without it.
In short, a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO
stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. That is the
strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if I did not
tell you I see a moral imperative too.
NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations
of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted
the cold war. Americans have long argued that the nations of
central Europe belong to the same democratic family as our
allies in western Europe. As Americans, we should be heartened
so many of them wish to join the institutions we did so much to
build.
We should also think about what would happen if we were to
turn them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its cold war
membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern
frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise
qualified democracies simply because they were once, against
their, will members of the Warsaw Pact.
Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old
democracies forever but its new democracies never? Were we to
do that, confidence would crumble in central Europe leading to
a search for security by other means, including costly arms
buildups and competition among neighbors.
We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the
landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which
of these nations that are so clearly important to our security
are ready to contribute to our security? The answer to that
question is before you today awaiting your affirmation.
I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty
voices on both sides of this debate. Let me address a few of
the concerns I expect you will consider fully.
First, we all want to make sure that the costs of a larger
NATO are distributed fairly. Last February the administration
made a preliminary estimate of America's share. Now we are
working with our allies to produce a common estimate by the
December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. At this point
the numbers we agree upon as 16 allies are needed prior to any
further calculations made in Washington.
I know that you are holding separate hearings on this
question, but I will say this. I am convinced that the cost of
expansion is real but affordable. I am certain our prospective
allies are willing and able to pay their share because in the
long run it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their forces
within the alliance than outside it. I will insist that our old
allies share this burden fairly. That is what NATO is all
about.
I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger
NATO will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key fact
about our estimate is that it is premised on the current
favorable security environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave
threat were to arise, the cost of enlargement would grow, but
then so would the cost of our entire defense budget.
In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO
democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is
why the main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and our
consultations with our allies needs to be on defining the level
of military capability we want our old and new allies to have
and then making sure that they commit to it. We should spend no
more than we must but no less than we need to keep NATO strong.
Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it
might damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian
opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it
for what it is, a product of old misperceptions about NATO and
old ways of thinking about its former satellites in central
Europe. Instead of changing our policies to accommodate
Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's more
modern aspirations.
This means we should remain Russia's most steadfast
champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining
rule-based institutions, opening markets, and participating
constructively in world affairs.
But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is
a threat, we owe it candor to say that is false and to base our
policies on what we know to be true. I believe our approach is
producing results from our cooperation in Bosnia to agreements
to pursue deeper arms cuts, to new signs that the new START II
Treaty may be moving ahead in the Duma, to NATO's new
relationship with Russia.
I know that some are concerned that this relationship with
Russia may actually go too far. You have asked me for an
affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council
remains NATO's supreme decisionmaking body. Let me say it
clearly: It does and it will. The NATO-Russia Founding Act
gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay, or block NATO
decisions.
Another important concern is that enlargement may create a
new dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the
countries that will not join in the first round. We have taken
a range of steps to ensure this does not happen, from NATO's
commitment to an open-door policy, to a stronger Partnership
for Peace, to the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there
is enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. They
understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new democracy is
permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy
would be permanently excluded.
The most important thing the Senate can do to reassure them
now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission of
the first three candidates.
A final concern I wish to address has to do with Bosnia.
Some have suggested our debate on NATO enlargement simply
cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that
troubled country. I agree with them. Both are aimed at building
a stable, undivided Europe. It was our experience in Bosnia
that proved a fundamental premise of our enlargement strategy:
There are still threats to security in Europe that only NATO
can meet.
We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve
all its goals, but we can say that whatever may happen, our
interest in a larger, stronger NATO will endure long after the
last foreign soldier has left that country.
We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful
instrument we have for building effective military coalitions
such as SFOR. At the same time, Bosnia does not by itself
define the future of a larger NATO. NATO's most important aim,
if I can paraphrase Arthur Vandenberg, is to prevent wars
before they start so it does not have to keep the peace after
they stop.
These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to
address today. I know our discussion is just beginning. I am
glad that it will also involve other committees of the Senate,
the NATO Observers' Group, and the House of Representatives.
Most important, I am glad it will involve the American people.
When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I
trust they will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman.
On that day, we will be standing on the shoulders of many. We
will be thankful to all those who waged the cold war on the
side of freedom, to all those who champion the idea of a larger
NATO, to all those Members of Congress from both parties who
voted for resolutions urging the admission of these three
nations, to all those Republican Members who made NATO
enlargement part of their Contract with America.
Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, all of our
allies and future allies are watching you for one simple
reason: The American Constitution is unique in the power it
grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy,
especially over treaties. In this matter, you and the American
people you represent are truly in the driver's seat.
That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe
and telling our allies this is what we want to do but
ultimately it will be up to our Senate and our people to
decide. I say that with pride because it tells them something
about America's faith in a democratic process.
But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as
well. I believe that when the time comes for the Senate to
decide, Mr. Chairman, you and I and the American people will
stand together, for I know that the policy we ask you to
embrace is a policy that the administration and Congress shaped
together, and I am certain that it advances the fundamental
interests of the United States.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary Albright
Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: it is with
a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come before you to urge
support for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to
NATO.
Each of us today is playing our part in the long unfolding story of
America's modern partnership with Europe. That story began not in
Madrid, when the President and his fellow NATO leaders invited these
three new democracies to join our Alliance, nor eight years ago when
the Berlin Wall fell, but half a century ago when your predecessors and
mine dedicated our nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.
It was then that we broke with the American aversion to European
entanglements, an aversion which served us well in our early days, but
poorly when we became a global power. It was then that we sealed a
peacetime alliance open not only to the nations which had shared our
victory in World War II, but to our former adversaries. It was then
that this committee unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the
original NATO treaty.
The history books will long record that day as among the Senate's
finest. On that day, the leaders of this body rose above partisanship
and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal moment in the history of
the world.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition today. I
thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for the
bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are conducting them,
and for the serious and substantive way in which you have framed our
discussion.
I am honored to be part of what you have rightly called the
beginning of the process of advice and consent. And I am hopeful that
with your support, and after the full national debate to which these
hearings will contribute, the Senate will embrace the addition of new
members to NATO. It would be fitting if this renewal of our commitment
to security in Europe could come early next year, as Congress
celebrates the 50th anniversary of its approval of the Marshall Plan.
As I said, and as you can see, I am very conscious of history
today. I hope that you and your colleagues will look back as I have on
the deliberations of 1949, for they address so many of the questions I
know you have now: How much will a new alliance cost and what are its
benefits? Will it bind us to go to war? Will it entangle us in far away
quarrels?
We should take a moment to remember what was said then about the
alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.
Senator Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary predecessor,
predicted that NATO would become ``the greatest war deterrent in
history.'' He was right. American forces have never had to fire a shot
to defend a NATO ally.
This Committee, in its report to the Senate on the NATO treaty,
predicted that it would ``free the minds of men in many nations from a
haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them to work and plan with
that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery
and progress.'' Your predecessors were right. NATO gave our allies time
to rebuild their economies. It helped reconcile their ancient
animosities. And it made possible an unprecedented era of unity in
Western Europe.
President Truman said that the NATO pact ``will be a positive, not
a negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt not
only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world.'' And
he was right, too. NATO gave hope to democratic forces in West Germany
that their country would be welcome and secure in our community if they
kept making the right choices. Ultimately, it helped bring the former
fascist countries into a prosperous and democratic Europe. And it
helped free the entire planet from the icy grip of the Cold War.
Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different world. Our
Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has been unfurled from
the Baltics to Bulgaria. The threat of nuclear war has sharply
diminished. As I speak to you today, our immediate survival is not at
risk.
Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense at
NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and freer Europe.
You may ask why, in this time of relative peace, are we so focused on
security?
The answer is, we want the peace to last. We want freedom to
endure. And we believe there are still potential threats to our
security emanating from European soil.
You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I want to
answer as plainly as I can.
First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy to forget
this, but for centuries virtually every European nation treated
virtually every other as a military threat. That pattern was broken
only when NATO was born and only in the half of Europe NATO covered.
With NATO, Europe's armies prepared to fight beside their neighbors,
not against them; each member's security came to depend on cooperation
with others, not competition.
That is one reason why NATO remains essential, even though the Cold
War is over. It is also one reason why we need a larger NATO, so that
the other half of Europe is finally embedded in the same cooperative
structure of military planning and preparation.
A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because of
conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, Europe has already
buried more victims of war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the
years of the Cold war. It is sobering to recall that this violence has
its roots in the same problems of shattered states and hatred among
ethnic groups that tyrants exploited to start this century's great
wars.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider the
dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats against the
soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact is designed to
meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon, such as the threat posed by
rogue states with dangerous weapons that might have Europe within their
range and in their sights. Others may not seem apparent today, in part
because the existence of NATO has helped to deter them. But they are
not unthinkable.
Within this category lie questions about the future of Russia. We
have an interest in seeing Russian democracy endure. We are doing all
we can with our Russian partners to see that it does. And we have many
reasons to be optimistic. At the same time, one should not dismiss the
possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By
engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to
deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with
neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.
We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even 50
years from now. We do know enough from history and human experience to
believe that a grave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise. We know
that whatever the future may hold, it will be in our interest to have a
vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share
our values and our determination to defend them.
We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of American
responsibilities in Europe. It does not bind us to respond to every
violent incident by going to war. But it does oblige us to consider an
armed attack against one ally an attack against all and to respond with
such action as we deem necessary, including the use of force, to
restore the security of the North Atlantic area.
As Americans, we take our commitments seriously and we do not
extend them lightly. Mr. Chairman, you and I do not agree on
everything, but we certainly agree that any major extension of American
commitments must serve America's strategic interests.
Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
into NATO meets that test.
First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in
Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the productive paradox
at NATO's heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters
aggression. By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend
our allies, it makes it less likely our troops will ever be called upon
to do so.
Now, you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat
of armed attack today. That is true. And I would say that the purpose
of NATO enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it
in 1949: ``[NATO] is not built to stop a war after it starts, although
its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is built to stop
wars before they start.''
It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to prevent
conflict in central Europe. There are those who imply it is not. I'm
sure you have even heard a few people trot out what I call the
``consonant cluster clause,'' the myth that in times of crisis
Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant city with an
unpronounceable name, that we will protect the freedom of Strasbourg
but not Szczecin, Barcelona, but not Brno.
Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a European
power. We have an interest not only in the lands west of the Oder
river, but in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the
nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in
part because these nations were held captive. We fought World War II in
part because these nations had been invaded.
Now that these nations are free, we want them to succeed And we
want them to be safe, whether they are large or small. For if there
were a major threat to the security of their region, if we were to wake
up one morning to the sight of cities being shelled .and borders being
overrun, I am certain that we would choose to act, enlargement or no
enlargement. Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent
that kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to make that kind
of choice.
Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the test of
national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more cohesive.
The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are passionately committed to NATO and
its principles of shared responsibility. Experience has taught them to
believe in a strong American leadership role in Europe. Their forces
have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia.
Just last month, Czech soldiers joined our British allies in securing a
police station from heavily armed Bosnian Serb extremists.
Mr. Chairman, I know you have expressed concern that enlargement
could dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involving the
alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we invited only
the strongest candidates to join the Alliance. And nothing about
enlargement will change NATO's core mission, which is and will remain
the collective defense of NATO soil.
At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has always
served a political function as well. It binds our allies to us just as
it binds us to our allies. So when you consider the candidacy of the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider
this:
When peace is threatened somewhere in the world and we decide it is
in our interest to act, here are three nations we have been able to
count on to be with us. In the fight against terror and nuclear
proliferation, here are three nations we have been able to count on. In
our effort to reform the UN, here are three nations we have been able
to count on. When we speak out for human rights around the world, here
are three nations we will always be able to count on.
Here are three nations that know what it means to lose their
freedom and who will do what it takes to defend it. Here are three
democracies that are ready to do their dependable part in the common
enterprise of our alliance of democracies.
Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our
interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of central
and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align
themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their
democratic institutions. They have made sure that soldiers serve
civilians, not the other way around. They have signed 10 major accords
that taken together resolve virtually every old ethnic and border
dispute in the region, exactly the kind of disputes that might have led
to future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to join
NATO have resolved every outstanding dispute of this type.
I have been a student of central European history and I have lived
some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a
genuine friendship after centuries of enmity, when I see Poles,
Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of
suspicion, when I see Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of
mistrust, when I see central Europeans confident enough to improve
their political and economic ties with Russia, I know something
remarkable is happening.
NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did--precisely
what this Committee predicted it would do--for Europe's west after
World War II. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, to promote
integration and to create a secure environment for economic prosperity.
This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our
troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social
unrest are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without
it.
In short, a larger NATO will prevent conflict, strengthen NATO, and
protect the gains of stability and freedom in central and eastern
Europe. That is the strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if
I did not tell you that I see a moral imperative as well. For this is a
policy that should appeal to our hearts as well as to our heads, to our
sense of what is right as well as to our sense of what is smart.
NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of
North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War.
America has long stood for the proposition that this Atlantic community
should not be artificially divided and that its nations should be free
to shape their destiny. We have long argued that the nations of central
and eastern Europe belong to the same democratic family as our allies
in western Europe.
We often call them ``former communist countries,'' and that is true
in the same sense that America is a ``former British colony.'' Yes, the
Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the other side of the Iron
Curtain during the Cold War. But we were surely on the same side in the
ways that truly count.
As Americans, we should be heartened today that so many of Europe's
new democracies wish to join the institutions Americans did so much to
build. They are our friends and we should be proud to welcome them
home.
We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn
them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and
preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. It would mean
locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified democracies simply
because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact.
Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old democracies
forever, but its new democracies never? There is no acceptable,
objective answer to that question. Instead, it would probably be said
that we blocked the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia
objected. And that, in turn, could cause confidence to crumble in
central Europe, leading to a search for security by other means,
including costly arms buildups and competition among neighbors.
We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the
landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of
these nations that are so clearly important to our security are ready
and able to contribute to our security? The answer to that question is
before you today, awaiting your affirmation.
I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty voices
on both sides of this debate. There are legitimate concerns with which
we have grappled along the way, and that I expect you to consider fully
as well. Let me address a few.
First, we all want to make sure that the costs of expansion are
distributed fairly. Last February, at the behest of Congress and before
the Alliance had decided which nations to invite to membership, the
Administration made a preliminary estimate of America's share. Now that
we have settled on three candidates, we are working with our allies to
produce a common estimate by the December meeting of the North Atlantic
Council. At this point, the numbers we agree upon as 16 allies are
needed prior to any further calculations made in Washington.
I know you are holding separate hearings in which my Pentagon
colleagues will go into this question in detail. But I will say this: I
am convinced that the cost of expansion is real but affordable. I am
certain our prospective allies are willing and able to pay their share,
because in the long run it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their
forces within the alliance than outside it. As Secretary of State, I
will insist that our old allies share this burden fairly. That is what
NATO is all about.
I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger NATO
will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key fact about our
estimate is that it is premised on the current, favorable security
environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave threat were to arise, the
cost of enlargement would rise. But then so would the cost of our
entire defense budget.
In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO
democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is why the
main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and in our consultations
with our allies, needs to be on defining the level of military
capability we want our old and new allies to have in this favorable
environment, and then making sure that they commit to that level. We
must spend no more than we must, but no less than we need to keep NATO
strong.
Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it might
damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian opposition to
NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it for what it is: a
product of old misperceptions about NATO and old ways of thinking about
its former satellites in central Europe. Instead of changing our
policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage
Russia's more modern aspirations.
This means that we should remain Russia's most steadfast champion
whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining international
institutions, opening its markets and participating constructively in
world affairs. It means we should welcome Russia's decision to build a
close partnership with NATO, as we did in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a
threat, we owe it candor to say that is false--and to base our policies
on what we know to be true. When they imply that central Europe is
special, that its nations still are not free to choose their security
arrangements, we owe it to candor to say that times have changed, and
that no nation can assert its greatness at the expense of its
neighbors. We do no favor to Russian democrats and modernizers to
suggest otherwise.
I believe our approach is sound and producing results. over the
past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, reformers have
made remarkable gains in the Russian government. We have agreed to
pursue deeper arms reductions. Our troops have built a solid working
relationship on the ground in Bosnia. Russia was our full partner at
the Summit of the Eight in Denver and it has joined the Paris Club of
major international lenders.
What is more, last week in New York we signed documents that should
pave the way for the Russian Duma to ratify the START II treaty. While
this prospect is still by no means certain, it would become far less so
if we gave the Duma any reason to think it could hold up NATO
enlargement by holding up START II.
As you know Mr. Chairman, last week, NATO and Russia held the first
ministerial meeting of their Permanent Joint Council. This council
gives us an invaluable mechanism for building trust between NATO and
Russia through dialogue and transparency.
I know that some are concerned NATO's new relationship with Russia
will actually go too far. You have asked me for an affirmation, Mr.
Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council remains NATO's supreme
decision making body. Let me say it clearly: It does and it will. The
NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay
or block NATO decisions. NATO's allies will always meet to agree on
every item on their agenda before meeting with Russia. And the
relationship between NATO and Russia will grow in importance only to
the extent Russia uses it constructively.
The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate authority to
deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to
new and old members. All it does is to restate unilaterally existing
NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment,
we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons
in the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently
stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits on
conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the CFE treaty,
with central European countries and all the other signatories at the
table, and we will proceed on the principle of reciprocity.
Another important concern is that enlargement may create a new
dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the countries that
will not join in the first round. We have taken a range of steps to
ensure this does not happen.
President Clinton has pledged that the first new members will not
be the last. NATO leaders will consider the next steps in the process
of enlargement before the end of the decade. We have strengthened
NATO's Partnership for Peace program. We have created a new Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, through which NATO and its democratic
partners throughout Europe will shape the missions we undertake
together. We have made it clear that the distinction between the
nations NATO invited to join in Madrid and those it did not is based
purely on objective factors--unlike the arbitrary line that would
divide Europe if NATO stood still.
Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there is
enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. Had you seen the
crowds that cheered the President in Romania in July, had you been with
me when I spoke to the leaders of Lithuania and Slovenia, you would
have sensed how eager these nations are to redouble their efforts.
They understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new democracy
is permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy would
be permanently excluded. The most important thing the Senate can do to
reassure them now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission
of the first three candidates.
Mr. Chairman, a final concern I wish to address has to do with
Bosnia.
Some have suggested that our debate on NATO enlargement simply
cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that troubled
country. I agree with them. Both enlargement and our mission in Bosnia
are aimed at building a stable undivided Europe. Both involve NATO and
its new partners to the east.
It was our experience in Bosnia that proved the fundamental premise
of our enlargement strategy: there are still threats to peace and
security in Europe that only NATO can meet. It was in Bosnia that our
prospective allies proved they are ready to take responsibility for the
security of others. It was in Bosnia that we proved NATO and Russian
troops can work together.
We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve all its
goals, for that ultimately depends on the choices the Bosnian people
will make. But we can say that whatever may happen, NATO's part in
achieving the military goals of our mission has been a resounding
success. Whatever may happen, our interest in a larger, stronger NATO
will endure long after the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia.
We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful instrument
we have for building effective military coalitions such as SFOR. At the
same time, Bosnia does not by itself define the future of a larger
NATO. NATO's fundamental purpose is collective defense against
aggression. Its most important aim, if I can paraphrase Arthur
Vandenberg, is to prevent wars before they start so it does not have to
keep the peace after they stop.
These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to address today;
I know you have many more questions and I look forward to answering
them all.
This discussion is just beginning. I am glad that it will also
involve other committees of the Senate, the NATO Observers' Group and
the House of Representatives. Most important, I am glad it will involve
the people of the United States. For the commitment a larger NATO
entails will only be meaningful if the American people understand and
accept it.
When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I trust they
will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman. And on that day,
we will be standing on the shoulders of many.
We will be thankful to all those who prosecuted the Cold War, to
all those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who believed that the goal
of containment was to bring about the day when the enlargement of our
democratic community would be possible.
We will be grateful to all those who championed the idea of a
larger NATO--not just President Clinton, or President Havel, or
President Walesa, but members of Congress from both parties who voted
for resolutions urging the admission of these three nations. we will
owe a debt to the Republican members who made NATO enlargement part of
their Contract with America.
Today, all of our allies and future allies are watching you for one
simple reason. The American Constitution is unique in the power it
grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy, especially over
treaties. In this matter, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, you
and the American people you represent are truly in the driver's seat.
That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe and
telling our allies: ``This is what we want to do, but ultimately, it
will be up to our Senate and our people to decide.'' I say that with
pride because it tells them something about America's faith in the
democratic process.
But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as well. I
believe we will stand together, Mr. Chairman, when the time comes for
the Senate to decide, because I know that the policy we ask you to
embrace is a policy that the Administration and Congress shaped
together, and because I am certain that it advances the fundamental
interests of the United States.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for a very
eloquent statement. It will be written about and talked about
for some time because this is an important subject. It is an
important milestone in not only the history of this country,
but the world.
We are going to have a round of 6-minute questions by each
Senator, and I hope that they will not be taken up by
statements up until 10 seconds before the red light comes on
and therefore give you a chance to answer.
Reports that NATO intends to consult with Russia on such
fundamental matters as the military strategy and nuclear
doctrine of the alliance have caused a great concern among a
great many leaders of our country, past and present. They, you
better believe, are contacting me with suggestions.
Now, how can NATO consult with Russia on these and other
matters without compromising the security or decisionmaking
process of NATO?
I guess that leads to a second question. Will you establish
fire walls in NATO's relations with Russia and assure that
Russia has neither a voice nor a veto in NATO discussions of
issues such as arms control, strategic doctrine, and further
alliance expansion? A pretty hefty question but I know you can
handle it.
Secretary Albright. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, we are pleased with the development of the
NATO-Russia relationship to date. We believe that the NATO-
Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council it created
offers real opportunities to develop a partnership between NATO
and Russia through regular consultations and activities to
build practical cooperation.
I have been very pleased with the early work of that
council, including its first ministerial meeting in New York on
September 26th, and I think that in many ways that was quite a
remarkable meeting in starting this process out. I believe that
these elements of the NATO-Russia relationship, together with
our bilateral efforts to integrate Russia more fully into the
rest of the West, are beginning to bear fruit.
At the same time, let me be very clear about your concern.
The Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council created as a
result do not provide Russia any role in decisions the alliance
takes on internal matters, the way NATO organizes itself,
conducts its business, or plans, prepares for and conducts
those missions which affect only its members, such as
collective defense, as stated under Article 5.
The Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in which
NATO's basic strategy doctrine and readiness are negotiated
with Russia, nor will NATO use the Permanent Joint Council as a
substitute for formal arms control negotiations such as the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.
Consistent with our past approach to relations with Russia,
NATO will continue to explain to Russia its general policy on a
full range of issues, including its basic military doctrine and
defense policies. Such explanation will not extend to a level
of detail that could in any way compromise the effectiveness of
NATO's military forces. Such explanations will only be
offered--and I state this very emphatically--after NATO has
first set its policies on issues affecting internal matters.
NATO has not and will not discuss these issues with Russia
prior to making decisions within the North Atlantic Council.
Now, further, the Permanent Joint Council operates by
mutual agreement, which means both NATO and Russia must agree
to discuss an issue in the first place. NATO's policy always
will first be established by consensus requiring all allies'
agreement. Moreover, NATO is not required to discuss any issue.
The Founding Act is a political commitment, not a legal
document. The U.S., thus, will always retain the ability to
prevent the Permanent Joint Council from discussing any issue
which it does not want addressed for whatever reason within
that forum.
So, let me just reemphasize. I can assure you that the
Permanent Joint Council will never be used to make decisions on
NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness. The North Atlantic
Council is NATO's supreme decisionmaking body, and it is
sacrosanct. Russia will not play a part in the NAC or NATO
decisionmaking and it will never have a veto over NATO policy.
Any discussion with Russia of NATO doctrine will be for
explanatory, not decisionmaking, purposes.
But I also would like to state, Mr. Chairman, that I think
we will find the Permanent Joint Council a very useful
mechanism for having discussions with Russia on issues of
mutual interest. If the first meeting that we just held in New
York is an example of it, I look forward to seeing that as a
very useful mechanism as we develop our relationship with a
democratic Russia.
The Chairman. Very quickly because the yellow light is on.
That is a good answer to my questions and I appreciate it.
Have our allies met the current defense obligations to
which they have committed themselves as members of NATO?
Secretary Albright. Yes, they have. We are all part of how
we burden-share in terms of allotments for NATO. As you know,
there are really two parts to the NATO budget. There are common
budgets for which there are assessments, and then each country
provides within its defense budget to live up to its
obligations under NATO. I believe that they are doing so and I
also believe that they will do so as we go through developing
the processes for the payment of the enlargement.
The Chairman. Very well.
Our distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I have had the occasion now--it seems a
little premature--to debate this subject in different fora with
several of my colleagues who oppose the expansion of NATO, most
recently before a group of chief executive officers and opinion
leaders from one of our States who were here in town.
There have also been closed meetings that Senator Roth and
I have set up in the Senate's NATO Observer Group where our
colleagues come in and state their support, opposition, or
concern.
It seems to be coming down to a pretty basic thing. It is
kind of ironic. The only thing that seems to be carrying the
momentum right now in the minds of many of my colleagues and
the American people is the moral imperative, and that is that
Poland and particularly Hungary and the Czech Republic were
left behind the curtain. the curtain is up. Now is the time to
let them come to the west from the east.
But there's very little knowledge--I should not say
knowledge--there is very little consensus about why this is in
the vital interest of the United States. Very few people
believe that adding, as brave and as valiant as they may be,
the Polish army and the Czech army and the Hungarian army to
NATO is any more likely to make them sleep more safely in
Peoria than they sleep today.
I am going to recite the arguments I hear very briefly, and
then stop and ask you to comment because they are the essence
of what we are going to have to answer in order to prevail.
You indicate that the American people will eventually agree
with NATO expansion. I think there is only one lesson I take
away from the Vietnam War and that is that a foreign policy, no
matter how well or poorly constructed, cannot be maintained
without the informed consent of the American people. Right now
there is not informed consent.
Right now, if you ask the American people if they think
there is a need for NATO, if they like spending $120 billion a
year, or whatever allocation we would conclude is warranted by
our NATO membership, I suspect you would find them saying the
same thing I hear from my colleagues. Why cannot Europe do
this? Why not leave well enough alone?
If we expand, the alliance will lose its vitality. As one
of my senior colleagues on the Armed Services Committee said in
a debate I recently had with him ``if it ain't broke, don't fix
it.''
If you expand it, you are going to diminish consensus. We
have a hard enough time getting 16 nations to agree now. Expand
it by three or more nations and it is going to even be more
difficult to obtain consensus. You are going to do what was
done 300 years ago in Poland when the princes got together and
each had a veto. You are going to allow the basic structure to
crumble.
These are the arguments that I keep hearing, but the root
argument is as follows. Look at Europe. As one of our
colleagues says, of the six largest armies in the world, five
are in Asia. Our economic future lies in Asia. We have a
disproportionate allocation of our resources in Europe. Why are
we doing this?
It comes down, in my view, to the need to answer the
following question, and then I will cease when I ask it,--why
cannot the Europeans take care of themselves? Their GDP is
larger than ours. Their population is larger than ours. As my
father said in a different context to me, not since the Roman
army invaded Europe and quelled the pagans has there been an
occupying army that stayed in place as long as we have been
required to stay in place in Europe. Why?
I believe you and the President in particular are going to
have to carry that argument to the people, an answer to that
question. Why can Europe not do this themselves? Why do we have
to be involved?
I think I am like that old joke about the Texan who says he
does not know much about art, but he knows what he likes. I
feel firmly I know the answer to why we have to be involved,
but I think until it is explained to the American people, we
are going to have this shadow debate about a lot of things
other than why the Europeans cannot do this by themselves. Why
do we need to be in Europe?
Secretary Albright. Senator Biden, I think that that is a
key question that we have to answer. Let me just say here that
one has to really hark to history.
First of all, as both you and the chairman said, our
history is tied to the history of Europe, even before,
obviously, the 20th century. Our values and a great deal of our
history comes from Europe and strategically Europe is key to
the United States in terms of its population, its economy, its
geostrategic structure.
But let me also say that what is evident because of those
aspects, we have found that when we have not paid attention to
Europe ultimately because those elements are so strong, we are
drawn into dealing with Europe's problems, always at a much
greater cost than would have been the case in the first place.
I believe very strongly that this is a very smart
additional preventive measure because history has shown us that
we will go into Europe when we see massive wars that involve
people that we are very closely related to, and when it
involves our economic and strategic interests.
Now, we are not an occupying power in Europe. We are a
partner, and the point of this is that NATO does in fact bind
us to Europe in a way that keeps us there as an invited partner
and not as an occupying power. I believe that if we do not stay
there now, and say ``let the Europeans do it,'' history will
show us that we will be back and we will be back at much
greater cost than if we were to do it now at a lesser cost as a
partner rather than as someone that has to go dig them out of a
mess.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Albright, in my judgment the NATO enlargement
debate has thus far largely ignored the central question of
NATO's basic purpose. The Senate's ratification debate over new
alliance members should start with that question, and I commend
Chairman Helms for focusing on that theme in this committee's
initial hearing.
Many of us within the Congress and the administration have
been working hard to ensure ratification of the admission of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, perhaps too busy to
define NATO's purpose. But issues associated with purpose and
burden sharing will come up in the ratification proceedings.
The answers will be key to the ratification, but also for the
future of NATO.
First, the absence of a clearly defined and understood
purpose can complicate the implementation of enlargement by
making it appear as if the alliance's exclusive mission is to
defend its members against some future, yet ill-defined threat
from the east.
While not insignificant, such a preoccupation could in turn
focus allied militaries on the wrong problem, particularly if
major strategic threats to the United States and its allies are
elsewhere.
Second, the act of enlargement is becoming confused with
the alliance's reason for existence, and the issue of future
additional members could either cause further delay in
addressing NATO's core purpose or be delayed by inadequate
definition of the alliance's core missions.
Third, the alliance force planning goals and programs must
be based on a military strategy which must, in turn, be shaped
by strategic purpose. Adequate defense spending in the
modernization and restructuring of outdated forces will not
occur in the absence of strategic purpose.
Fourth, the United States' strategy and technology are
driven by global priorities, while European forces are focused
on territorial defense and thus are largely irrelevant to U.S.
priorities. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review does not
substantially take account of NATO, Europe, or the allies in
U.S. global strategy and requirements. In short, adjudged by
the QDR, America's main alliance is not confronting the main
security problems of the United States.
Despite alliance emphasis on defense of its members'
territory under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and peace
operations and crisis management under Article 4, NATO is in
need of strategic direction. This should be accomplished before
or in parallel with further decisions about forces, command
structure, and membership.
To oversimplify, I believe there are at least two strategic
alternatives that could drive the alliance's core purpose.
The first is for NATO to be the guarantor of European
security, and thus NATO's mission is identified with a European
mission and should dovetail with Europe's danger.
The second is for NATO to serve as the vehicle by which
Americans and Europeans protect their common interests wherever
challenged. While it subsumes the first, it also suggests that
the Atlantic Alliance can and should confront the rising
threats to the interest of members beyond Europe. Geography is
the chief criteria of the first strategy. Interests are what
matter in the second.
These two strategic alternatives point toward quite
different futures and may suggest different approaches to
future enlargement to further encourage other engagement of PFP
partners to burden sharing, to structuring forces and commands.
Secretary Albright, where does the administration stand on
the definition of our strategic alternatives and what strategic
direction or rationale will it promote within the alliance?
Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, let me say that there
are two parts to the answer to this question.
First of all, clearly the basic original objective of NATO,
which was a collective defense treaty to deal with Europe,
continues to be in place and in fact is adapted in order to
deal with the changing security environment and obviously the
change that has taken place with the end of the cold war. There
have been studies that have been undertaken internally in order
to adapt the strategic concept of NATO to the more current
threats that it faces.
If I might say, to dovetail on a point that Senator Biden
made, that those who say it ain't broke, don't fix it, the
truth is it ain't suitable for what we are doing now. So, it
needs to be fixed. Europe looks very different, and I would ask
you to review what I said in my opening statement: What would
happen if we did not adapt NATO and enlarge it? Because
otherwise, we would be dealing with the past instead of dealing
with the future.
At the same time, Senator, I do think that there has been
an incredible amount of creativity in terms of developing
institutional structures such as the EAPC or the Partnership
for Peace that allows us to look at how to use an enlarged NATO
or a NATO along with subsidiary organs to deal with
peacekeeping, and to deal with the potential threats from some
of the rogue states. I find what is going on is a very good
exercise in creativity with substantial backing from strategic
thinkers in terms of how to use what is the best military
alliance in the history of the world to deal with the new
threats, both geographically and the ones that you mentioned.
That process is going on. These are not two mutually exclusive
goals.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Madam Secretary, I want to join with my
colleagues in welcoming you before the committee. As everyone
has indicated, this is the beginning of an extended process to
examine carefully this issue.
I want to get some sense at the outset about the path that
we will be placed upon and where it will lead and what the
timing is, as we move forward. So, I would like first to just
get a sense of the parameters of the timing. How do you see
that unfolding?
Secretary Albright. Well, Senator, as of right now, we are
dealing both with our allies and the invitees to develop what
would be their defense plans and the budget that goes with it.
We would hope that by December there would be the NAC
ministerial at which the accession protocols would be signed.
Then our plan would be to submit the treaty to you formally and
have, in fact, the official debate going on. At the same time,
there would be a ratification debate going on in the
parliaments of the other NATO members. Then we would be able
to, in fact, have the new NATO, the enlarged NATO, at the 50th
anniversary in 1999.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, is the December meeting of the North
Atlantic Council the meeting at which you expect approval of
the entry of the three countries into NATO?
Secretary Albright. From the perspective that they have the
power to do that, the accession protocols would be signed.
Obviously, it is not final until this is ratified and goes
through the constitutional processes of each individual
country.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, at that point, will the burden of
the cost be outlined, or will that be something to be developed
later?
Secretary Albright. No. The plan is that the comprehensive
NATO and cost report would be approved by the NATO ministers in
December.
Now, I have to stress again, as I stressed in my statement,
those are to do with the costs in the current environment. They
would have been worked out as a result of very careful work
among the allies, as well as what is going on now, Senator
Sarbanes, in terms of our people going around talking with the
three invitees about developing their specific defense plans.
Senator Sarbanes. I am having some difficulty in
understanding why the 50th anniversary of either the Congress'
approval of the Marshall Plan or the entry into force of the
Marshall Plan is relevant as a date by which this process ought
to move. I wonder if you could enlighten me on that.
Secretary Albright. Well, we have been celebrating the 50th
anniversary of everything.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I understand that.
Secretary Albright. Are you suggesting, Senator----
Senator Sarbanes. I take it that is about the only
rationale for it.
Secretary Albright. We believe, Senator, that the debates
will be going on in the various parliaments. We want to give
the publics a chance to really be a part of the debate. We
would like to be early on in the ratification process because
we are the United States and provide the leadership. We thought
it would be a nice time, but it could be earlier if everyone
were ready to go.
Senator Sarbanes. I take it once that process is completed,
then the immediate issue before us, as we are moving down this
path, would be the accession to NATO of other countries which
are seeking to become members. Would that be correct?
Secretary Albright. We have said that it is an ongoing
process. We have not specifically set a date for the next
tranche, and we will be considering new members. We had said
hypothetically that it could take place after these members
were full members, which is where we had put it in 1999.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, is it not reasonable to assume that
once these members are dealt with, that that issue will then be
immediately before us?
Secretary Albright. It is reasonable to assume that. I
think that there are countries that wish to be considered in
the next tranche. There are those that we would like to be
looking at that are, as part of the Partnership for Peace
process, already very much involved with what we are doing. We
are setting up relationships with those countries. So, this is
an ongoing process, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, that would encompass not only, say,
the two that were considered at Madrid, Romania and Slovenia,
but I take it other eastern European countries, would it not?
Secretary Albright. We have said that all those countries
that met the criteria and the guidelines, are eligible. NATO is
open to all democracies and market systems which can show a
real dedication to the development of democratic institutions
which include civilian control over the military, and which can
add to the security of NATO. We would not even consider other
countries that could not contribute generally to the
enhancement of NATO. That is the basis on which these three
were invited, and that would be the basis on which others would
be considered.
The Chairman. The able Senator from Nebraska.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Secretary Albright, thank you for taking time this morning
and for your testimony.
As you mentioned in your statement--and I think your
statement, Secretary Albright, is a good beginning to this
debate, but you mentioned clearly that NATO expansion is
interconnected. It is connected to many variables, many
interests, economic, trade, national security, Bosnia, Middle
East, Caspian Sea, and others.
Is the President of the United States going to set out a
clear visionary comprehensive foreign policy so that this
Congress, the American people, the world can understand what it
is that he thinks is important as we move into the next
century, including NATO expansion? How does that fit together?
Will that be forthcoming?
Secretary Albright. Well, Senator, I believe that all along
we are giving speeches, as is the President, about the
direction of our foreign policy. He has made a number of
statements already. He obviously will continue to do so as will
the rest of us.
We are in a period, I think, that is more exciting than any
that I have witnessed in terms of the possibility of putting
all those pieces together and explaining to the American public
what our national interests are and what the stake of each
American is in all those issues that you have raised. Yes, the
President will be speaking out, as will the rest of us.
Senator Hagel. On Bosnia, which you alluded to and did
mention that obviously Bosnia has in effect, will continue to
have in effect, as we debate NATO expansion, could you give us
an update at this point? Where are we in Bosnia? What is our
course of action? When do we look at pulling some troops out,
leaving some behind? Where might they be left? Where? Whatever
you can give us in regard to Bosnia.
Secretary Albright. Yes. Senator, I think it is very
interesting. Bosnia has obviously been very much on our minds
in the last couple of years, and often we focus too much on the
negative aspect of the fact that the situation has not been
totally resolved.
I would prefer to focus on the positive, which is that if
we go back 3 or 4 years, there were hundreds of thousands of
people dying. It was impossible for any of us to feel that we
were doing the right thing in terms of ethnic cleansing. There
were refugees not only throughout the Balkans, but throughout
Europe, and there was a question about the survival of the
whole region.
Thanks to the resolute action of the United States, led by
President Clinton, we have in fact been able to reverse the
tide and not only reverse the tide but take some very positive
actions.
First of all, there is a development of the centralized
institutions within the federation where they are moving more
and more to those central institutions. We have had municipal
elections. New elections have now been scheduled in Republika
Srpska for November. We have managed to see the return of
refugees. There has been a real change in terms of the economic
reconstruction. War criminals are going to the Hague. As we
know, we had 10 of them that the Croats have turned over, and
we see a genuine change.
The President has stated, as have I and Sandy Berger, that
we see the SFOR mission ending in June 1998. But clearly there
will be a need for continued international presence in Bosnia,
and that is evident in terms of an economic and political
presence. We will have to see what kind of a security presence
will be needed after that time, and that discussion has not
taken place either in NATO or for us specifically. That is what
we are turning our attention to now.
But after a large review of our Bosnia policy last year, I
do believe that we have new momentum and that we have done a
great deal to improve the situation for the Bosnian people and
ultimately, therefore, for the United States because it is in
our national interest that there not be instability in the
Balkans.
Senator Hagel. One additional comment and I would be very
interested in your thoughts on this, Madam Secretary.
It seems to me, although I was barely around 50 years ago,
that one of the reasons that NATO has been such a great success
is because the leaders at the time had very clear vision that
called upon the best of our people worldwide, certainly in
America, and they were able to articulate that and express that
in not just a grand vision but a realistic vision that called
upon the best that we as a people, as a Nation, had and as a
community of nations.
I would hope that the President will be very engaged in
this debate because it is very clear that his personal
commitment and leadership is going to be critical to whatever
happens here. He, as you suggest, has a tremendous opportunity,
one of the few opportunities in history, to really put a print
on the future for the world.
Secretary Albright. I was 10 years old, but I was on the
other side of this. I have to tell you, if I might, Mr.
Chairman, take a minute. I was living in Czechoslovakia at the
time and it was left out of NATO because there was a communist
coup and the Soviets had liberated Czechoslovakia and it was
not allowed to be in this great Western alliance that was there
to save the West. It did take the leadership of a lot of people
in the United States to finally realize that in order to stop
the slide toward communism, it was essential for the American
people, with our European allies, to draw the line. It took a
great deal of work by President Truman and by your predecessors
and by my predecessors.
I hope very much that that same kind of dedication takes
place now, and I can assure you that President Clinton and the
administration is fully with this. I know from listening to all
of you--and the fact that we have started this now--that we do
have that kind of commitment and partnership in examining the
questions in 1997 as they were examined in 1948.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I am obliged to acknowledged that I was not
barely around 50 years ago.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was here but I was not concentrating on these particular
matters at that precise moment in history.
I join you and other members of this committee in thanking
the Secretary for coming and being with us this morning and
thank her for her leadership.
I might observe, if I may, that a distinguished colleague
and my senior Senator from Virginia, who is the Ranking
Republican Member on the Armed Services Committee, has joined
us this morning. I do not recall recently having had the
privilege of his visit on this particular committee before,
although we both serve on the other committee. I do not know
whether he is going to join the questioning or not, but I am
delighted that he could join us.
Madam Secretary, let me just ask a couple of process
questions or timing questions that are follow up on questions
that have already been asked in part this morning.
One of the questions has to do with the basic criteria. You
indicated in your statement that no new democracy would be
permanently excluded from NATO membership, but we are not,
understandably, precise as to exactly how long that whole
process might be open and inclusive.
I wonder if you could indicate what your thinking is, at
least at the moment, with respect to additional accessions.
Will it be based strictly on the criteria that have been
established?
Will it be based on concerns about collective security?
Will it be based on concerns about threat assessments or
circumstances as they exist at that particular time?
Will it be based in part on the success both politically
and as a matter of creating a more stable relationship of the
first three accessions or the invitees that presumably will be
formally accepted sometime in the near future?
Secretary Albright. Senator, I think that what we have
based ourselves on as a guiding principle here is that in
enlarging NATO, we do not wish to diminish its effectiveness.
As we look at new members, we have to keep in mind that what is
prime for us is to maintain the cohesiveness of NATO and have
those that join it be contributors to its strength rather than
to draw on it and to detract from it. So, that is a guiding
principle.
At the same time, we have made very clear that enlargement
is not a one-time event, that this is a process and that we
have to have a robust open-door policy in principle, but
maintain a certain amount of flexibility and nonspecificity as
we move forward on this.
I think, as I stated to Senator Sarbanes, we agreed that
NATO will review the process in 1999. We have made no decisions
or formal commitments regarding future members. We are going to
be using the same guidelines as we did for the invitations to
these three current members.
Now, obviously the circumstances at the time will be part
of what we are looking at, but it is our belief that what needs
to be the guiding principle is to maintain the cohesiveness and
strength of NATO and have the new members be additions to that
central goal.
Senator Robb. Given the criteria that you have suggested
and the ultimate ability for any democratic state, if they meet
the criteria and whatever other matters will be considered by
the member nations in NATO at the time, what would you assess
is the prospect for the ultimate accession of, say, the Baltic
states?
Secretary Albright. Well, I think that again we will have
to look at it as we move forward and make an assessment as to
how the situation is evolving and what the first round has
brought us. But let me specifically address myself to the
Baltic states.
We are taking a number of steps in order to ensure that the
Baltic states are more and more enveloped in European
institutions and that they are a part of an evolution that
makes them a part of what we are doing in knitting them in. So,
for instance, we have done more in terms of knitting them into
Baltic organizations in northeastern Europe. We are founding
members of a new group called the BALTSEA which does better
coordinated donor military assistance. We are also promoting
closer ties with Nordic states, as well as coordinating efforts
to promote cooperation between northern Europe and northern
Russia. We are encouraging the Baltic states in terms of EU
membership. We are working very hard, I think, to make sure
that they are very much a part of what we are doing.
But the major statement, Senator, is that NATO is open to
all democracies that meet those guidelines that we have been
talking about. It is not closed to anyone and there is a
process in train, but I am not going to predict specifically
what the next group of countries will be.
Senator Robb. I can understand about not wanting to address
the question of timing, but clearly for those who have some
hopes and aspirations for those states, that is precisely not
ruled out.
Secretary Albright. Absolutely.
Senator Robb. Thank you.
I had another question. My time is expired, however. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
I think all of us welcome the distinguished chairman of the
Rules Committee.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I enjoy sitting, where else? To his right on
the Rules Committee.
Senator Ashcroft.
Senator Ashcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I thank you for appearing before us.
You have stated today that there are no parts of Europe
that face immediate threat and you indicate that one of the
things we need to do is to enlarge NATO and to adapt NATO.
Obviously, the NATO enlargement is the subject of the
discussion.
Will the adaptation of NATO require us to restate the
purposes of the organizing documents in some way or is the
adaptation somehow within the limits of the purposes as stated
in the document?
Secretary Albright. We believe that it is within the
purposes of the document, a collective defense agreement.
Senator Ashcroft. In terms of collective defense, I'm
interested in what Senator Lugar mentioned. Defense seems to be
geographic, at least to defend the soil of those nations that
are members. Senator Lugar talked about pursuing the interests
of the member nations.
Do you see the adapted NATO and the enlarged NATO as
pursuing the interests of member states, as well as defending
the soil of those countries?
Secretary Albright. I do because I think that as I
mentioned to him, I think that there are increasing interests
out of area that the NATO countries themselves agree to pursue.
They are looking at ways to pursue the interests in a way that
is commensurate with the way that they define them. So, it is
not overreaching. On the other hand, there are threats that are
different from the original founding that in fact can be
subsumed in the way that the treaty is currently outlined.
Senator Ashcroft. Your use of the phrase ``out of area'' in
your response is instructive to me. I believe we see an out-of-
area deployment in Bosnia. How wide-ranging would you
anticipate out-of-area deployments might become under an
enlarged NATO? For instance, would you see them extending as
far as the Pacific Rim in the event our interests were
challenged there? Or would you define it as maybe extending to
the subcontinent of Asia? Or would you see us as having
potential out-of-area deployments in Africa, for example?
I guess then the thrust of my question is, if NATO becomes
an organization which addresses the interests of NATO nations
wherever they might take place, is it to be a sort of limited
U.N. that doesn't require quite as much consensus, or could you
comment about the potential limits? What would be beyond the
limit of a NATO which is to respond to the interests of members
sates rather than NATO's historical purpose of defending the
European democracies? Is there anyplace in the world to which
NATO troops might not be assigned?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, while I have said
it is the prime military alliance of our time, it is not the
only military arrangement that exists. The NATO Council
operates by consensus and we are obviously not just one but I
think people see us as a senior partner within the North
Atlantic Council. I think that the definition of how far it
would go is obviously based on that kind of a discussion.
But let me say what I have been particularly impressed by,
Senator, in the last couple of years is the creativity of the
international community in terms of dealing with nonspecific
threats that we had not heard about before. So, there are a
variety of ways that issues can be dealt with.
In the Pacific, we have just published new guidelines in
our dealings with Japan. We have a whole different way of
dealing with issues.
Without making any kind of a statement that rules anybody
in or out that might cause us problems later on, I would like
to underline the fact that what is interesting about this era
is the variety of ways that coalitions of the willing can be
formed where there is a core group and then there are ways to
deal with the problem where others join. The Partnership for
Peace is now viewed as a very creative way of dealing with
issues.
Senator Ashcroft. I think I am hearing you say that the
NATO Council's willingness to agree would be the only limit in
terms of our ability to enlist the aid of individuals pursuing
our interests somewhere else in the world.
Secretary Albright. Not only that, but obviously
constitutional processes of each of the countries is also
involved. While we always talk about NATO as triggering this
Article 5 where an attack on one is an attack on all, there are
different ways to grade whatever the threat has been and the
way that a country responds to it in which our constitutional
processes are the determinative factor.
Senator Ashcroft. I would like to raise one other issue. I
see the yellow light is on.
I am a little bit concerned about our relationships with
Russia. I think to allow enlargement, without understanding our
relationship to Russia in the context of it, would be in error,
and I am sure you are doing that.
But in one sense it seems like we are isolating a potential
ally in Russia. We are telling them that you are not a part of
the European or western oriented group of nations, and that
troubles me, particularly when it appears to me that the
administration is beginning to, while isolating a potential
ally, embrace a new threat--the People's Republic of China--
particularly the administration's consideration of allowing
nuclear cooperation with China.
I suppose the other hearings will afford opportunities to
address these issues, but I think we need to be careful, having
won the cold war against the Russians, not to turn them from
Europe and an orientation to the west.
Secretary Albright. If I might.
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Albright. On the contrary. I believe that what we
have managed here is to do a very important balance by, on the
one hand, asking Russia to join us in the NATO-Russia Founding
Act which allows them, as I mentioned in my remarks and also in
answer to Chairman Helms, a way to be part of a discussion
about issues of mutual interest. At the same time, this will
leave the door open to them and make it very clear that the new
NATO is not directed against them.
So, I feel very strongly that while we need to maintain
NATO as a guard against any potential resurgence, at the same
time we have walked this line very carefully in terms of not
isolating a new Russia from a new Europe and a new NATO.
The question about China, sir, is that we are very careful
in our dealings with China, in terms of having a multi-faceted
relationship with them, and making sure that they are part of
what we are trying to accomplish, which is a regime that does
not allow proliferation of any weapons of mass destruction. It
is important for us to engage with China also in a way that
does not isolate them as a huge power as we move into the 21st
century.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, it is good to see you again. You look
wonderful, none the worse for wear.
Secretary Albright. Love my job.
Senator Feinstein. Well, that helps.
Let me follow up on Senator Ashcroft's questions. My
concern about NATO is twofold. One is Russia and the second is
the cost item. Let me talk just for a moment about Russia.
I for one see a kind of growing instability there. I see an
increasing problem with proliferation, certainly a dramatic
impact in Iran and Iraq with that proliferation. Some have said
that there might be a response by Russia to NATO, by Russia's
trying to develop an alliance down south with those countries.
I do not know whether that is correct or not.
But when you see Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's comments too
on the subject that developments in Russia could take an
ominous turn. He says, I am not afraid that Poland or Hungary
or anyone else will be within NATO. It is not so dangerous for
Russia. The thing I am worried about is Russia and what might
happen in Russia and nothing else. End quote.
I think as we watch some of these events, I for one see his
point. I also recognize that START II is pending before the
Russian Duma. It would be hopeful for its ratification soon. I
would like your comment on that, and then whether promise
negotiations for a START III might be able to ease some of
this. But I think politically what happens in Russia as a
product of this is a potentially very dangerous thing. I would
like you to explore that a little further, if you would.
Secretary Albright. Senator, clearly one of the major
assignments that we have is managing the devolution of the
Soviet empire and creating a positive relationship with the new
Russia. I think we all see that as one of the major priorities
of this administration.
There have been all kinds of statements about how we were
moving with NATO enlargement how it was going to undercut our
relationship with Russia. It simply has not happened.
First of all, let me say Russia does not like NATO
enlargement. There is no question about that, and every time
that I meet with Foreign Minister Primakov or President Clinton
meets with President Yeltsin or Vice President Gore meets with
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, that point is made clear.
Nevertheless, it has not harmed us in terms of an ongoing
relationship with them. As I mentioned, the permanent Joint
Council meeting went very well. I have had extensive meetings
with Foreign Minister Primakov dealing with a whole host of
issues that we deal with on a mutual basis.
I also think that those who have predicted that NATO
enlargement would give solace to the hard-line members within
Russia have been wrong also. The process there in terms of
democratization is moving forward. I think we are seeing some
advances in their movement toward a market economy. It is not
without its problems, but it is not due to NATO enlargement. It
is due to very serious issues involved in the transformation of
that society, and our continued relationship with them and our
ability to support the reform process is something that we must
make sure continues.
On START, I was very pleased that while I was in New York
last week, I was able to sign a protocol to START II with
Foreign Minister Primakov which is going to make it possible
for them to move START II in the Duma. The Defense Minister and
the Foreign Minister now together have gone to the Duma pushing
for START II ratification. So, we are hopeful on that. They are
going to take up the CWC Treaty first, but they are going to
move on that in the next 4 or 5 weeks we have been told. I am
hopeful on that, too.
We have said that START III talks would begin after START
II goes into effect, but there are already expert talks that
are going on and there is a team in Russia right now that is
following up on a lot of these decisions.
So, I think that we are moving along well, not without
problems, but I think we have to understand that the dire
predictions about the end of the world if NATO enlarged are not
coming true. I ask you all to look at the kinds of statements
that Foreign Minister Primakov has been making when we sign
these protocols or the kind of discussion we had in the
Permanent Joint Council. So, the process is moving forward and
we have to support the reformers in Russia.
Senator Feinstein. Quickly on the subject of cost. With the
opening cost being between $27 billion and $35 billion, with
France's recalcitrance, and the limited means of the European
Union monetarily, how is this money going to get paid and will
it be paid?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, as I said, we are
now going through the process of determining what the cost
actually will be under the current environment. The NATO allies
have committed themselves--they did in Madrid--to paying the
cost, and we are going to make sure that they do. We will pay
our share and they will pay their share.
I think for them this is a domestic question--whether they
reallocate their defense resources in other ways; but they have
made a commitment to pay for the cost of enlargement.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, the Senator who will question you has a
fan club in North Carolina. He is the only Senator, past or
present, maybe not future, who has done heart transplants. He
flies his own jet plane, and he has done transplants I
understand at every major hospital in North Carolina and
probably all the other 49 States as well. Dr. Frist.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I join my colleagues in thanking you for
your forthright comments today.
I want to turn and shift the focus a little bit on
expectations of the various parties that are involved and what
visions that they have. Undoubtedly, the singularity of mission
has been the glue which in the past has bonded NATO members
together so effectively since the creation of the alliance.
However, we all now recognize that that bond and singularity of
purpose created by the Soviet threat has largely dissolved.
As we face the challenges of maintaining that alliance and
at the same time redefining that common bond, something that
concerns me in this or any other multilateral obligation is the
difference in expectations of each of the parties, both
currently at the table and coming to the table.
The United States seems to believe that NATO can and should
continue to maintain its original mission of mutual defense and
include whatever necessary changes there might be to meet new
evolving European demands.
As indicated in remarks in Madrid in July, at least some of
our main European partners view such a mission and a level of
commitment as either too costly or unnecessary in the current
environment and that a more loosely defined security should be
the mission of the alliance.
The incoming European countries with Soviet domination and
presence clearly in their minds, really having had Soviet
troops on their soil just a few years in the past, have an
understandably even different expectation of NATO, especially
how it will relate to membership in the European Union.
I ask you to comment on these different visions and these
different expectations and ask whether you think such different
visions among the members and the potential members create an
internal tension which the alliance simply has never had to
address in the past, and then beyond that, how you see such
differences in expectations affecting the alliance.
Secretary Albright. Well, I think you have stated a very
interesting proposition, but I am not sure that I totally agree
with it. I think that the discussions that I have participated
in and witnessed regarding our current NATO allies is that they
are dedicated to the NATO they have seen and frankly are also
proponents of enlargement. Otherwise, we would not have it.
When we were in Madrid, I think our internal discussions
there showed a basic dedication to the original purpose of NATO
and the fact that it should be expanded to cover a certain
number of countries. The discussion we had was whether it
should not cover more. There is no one that is now arguing that
it should not have expanded.
I think what I have again found so interesting about the
NATO alliance is its creativity in adapting itself and looking
at how to restructure itself internally as well as look at what
a new strategic concept is, and we are going through that
process.
As far as the new allies are concerned, I think there is no
doubt that they see membership in NATO in terms of the
possibility of being in the world that was denied them in the
first place, as the chairman was saying, the promise of the end
of the Second World War that they were cut out of. They do see
that as a way of rejoining the West that they belong to.
President Havel, who was in Washington on Friday getting the
Fulbright Statesman Award, spoke, as is always his way, very
movingly about what this means to come back to the West.
At the same time, I think they do see it as an important
security structure, one, within the original context, and two,
as a way that is an impetus to them to deal with their current
instabilities, the instability that we are trying to guard
against: The problems that we see in Europe of ethnic conflict,
of instability created as a result of that, and the fact that
it has driven many of them to signing agreements with people
and groups that they would never have imagined doing, as I
mentioned in my statements, Hungarians and Romanians.
So, they see it as a return to where they ought to be, but
also a way of dealing with what they see as their security
problems, not unlike I think what the original NATO group also
sees.
Senator Frist. Thank you. The expectations issue is one
that I hope to continue to explore in our future hearings, but
thank you for setting that foundation for me.
We have mentioned Bosnia a couple of times and let me just
go back because of my own mind. The U.S. has set next July as a
date certain for withdrawal of at least our ground forces in
Bosnia. Consequently our European allies have said that should
the United States leave, withdraw, they too would withdraw. As
you pointed out in your statement earlier, the implications for
Bosnia are clear.
Bosnia stands what realistically could be called the first
test of an expanded or new mission of NATO, that is,
peacekeeping or peacemaking beyond the borders of its members.
Should this specific point of withdrawal become one of the
major contentions between us and our allies? And if so, what
are the implications for the so-called new NATO, and what
implications are there for defining this mission?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, I think there has
been a meeting now in Maastricht where some of the discussion
started in terms of how we all operate together as we look at
Bosnia in the future. Let me just say not so parenthetically
here that as we begin to think about this decision, obviously
we will be consulting very closely with all of you.
I think that what we have seen is that Bosnia in many ways
has been a very good example of how NATO countries can work
with non-NATO countries and how there can be the possibility of
dealing with the kinds of destabilizing conflicts within a new
context. I would imagine--I would hope in fact--that we would
look at the lessons of Bosnia as we think about future
missions, both positively and negatively, and try to see how
NATO and NATO in coordination with Partnership for Peace
countries and a wider alliance can in fact deal with different
kinds of new threats.
These two discussions are obviously going to intersect and
we welcome that. I think that it is important for us to see
that they are on parallel tracks. We cannot equate the
discussions, but they will be intersecting here and in Europe.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.
I can very honestly and truthfully say that quite often I
have a real clear view about issues and know where I stand, and
on this question I am really quite undecided. I would like to
give you just a little bit of context and then put at least one
question to you.
My father was born in the Ukraine, but his family kept
staying one step ahead of the pogroms. He lived in Russia and
ultimately he came to this country in 1914 when he was 17.
He later had a chance to become friends with George Kennan
and he always used to praise George Kennan not only for his
wisdom but also for his command of the language.
George Kennan wrote a piece in the New York Times a while
ago now, in which he said something like he thought that this
expansion of NATO could be the most fateful decision. It could
have consequences that we could not even begin to prophetize.
So, there you have George Kennan, a real giant.
I have visited Russia, my father's home, and every time
there is a delegation that comes here, I try and meet with
people. I have not met anyone from Russia of any political
persuasion who is not very much opposed to this. On the other
hand, there is President Havel and there are you and others who
have, of course, taken a very different position.
This is what I do not quite understand. If we are talking
about the importance of improving the economies and
democratization of countries like Hungary and Czechoslovakia
and Poland, there is the European Union. I do not know how a
military alliance really meets those concerns.
I do want to mention Senator Feinstein's discussion of the
Prime Minister's remarks where he said I am not worried about
Czechoslovakia or Poland or Hungary, but I am worried about
what is going to happen in the country. You said, well, there
is no evidence yet. But that is kind of a snapshot of right
now. The question is where are we heading. We have to look to
the future.
If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end.
The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then
would be the consequences within Russia?
I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe
this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these
issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right
position for me to take as a Senator.
You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria,
they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the
question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all,
all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it
will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This
country is still critically important to the quality of our
lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives.
If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is
yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are
welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of
it.
But let me just say several things to your very well-
articulated question and your legitimate concern. I think all
of us that have grown up in this era have the concerns that you
have stated.
I spent my entire life studying the Soviet Union and now
Russia and the republics. I think we have to understand that
Russia is not the Soviet Union and Russia is a different place
than any of us ever thought it would be.
All of us have genuflected in front of George Kennan. We
all have felt that he was kind of the father of the way that we
had studied the Soviet Union and Russia.
But with all due respect, I disagree with him on this
subject. I think that we are in a new era. I have spent a lot
of time talking with the Russians about this and persuading
them that if they want us to think about a new Russia, they
have to think about a new NATO and a new Europe.
Russia has a long way to go, but it is on a very important
path. While they are objecting or stating that they do not like
NATO expansion, we are involved in a whole web of relationships
with them now in a way that I think is supportive of their
democratic processes. We do not have time to go into all that.
But the fact that we are in a set of arms control negotiations
with them on a completely different approach than being
adversaries in the way that we were, that there are trade
agreements and market forces working, that there are democratic
forces working, that they are part of a discussion about our
mutual interests in Europe is for me a sign that we are heading
in a different direction.
Now, another aspect of this is I cannot understand why we
would self-limit our desires for central and eastern Europe by
what the Russians want. That is going back to the post World
War II era, and I do not think that is correct. It is not
correct in terms of security and it is not correct in terms of
the morality that we talked about. Why should we now in 1997
agree to a line that was created in 1945? I think it is wrong.
Senator Wellstone. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just in 30
seconds add, I do not have all of your intellectual capital in
this area, but a different formulation might be why would we be
trying to expand a military alliance, which we built, vis-a-vis
a Soviet Union that does not exist any longer?
It is not so much a question of our policy being governed
necessarily by ``paranoia'' in Russia, but it has more to do
with, as we look to the future, whether or not this could in
fact invite the very instability that would be I think so
dangerous to the world that we live in. It is a very
legitimate, important concern that I think we will have more
debate on. Again, for myself I still am trying to wade through
this.
Secretary Albright. May I, Mr. Chairman, respond?
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Albright. I would say the following. First of
all, we had options here. We could say the threat is different,
so let us just kind of junk NATO and start over. Why do that
when NATO as a structure has worked very well and is, I think,
capable of expanding and enlarging in terms of its strategy as
well as its membership, as I answered to members over here.
So, I think that the purpose here is NATO, while it
maintains its central core of being a defensive alliance, has
the capability of adjusting its strategic concept in a way that
is not directed against Russia. The threat at the moment in
Europe is instability and the undermining of the overall
structure of what we want which is a free, undivided and fully
united Europe. That is what is a priority for the United
States, and NATO provides a very good structure for that. It is
adjusting. It is a new NATO. It is not the NATO that you and I
grew up with.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Now, my chairman of the Rules Committee, the Senator from
Virginia, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and
the other Members.
I will ask but one question, the same question that I have
debated very lively publicly with Senator Biden. I happen to be
a very firm skeptic of this program.
First, a quick answer. If Russia is admitted, I suggest
that that would be the end of NATO because one of the primary
missions of NATO would no longer exist. It would be the end
because when I joined the Senator 19 years ago for the first 5
years, this senior group up here led the defense against
withdrawing from NATO, pulling our troops back, predicated both
on an economic argument and other arguments. We remember very
well our distinguished Majority Leader Mike Mansfield who led
that fight. I think if Russia were admitted, that fight would
start again.
But my concern, Madam Secretary, goes to the other threat
that faces all of the new nations that are looking toward
admission, and that is they are fighting fairly today and
peaceably for economic survival. By conferring a NATO status on
the three, it puts the other three in my humble judgment at a
severe disadvantage in two ways.
First, they can put in their advertisements for foreign
capital, come invest here because you will be more secure
because NATO is here, not unlike the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation when you deposit in your bank.
Second, these nations will not have to mount their own
defenses because they will be a part of NATO. I have discussed
this with the Ambassadors and foreign ministers and defense
ministers of these countries. They readily admit our cost to
build that level of defense we think and security that is
necessary will be one-third or perhaps one-half of what the
nations that are not admitted will have to cough up.
All of this to me indicates that you will begin to breed
dissension. As we know today, part of the security of the
world, the growing part of it that is threatened, are the
ethnic strife, the border strife, religious strife, and you
superimpose on their struggle today for economic survival,
economic competition NATO status and a less cost for their
defense, and I think you are sewing the seeds of strife between
these countries.
I go back to Harry Truman's biography in which he said his
two proudest accomplishments were the Marshall Plan and NATO,
and I fear we may be undoing one of his proudest
accomplishments.
Secretary Albright. Senator, I was looking forward to
coming to see you in your committee.
Senator Warner. We will make that opportunity available
and this record will be a very important part of that
discussion.
Secretary Albright. Let me say we have had this discussion
and we will continue to have it.
But let me just say on the Russian question, first of all,
I think that, they have expressed no interest in being members.
I was answering a question of Senator Wellstone whether it was
hypothetically possible, and it is because, as we have said, it
is a process that is open to democracies that meet the agenda.
But it is a hypothetical question at this stage, and I
think we need to focus on the fact that we are looking at a
very different world. Who would have ever expected the things
that we have seen in the last 10 years? So, I would just leave
it in the realm of the hypothetical at this stage.
Now, on your other question, I think that there is no proof
of the fact that NATO status confers better investment. If you
just look, for instance, at what we have seen in western
Europe, NATO membership has not been used over the past half
century to draw investment, let us say, to Norway. I think that
there is no historical evidence of the fact that NATO provides
economic benefits.
At the same time, having spent a lot of time studying
central and eastern Europe, I can tell you that the other
countries, the non-invitees, are working very hard in terms of
their privatization, their various other institutions that
would provide good investment climate. They are creating a
whole web of other relationships with the hope that they will
be in NATO.
I also think that we cannot get ourselves into this
argument of none or all. We have to do what is right for NATO
which is expand in a way that is good for the central core of
keeping a cohesive alliance.
Senator, on your final point, I think that our greatest
leaders historically have been those who have understood that
history does not stand still and that there are opportunities
to be seized. What Harry Truman did with both the Marshall Plan
and NATO was go against the tide and assume leadership at a
time when creativity was needed. While one can never speak for
the dead, one would assume, in looking at his record, that he
would be the kind of person that would see the opportunities
that NATO enlargement offers for U.S. national interests.
Senator Warner. I thank the witness. I thank the chair and
the Ranking Member.
The Chairman. A bit of housekeeping. I ask unanimous
consent that a statement by Senator Smith of Oregon be
submitted at the appropriate place in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Smith
Secretary Albright, thank you for appearing before the Committee
today to begin the process of advice and consent on the proposed
enlargement of NATO.
The United States is engaged in an ambitious effort to reshape the
political and security structures of post-Cold War Europe. The goal of
this effort is to build strong states, stable democracies, prosperous
economies, and friendly governments across the breadth of Europe. We
are joined in this effort by our NATO allies and by newly democratic
people yearning for the opportunity to pursue political freedom and
economic prosperity. Working against us are certain, backward looking
leaders, historical antagonism between certain states, and ethnic and
religious intolerance. These challenges that we confront, together with
our friends and allies, are significant but not insurmountable.
In recent years, Europe has seen historic changes. On the continent
of Europe, more people than at any other time in history live under
democratic government and enjoy the opportunity to pursue freely
economic prosperity for themselves and their families. This soaring
accomplishment is offset by the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia, in
which Europe experienced the most brutal and widespread violence since
Hitler's armies stalked the Continent.
These two extremes reflect the significant, competing pressures on
U.S. foreign policy at this moment in time. The United States is at
once pressing for the consolidation of the gains of democracy in Europe
by expanding NATO and with it our country's commitment to European
security. Simultaneously, we have reluctantly, and with some
controversy, assigned our soldiers to serve as peacekeepers in Bosnia
in a mission that is defined less by an exit strategy than an exit
date.
These conflicting impulses--to engage and withdraw simultaneously
from Europe--are manifested as much in our people as in our policies.
It is absolutely critical that these contradictory inclinations are
resolved through the leadership of the President, and through the
development of sensible foreign policies that will gain the support of
the American people. The Congress can be a partner in this effort, but
by its very nature it cannot lead the effort
The Chairman. Also, the record will be kept open for 3 days
for additional written questions to be submitted to the
distinguished Secretary.
Madam Secretary, you have acquitted yourself admirably and
effectively as always. It has been a pleasure to have you with
us.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you close, would you
yield me 30 seconds?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I think the last argument that
Senator Warner made is the most compelling, which is that these
nations are going to spend more money to go it alone or to put
it another way,less money to be part of the west. It seems to
me that he makes the argument for NATO when he makes the
argument that in fact they will be spending less money. They
are going to spend the money. They are going to seek their own
alliances. Bring them to the west.
Secretary Albright. I agree with that.
The Chairman. Do you agree?
Secretary Albright. Absolutely. That's why when people are
saying can they meet their obligations, they know that they can
do better by increasing their defense budgets to be a part of
NATO and that they will spend less by being a part of it. Yes,
I do.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, is there anything else?
Sometimes when I make an appearance, driving home I make the
best speech of my career.
I think you have done well this morning, but do you have
any closing note that you would like to add?
Secretary Albright. Well, the only note that I would like
to make, Senators, is that I do think we are embarked on a
great historical partnership here of being able to take what we
have been watching very carefully, the evolution of Europe, and
being able to now put our stamp on it and do for the 21st
century what our predecessors have done for the second half of
this one.
I consider it a great honor to be here working with all of
you on this. I know we are going to have an interesting debate.
I think the questions are terrific. I do not know about all the
answers, but I really do appreciate this and I feel that we are
all making history here together.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Very well.
There being no further business, the committee stands in
recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at 2:06 p.m., October 9, 1997.]
PROS AND CONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, G. Smith, Grams,
Biden, Robb and Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
We have Members on the way, including the distinguished
Ranking Member, Mr. Biden. Mr. Biden's representative suggested
that I proceed. I will do that by welcoming all of the
distinguished foreign policy people that we have scheduled for
today, including my friend, and the friend of a lot of people,
Senator Bill Roth, whom I admire greatly.
Today we are honored to have with us people on both sides
of the NATO expansion issue, and that is proper. I might say,
parenthetically, that what I envision as our role is to get all
of the facts laid out so that the American people, to the
extent possible, will understand what the issues are and where
who stands on what.
Our first witness is going to be, as I have said, the
distinguished President of the North Atlantic Assembly and
Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer Group.
Senator Roth will be followed by two prominent supporters
of NATO enlargement, Dr. Brzezinski, whom everybody knows--
nobody needs an introduction to him--and Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick, who is on the way here. Both have, again,
generously consented to help Senators acquire a better
understanding of a complex foreign policy matter.
After completion of this first panel, the committee will
hear from two outspoken opponents of NATO expansion, Ambassador
Jonathan Dean and Professor Michael Mandelbaum.
Again, on behalf of the committee and on behalf of the
Senate, I thank each of you for being here and welcome all of
our guests.
We will first hear from Senator Roth. We are glad to have
you and I thank you for coming. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., UNITED STATES SENATOR
FROM DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN, SENATE NATO OBSERVER GROUP, AND
PRESIDENT, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSEMBLY
Senator Roth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
great honor to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to provide my perspective on NATO enlargement.
I come, as you pointed out, before your committee not only
as a colleague, committed to sustaining and strengthening the
Transatlantic Alliance, but as President of the North Atlantic
Assembly, as well as Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer
Group.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the North Atlantic
Assembly, representing over 40 political parties from the 16
NATO nations, has given more serious and consistent study to
the future of NATO than any other transatlantic organization.
The Senate NATO Observer Group, organized just last May by
Senators Lott and Daschle, has already held more than a dozen
meetings to examine the challenges and promise of enlargement.
My association with both the NAA and the Observer Group
leaves me firmly convinced that enlargement is not only
necessary and important to the alliance, but to the United
States as well.
Will enlargement be easy? Few things this important are
ever easy. Will it be worth it? Absolutely. Let me explain why.
As a leader in the North Atlantic Assembly, I was in Berlin
shortly after the Wall came down--meeting with many of the
young, democratic leaders who were emerging in Central Europe.
On that occasion, I was struck by two oddly opposing insights.
First, is that the cold war was over. Democracy had, indeed,
prevailed. My second insight, however, was that the move toward
democracy alone would not guarantee peace and stability on the
European continent. Having served in World War II, I was
painfully aware of just how important peace and stability in
Europe are to the United States of America.
As I see it, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is an
opportunity unprecedented in world history. For the first time,
we have the chance to be proactive in shaping a strategic
landscape that will contribute to peace and stability in
Europe. We are not responding to aggression or disaster, but we
are building a foundation for a secure future in a region of
vital interest to the United States.
Four significant arguments make it clear why NATO
enlargement is in America's best interest.
First, a wider alliance is a stronger, more capable,
alliance. The proposal to grant NATO membership to Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will add three democracies to
the alliance that have demonstrated their commitment to the
values and interests shared by NATO members: human rights,
equal justice under the law, and free markets. Each of these
nations has a growing economy and a military under civilian
control.
It is important to note that each also contributed forces
to Operation Desert Storm as well as our peacekeeping missions
in Haiti and Bosnia. In that NATO is first and foremost a
military alliance, the admission of these three democracies
will enable the alliance to better fulfill its core mission of
collective defense, as these nations will add another 300,000
troops to NATO.
Second, NATO enlargement will eliminate the zone of
instability that now exists in Europe. Throughout its history,
Europe has been a landscape of many insecure small powers, a
few imperialistic great powers, and too many nationalistic
defense policies, each creating friction with the other. Three
times in this century these dynamics have pulled America into
wars on the European continent. As President Havel has said,
``If the West does not stabilize the East, the East will
destabilize the West.'' Every time America has withdrawn its
influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This we cannot
afford.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, NATO enlargement
is the surest means of doing for Central and Eastern Europe
what American leadership, through the alliance has done so well
for Western Europe. This includes promoting and
institutionalizing trust, cooperation, coordination and
communication. In this way, NATO enlargement is not an act of
altruism, but one of self-interest.
Third, keeping the above argument in mind, it follows that
the costs of enlargement are insignificant compared to the
costs of remaining static. Should NATO fail to follow through
on the commitments made in Madrid, the alliance would be
denying what it has stood for and defended throughout the cold
war. Why? It is because NATO is much more than a military
alliance. It is also a community of values. Enlargement is not
only a strategic opportunity, it is a moral imperative. We
cannot ignore the valid aspirations of European democracies who
seek to become contributing members of our community.
Failure to expand must be considered in terms of what it
will cost as disillusionment replaces hope in Central Europe,
as nationalism--which enjoyed a renaissance following World War
II--fills the security vacuum in a region that has given birth
to two world wars. Costs must also be considered in terms of
the consequences to Russia and its struggle toward democracy.
Should Central Europe remain a gray zone of insecurity, such a
condition would risk reawakening Moscow's history of
imperialism. NATO enlargement is a critical, nonthreatening
complement to the hand of partnership that the West and NATO
has extended to Russia. It insures a regional context in which
a democratic Russia will have the best prospects for normal,
cooperative relations with its European neighbors.
Fourth, and finally, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is
fundamental to Europe's evolution into a partner that will more
effectively meet global challenges to the transatlantic
community. An undivided Europe at peace is a Europe that will
be better able to look outward, a Europe better able to join
with the United States to address necessary global security
concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe in the time-
and stress-tested architecture of NATO will enable the United
States to more effectively meet the global challenges to its
vital interests at a time when defense resources are
increasingly strained.
Mr. Chairman, these arguments make it clear that America's
best chance for enduring peace and stability in Europe--our
best chance for staying out of war in Europe, our best chance
for reinforcing what has been a strong, productive partnership
with Europe--is to promote a Europe that is whole, free, and
secure.What better organization to do this than the North
Atlantic Alliance, an organization that has kept the peace for
more than 50 years and remains unmatched in its potential to
meet the security challenges of the future.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Roth
It's an honor to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to provide my perspective on NATO enlargement. I come before
your Committee not only as a colleague, committed to sustaining and
strengthening the Transatlantic Alliance, but as President of the North
Atlantic Assembly, as well as Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer
Group.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the North Atlantic Assembly
representing over 40 political parties from the 16 NATO nations--has
given more serious and consistent study to the future of NATO than any
other transatlantic organization. And the Senate NATO Observer Group--
organized just last May by Senators Lott and Daschle--has already held
more than a dozen meetings to thoroughly examine the challenges and
promise of enlargement.
My association with both the NAA and the Observer Group leave me
firmly convinced that enlargement is not only necessary and important
to the Alliance, but to the United States, as well.
Will enlargement be easy? Few things this important are ever easy.
Will it be worth it? Absolutely.
Let me explain why. As a leader in the North Atlantic Assembly, I
was in Berlin shortly after the Wall came down--meeting with many of
the young democratic leaders who were emerging in Central Europe. On
that occasion, I was struck by two oddly opposing insights. First, that
the Cold War was over. Democracy had, indeed, prevailed. My second
insight, however, was that the move toward democracy alone would not
guarantee peace and stability on the European continent. And having
served in World War II, I was painfully aware of just how important
peace and stability in Europe are to the United States. of America.
As I see it, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is an opportunity
unprecedented in world history. For the first time, we have the chance
to be proactive in shaping a strategic landscape that will contribute
to peace and stability in Europe. We are not responding to aggression
or disaster, but we are building a foundation for a secure future in a
region of vital interest to the United States.
Four significant arguments make it clear why NATO enlargement is in
America's best interest:
First, a wider Alliance is a stronger, more capable Alliance. The
proposal to grant NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic will add three democracies to the Alliance that have
demonstrated their commitment to the values and interests shared by
NATO members: human rights, equal justice under the law and free
markets. Each of these nations has a growing economy and a military
under civilian control.
It is important to note that each also contributed forces to
Operation Desert Storm, as well as to our peacekeeping missions in
Haiti and Bosnia. In that NATO is first and foremost a military
alliance, the admission of these three democracies will enable the
Alliance to better fulfill its core mission of collective defense, as
these nations will add another 300 thousand troops to NATO.
Second, NATO enlargement will eliminate the zone of instability
that now exists in Europe. Throughout its history, Europe has been a
landscape of many insecure small powers, a few imperialistic great
powers, and too many nationalistic defense policies, each creating
friction with the other. Three times in this century, these dynamics
have pulled America into wars on the European continent. As Vaclav
Havel has said, ``If the West does not stabilize the East, the East
will destabilize the West.'' Every time America has withdrawn its
influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This, we cannot afford.
Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is the surest means of doing for
Central and Eastern Europe what American leadership, through the
Alliance, has done so well for Western Europe. This includes promoting
and institutionalizing trust, cooperation, coordination and
communication. In this way, NATO enlargement is not an act of altruism,
but one of self-interest.
Third, keeping the above argument in mind, it follows that the
costs of enlargement are insignificant compared to the costs of
remaining static. Should NATO fail to follow through on the commitments
made in Madrid, the Alliance would be denying what it has stood for and
defended throughout the Cold War. Why? Because NATO is much more than a
military alliance. It is also a community of values. Enlargement is not
only a strategic opportunity, it is a moral imperative. We cannot
ignore the valid aspirations of European democracies who seek to become
contributing members of our community.
Failure to expand must be considered in terms of what it will cost
as disillusionment replaces hope in Central Europe, as nationalism--
which enjoyed a renaissance following World War II--fills the security
vacuum in a region that has given birth to two world wars. Costs must
also be considered in terms of the consequences to Russia and its
struggle towards democracy. Should Central Europe remain a gray zone of
insecurity, such a condition would risk reawakening Moscow's history of
imperialism. NATO enlargement is a critical, non-threatening complement
to the hand of partnership that the West and NATO has extended to
Russia. It ensures a regional context in which a democratic Russia will
have the best prospects for a normal, cooperative relationship with its
European neighbors.
Fourth, and finally, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is fundamental
to Europe's evolution into a partner that will more effectively meet
global challenges to the transatlantic community. An undivided Europe
at peace is a Europe that will be better able to look outward, a Europe
better able to join with the United States to address necessary global
security concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe in the time-
and stress-tested architecture of NATO will enable the United States to
more effectively meet the global challenges to its vital interests at a
time when defense resources are increasingly strained.
Mr. Chairman, these arguments make it clear that America's best
chance for enduring peace and stability in Europe--our best chance for
staying out of war in Europe, our best chance for reinforcing what has
been a strong, productive partnership with Europe--is to promote a
Europe that is whole, free and secure. What better organization to do
this than the North Atlantic Alliance--an organization that has kept
the peace for more than fifty years and remains unmatched in its
potential to meet the security challenges of the future.
The Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for being
here. That is an excellent statement and an excellent
introduction to what we are going to attempt to do here this
afternoon.
We would be delighted for you to say for as long as you
wish. But with all the things you have on your front burner,
you may want to depart. But please stay as long as you will and
as long as you can.
Senator Roth. I am on my way to Bucharest for a meeting of
the NAA. So I thank you for opportunity to be here before I
leave.
The Chairman. Well, do not miss the plane.
Senator Roth. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Now two names always thought of in this town and across the
country, for that matter, when foreign policy matters come up
are the names of Dr. Brzezinski and Dr. Kirkpatrick, who will
compose our first panel today.
I might mention that I first met Dr. Kirkpatrick through a
mutual friend, who later became President of the United States.
His name was Ronald Reagan. I had a hope then and I continue to
have the hope that one of these days Dr. Kirkpatrick may be
Secretary of State or higher.
Dr. Brzezinski, we will hear from you first. I certainly do
appreciate your being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, COUNSELOR, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
In my initial comment I will not retrace the ground that
was covered by your discussion with Secretary Albright on
Tuesday. It was an excellent discussion and many cogent
arguments were reviewed regarding the issue of NATO
enlargement.
In my brief comments, I would like to touch merely on the
historic and geopolitical significance of NATO's enlargement,
as I see it. In my view, that enlargement has truly global
significance. It is central to the step by step construction of
a secure international system in which the Euro-Atlantic
alliance plays the major role in insuring that a peaceful and
democratic Europe is America's principal partner.
Hence, NATO's enlargement is about America's role in
Europe, whether America will remain a European power, and
whether a larger, democratic Europe will remain organically
linked to America.
It is about Europe's historically important self-
definition, whether its scope and security are to be confined
to the lines drawn arbitrarily in 1945, thus to a rump Europe
with NATO increasingly anachronistic in the post cold war era,
or whether NATO's membership should correspond to the
aspirations of the democratic European nations.
It is about Russia's relationship to Europe, whether NATO's
enlargement helps a democratizing Russia by foreclosing to it
the revival of any self-destructive imperial temptations
regarding Central Europe.
Let me also note parenthetically that NATO and the European
Union have creatively resolved the old question of
disproportionate German power in Europe. The progressive
expansion of NATO can similarly resolve the question of
disproportionate Russian power in Europe. It is noteworthy also
in this connection that public opinion in key European
countries is favorable to expansion.
Moreover, so far, all of the apocalyptic predictions of the
critics of NATO expansion have failed to come to pass.
In brief, to me, NATO expansion is not principally about
the Russian threat for, currently, it does not exist, though
one cannot exclude its reappearance and, hence, some insurance
against it is desirable.
Second, to me, NATO expansion is not primarily a moral
crusade, meant to undo the injustice the Central European
people suffered during the half century's long Soviet
oppression, though one cannot ignore the moral right of the
newly emancipated and democratic Central Europeans to a life no
less secure than that enjoyed by the West Europeans, or, I may
add, ourselves, as well.
For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-
term, historic, and strategic relationship between America and
Europe. NATO expansion is central to the vitality of the
American--European connection, to the scope of a secure and
democratic Europe and to the ability of America and Europe to
work together in promoting international security.
The expansion of the Euro-Atlantic alliance will bring into
NATO counsels new, solidly democratic, and very pro-American
nations. That will further deepen the American--European
kinship while expanding Europe's zone of peace and democracy.
Such a more secure Europe will be a better and a more vital
partner for America in the continuing effort to make democracy
more widespread and international cooperation more pervasive.
That is why NATO's enlargement, in itself a vivid testimonial
to the dynamism of the democratic ideal, is very much in
America's long-term national interest.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brzezinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Brzezinski
I would like to comment very briefly on the historic and
geopolitical significance of NATO's enlargement. In my view, that
enlargement has global significance--it is central to the step-by-step
construction of a secure international system in which the Euroatlantic
alliance plays the major role in ensuring that a peaceful and
democratic Europe is America's principal partner.
Hence
<bullet> NATO's enlargement is about America's role in Europe--
whether America will remain a European power and whether a
larger democratic Europe will remain organically linked to
America;
<bullet> it is about Russia's relationship to Europe--whether NATO's
enlargement helps a democratizing Russia by foreclosing the
revival of any self-destructive imperial temptations regarding
Central Europe.
(Let me note in passing that NATO and the EU have creatively
resolved the old question of disproportionate German power in Europe;
the progressive expansion of NATO can similarly resolve the question of
disproportionate Russian power in Europe. It is also noteworthy that
public opinion in key NATO countries is favorable to expansion.
Moreover, so far, all the apocalyptic predictions of the critics of
NATO expansion have failed to come to pass.)
In brief, to me NATO expansion is not principally about the Russian
threat, for currently it does not exist, though one cannot exclude its
reappearance and hence some insurance against it is desirable.
Secondly, to me NATO expansion is not primarily a moral crusade,
meant to undo the injustice the Central European peoples suffered
during the half-century long Soviet oppression, though one cannot
ignore the moral right of the newly emancipated and democratic Central
Europeans to a life no less secure than that enjoyed by the West
Europeans.
For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-term
historic and strategic relationship between America and Europe. NATO
expansion is central to the vitality of the American-European
connection, to the scope of a democratic and secure Europe, and to the
ability of America and Europe to work together in promoting
international security.
The expansion of the Euroatlantic alliance will bring into NATO
counsels new, solidly democratic and very pro-American nations. That
will further deepen the American-European kinship while expanding
Europe's zone of peace and democracy. Such a more secure Europe will be
a better and a more vital partner for America in the continuing effort
to make democracy more widespread and international cooperation more
pervasive. That is why NATO's enlargement--in itself a vivid
testimonial to the dynamism of the democratic ideal--is very much in
America's long-term national interest.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski. Dr. Kirkpatrick.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR, FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE STUDIES, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank
you for inviting me today to testify before this distinguished
committee.
The Chairman. Thank you for coming.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the
subject of today's hearing is exceedingly important and that
the Senate's decision on NATO enlargement today is even more
important. I have followed this issue with substantial interest
since the end of the cold war made it a practical policy
option.
I begin with a question: why should we enlarge NATO? I
believe that the case for admitting Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary to membership in NATO is not only strong, but that
it is essentially the same as the case for organizing NATO in
1947--to provide a security shield behind which the free
institutions of these more geographically vulnerable European
democracies can strike deep roots and thrive, to deter
aggression, and to discourage conflict.
Of course, there are differences between 1939, 1947, and
1997. There is no one major threat to peace and security
throughout the region today. But if the threats of aggression,
subversion, and conquest are less clear now than they were
after World Wars I and II, the new democracies' appetite for
democracy and peace is greater.
More people understand the benefits of freedom and long to
share in them, and long for a place in the prosperity and
security of the West. More associate that freedom, prosperity,
and security with joining NATO--and the European Union, which,
unfortunately, is not an issue that we are free to resolve by
action of this Senate or any other American forum.
I believe, these candidates that have been proposed for
membership in NATO, will strengthen that institution. Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary share a history and a
civilization with the countries of NATO and were engaged in
parallel patterns of democratic development when first Adolph
Hitler and then Josef Stalin's expansionist policies abruptly
strangled their evolution.
The people in each of these countries share our culture.
They have demonstrated their vocation for freedom with heroic
efforts to throw off foreign domination and regain control of
their own histories. This took place again and again during
their tragic evolution of this century.
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary can be incorporated
into NATO, I believe, without creating any serious disruption
and without requiring a reorientation of NATO's operations.
They will ``fit'' in NATO. Their inclusion will not require
qualitative changes in its purposes, culture, or mode of
operation. NATO has been and, after their inclusion, will be, a
military alliance of democratic nations united in the
determination to preserve their free societies from
aggression--by force, if necessary.
The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary applied for
membership in the European Union and in NATO years ago. Hungary
actually applied for membership in the European Union before
Soviet forces had departed their country. They have met all the
stated requirements, and have cooperated in all proposed
projects, including Partnership for Peace. They have
demonstrated their seriousness.
Moreover, 4 years have passed since President Clinton said
in Prague, ``Let me be absolutely clear: the security of your
States is important to the security of the United States. The
question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members,
but when and how.''
Yet to this day, no country that suffered under Soviet
dominance has been admitted into either NATO or the EU.
The post cold war period has seen the emergence of numerous
threats to the development of a democratic Europe. Resurgent
anti-democrats have won power in some States and threaten peace
in others. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Slovakian
Prime Minister Vladimir Mecias are examples.
Milosevic sponsored and encouraged Serbian aggression and
``ethnic cleansing'' against Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovena, in that order. He has attempted to destabilize
Macedonia and repeatedly violated democratic norms and the
human rights of the Serbian opposition. He has undermined
democracy in Serbia and outside it. The violent attacks he
sponsored have devastated two States--Croatia and Bosnia, and
have destabilized the region.
This aggression could happen because he is not a democratic
president, although he is, in fact, elected. This reminds us
that not all elected presidents are democratic presidents,
governing within a framework of law and constitutional rule.
It is no accident, Mr. Chairman, as the Marxists like to
say, that in democratic Czechoslovakia, the separation of
Slovakia from the Czech Republic was peaceful, and that the
separation of Yugoslavia was violent. The difference was not in
the preference of the presidents because the President of
Czechoslovakia also preferred that that country remain united.
The difference was the respect of those presidents for
democratic decisions.
There was in the Czech Republic no will to conquest in the
government. The Czech Republic is a democracy, prepared to
accept the democratic self-determination of Slovakia. Serbian
rulers were not committed to democratic methods and were not
prepared to accept the democratic self-determination of the
component States of former Yugoslavia. The result was, first,
instability, and then aggression and war, which continues to
this day.
There is, finally, in my judgment, Mr. Chairman, only one
reliable guarantee against aggression. It is not found in
international organizations. It is found in the spread of
democracy. It derives from the simple fact that true
democracies do not invade one another and do not engage in
aggressive wars.
Numerous studies establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
best system, the only reliable basis for collective security,
is that all the governments in an area should be democratic
governments. Therefore, what reinforces democracy reinforces
peace. That is the reason that the top priority for the United
States and NATO should, today, be to preserve and strengthen
the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, and in
Russia as well.
Preserving and strengthening democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe should be the United States' central goal and
top foreign policy priority in Europe, in my opinion.
Membership in NATO will help to achieve those goals and
strengthen the alliance.
Enlargement of NATO will assuredly expand the zone of
security, to quote the distinguished Senator who testified
before me. It will expand the zone of security in Europe and
will shrink the zone of insecurity and instability.
Unfortunately, I believe that it is necessary for the
United States to take a leadership role on this issue, perhaps
because we have had the opportunity to observe the inadequacy
of a purely European security framework policy to achieve these
desired goals. It is not graceful and perhaps not appropriate
for an American to emphasize the inability of the European
Union and the WEU or any of the purely exclusively European
military groups to protect peace and provide collective
security to Europe. Their failure is manifest, but more so
because, at the time the Serbs took up arms against Slovenia
and Croatia, then-President of the EU--and it was the EC,
then--Mr. Poos, of Luxembourg, said, and I quote, ``This is a
European problem that will be solved by Europeans. There is no
role here for Americans.''
I think President Bush was quite ready to have the
Europeans take that turn.
But everyone knows what happened. Presidents George Bush
and Bill Clinton were more than willing to stand aside while
first Europe, then the United Nations and Europe worked on the
problem. Unfortunately, what that experience provided was
additional and timely evidence of the inadequacy of purely,
European security arrangements to deal with the problems of
Europe.
And UNPROFOR, under Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali's command provided, I think, definitive evidence on the
inability of the United Nations to mount an effective military
operation in Europe or, indeed, virtually anywhere else.
The passive, inadequate response of the EU, the United
Nations, the OSCE, and the Western European Union testify to
the ineffectiveness of a collective defense based only on these
organizations. NATO has a different and a better record, though
it, too, was tarnished in Bosnia by its association with
UNPROFOR. I think it has reestablished its credibility.
I think we have seen clearly the inadequacy of a U.N.
response, which I emphasize only because we hear rather
frequently that peace can be defended by the United Nations and
peace can be restored by the United Nations. I believe that
certain lessons of great relevance to European security leap
out of the Yugoslav experience: that membership in the U.N.
cannot be regarded as a reliable guarantor of European
security--we have seen that very clearly, beyond any reasonable
doubt; that global institutions cannot necessarily provide
reliable solutions to regional problems; that diplomacy may not
be able to forestall aggression, whether or not that diplomacy
is directed from the U.N.; that ``peacekeeping'' is not an
adequate response to the determined use of military force; that
the ``peacekeeping'' rules of engagement that the U.N. has
invoked and imposed in former Yugoslavia may make peace keepers
hostages without deterring aggressors or assisting victims;
that effective force is often necessary to repel force.
NATO can be, and indeed, is, that effective force, Mr.
Chairman.
Why should we act now?
Czech President Vaclav Havel, a man of unusual foresight
and courage told the ``Economist'' magazine about a year ago
that he feared the spirit of Munich was returning to Europe. I
quote, ``I do not have in mind some concrete political act,''
he said. ``Rather, I refer to a mentality marked by caution,
hesitation, delayed decisionmaking, and a tendency to look for
the most convenient solutions.''
Havel charged the governments of NATO and the EU with
excessive caution and worried aloud that the opportunity to
build a Europe of independent democratic nations would not last
forever.
As usual, I think President Havel was right. Years which
might have been used to integrate the new democracies and to
reinforce them, to extend the institutions of freedom have
already been lost through indifference, procrastination and
timidity. These characteristics--indifference, procrastination,
and timidity--are not examples of effective foreign policy and
not examples of the kind of policy that Americans are proud of.
There has been a persistent question about whether we could
afford to support our share, our reasonable share, of the costs
of enlarging NATO. I would like to say Mr. Chairman, that the
United States spends each year in former Yugoslavia alone
several times the cost of even the CBO's estimates of enlarging
NATO. That is very interesting if you think about it.
No one made a decision to spend that much money in former
Yugoslavia. I would like to say that it would have been much
more economical in money and lives, to have taken timely action
to deter action that conflict.
Some people might argue that we could save the money by
simply ignoring the ethnic cleansing and the massacres in
former Yugoslavia. But the fact is, the United States cannot be
indifferent to a tragedy in the heart of the civilization of
which we are a part.
What about Russia? Mr. Chairman, I believe that NATO is a
defensive alliance dedicated to deterring and, if necessary,
defeating aggression. A democratic Russia will pose no threat
to anyone and a democratic Russia should not fear NATO. The
most urgent problem in my judgment in U.S. relations with
Russia is to help the Russian democrats defeat the internal
enemies of Russian democracy.
I think our government is working quite hard on that
problem and, indeed, has since the end of the cold war.
I think that it should be remembered that President Yeltsin
himself has on several occasions clearly indicated that he has
no problem with the inclusion in NATO of these independent
European neighbors who were formerly members of the Warsaw
Pact.
President Yeltsin is himself principally concerned with the
strengthening of democratic institutions in Russia. We cannot
help him achieve his goals or Russians achieve the goals of a
strong, consolidated, democratic government by appeasing the
extremists and anti-democrats in Russia. We do not help Russian
democrats by handing the opponents of democracy in Russia a
victory over NATO, a longstanding symbol of the West's
commitment to defend democracy
We can only help by strengthening and moving boldly toward
the construction of a democratic Europe, which is, indeed,
wholly consistent, indeed virtually identical, with his goal.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that Americans understand the
American stake in a stable democratic Europe. Public opinion
surveys and studies over the period from the end of World War
II, the Marshall Plan, and the establishment of NATO, down to
last week demonstrate that Americans support an active U.S.
role in Europe and support a strong America and a strong
democratic NATO. I think that the Senate should do no less.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before this
distinguished committee today.
The subject of today's hearing is important. The Senate's decision
will be more important. I have followed this issue with interest.
Why enlarge NATO?
The case for admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to
membership in NATO is not only strong, it is essentially the same as
the case for organizing NATO in 1949--to provide a security shield
behind which the free institutions of these more geographically
vulnerable European democracies can strike deep roots and thrive, to
deter aggression and discourage conflict.
Of course there are differences between 1939, 1949 and 1997. There
is no one major threat to peace and security throughout the region
today. But if the threats of aggression, subversion and conquest are
less clear now, as they were after World Wars I and II, the appetite
for democracy and peace is greater. Still, more people understand the
benefits of freedom and long to share it--and the prosperity and
security of the ``West''. And more associate that freedom, prosperity
and security, with joining NATO and the European Union.
The new members ``fit'' in NATO
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary share a civilization with
the countries of NATO and were engaged in parallel patterns of
democratic development when first, Adolf Hitler's, then Joseph Stalin's
expansionist policies interrupted their evolution. The people in each
of these countries share our culture. They demonstrated their vocation
for freedom with heroic efforts to throw off foreign domination and
regain control of their own histories.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary can be incorporated into
NATO without creating serious disruption or without requiring
reorientation of NATO's operations. They will ``fit'' in NATO. Their
inclusion will not require qualitative changes in its purposes,
culture, or mode of operation. NATO has been and, after their
inclusion, will be a military alliance of democratic nations united in
the determination to preserve their free societies from aggression--by
force if necessary.
The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary applied for membership in
the European Union and in NATO years ago (Hungary actually applied for
EU membership before Soviet forces had departed). They have met all
stated requirements and cooperated in all proposed projects including
Partnerships for Peace.
Moreover, four years have passed since President Clinton said in
Prague, ``Let me be absolutely clear: the security of your states is
important to the security of the United States ... the question is no
longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.'' But
neither they nor any other country that suffered under Soviet dominance
has been admitted to NATO or the EU.
``Threats'' to a democratic Eastern Europe
The post Cold War period has seen numerous threats to the
development of a democratic Europe. Resurgent anti-democrats have won
power in some states and threaten peace in others. Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic and Slovakian Prime Minister Vladimir Mecias are
examples.
Milosevic sponsored and organized Serbian aggression, and ``ethnic
cleansing'' against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovenia (in that
order) and acted repeatedly to destabilize Macedonia. He repeatedly
violated democratic norms and the human rights of the Serbian
opposition. He undermined democracy in Serbia and outside it. The
violent attacks he sponsored devastated two states--Croatia and Bosnia
and destabilized the region.
It is no accident, as Marxist liked to say, that in democratic
Czechoslovakia separation of Slovakia from Czeck Republic was peaceful.
And that the separation of Yugoslavia was violent. The difference was
respect for democratic decisions. There was no will to conquest in the
government of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is a democracy
prepared to accept democratic self-determination of Slovakia. Serbian
rulers are not committed to democratic methods.
There is, finally, only one reliable guarantee against aggression--
it is not found in international organizations. It is the spread of
democracy. It derives from the simple fact that democracies do not
invade one another, and do not engage in aggressive wars.
Numerous studies establish beyond reasonable doubt that the best
system, the only reliable system of collective security is that all the
governments in an area should be democratic governments. Therefore,
what reinforces democracy reinforces peace. That is the reason that the
top priority for the United States and NATO should today be to preserve
and strengthen the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and
Russia as well. Preserving and strengthening democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe should be the United States central goal and top foreign
policy priority in Europe. Membership in NATO helps achieve those
goals.
The Inadequacy of a purely European Response
It is not graceful and perhaps not even appropriate for an American
to labor the inability of the EC and the WEU to protect peace and
provide collective security to Europe. That failure is manifest, the
more so because at the time Serbs took up arms against Slovenia
Croatia, then President of the EC, Mr. Poos of Luxembourg, said, ``This
is a European problem that will be solved by Europeans. There is no
role for Americans.''
Everyone knows what happened. Presidents George Bush and Bill
Clinton were more than willing to stand aside while first Europe, then
the United Nations and Europe worked on the problem.
Unfortunately, this experience provided additional and timely
evidence of the inadequacy of purely European security arrangements.
And UNPROFOR, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghaii provided
definitive evidence on the inability of the United Nations to mount an
effective military operation.
The passive, inadequate response of the EU, the United Nations, the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Western
European Union have testified to the ineffectiveness of a collective
defense based only on these organizations. NATO has a different and a
better record though it was tarnished in Bosnia by its association with
UNPROFOR.
The Inadequacy of a U.N. Response
Certain lessons of great relevance to European security leap out of
the Yugoslav experience:
<bullet> that membership in the United Nations cannot be regarded as
a reliable guarantor of European security;
<bullet> that global institutions cannot necessarily provide
solutions to regional problems;
<bullet> that diplomacy may not be able to forestall aggression--
whether or not that diplomacy is directed from the U.N.;
<bullet> that ``peacekeeping'' is not an adequate response to the
determined use of military force;
<bullet> that the ``peacekeeping'' rules of engagement may make
``peacekeepers'' hostage without deterring the aggressors or
assisting the victims; and,
<bullet> that effective force is often necessary to repel force;
<bullet> NATO can be that force.
Why Act Now?
Czech President Vaclav Havel, a man of unusual foresight and
courage, told the Economist magazine about a year ago that he fears the
spirit of Munich has returned to Europe.
``I do not have in mind some concrete political act,'' Havel said.
``Rather I refer to a mentality marked by caution, hesitation, delayed
decision-making and a tendency to look for the most convenient
solutions.'' Havel charged the governments of NATO and the European
Union with ``excessive caution'' and worried aloud that the opportunity
to build a Europe of independent democratic nations will not last
forever.
As usual, Havel was right. Years which might have been used to
integrate the new democracies and extend the institutions of freedom
have already been lost through indifference, procrastination and
timidity.
Can we Afford It?
The United States spends each year in former Yugoslavia several
times the cost of enlarging NATO.
How much more economical in money and lives it would have been to
deter that conflict.
What About Russia?
NATO is a defensive alliance dedicated to deterring and, if
necessary, defeating aggression.
A democratic Russia will pose no threat to anyone. The most urgent
problem in U.S. relations with Russia is to help Russian democrats
defeat internal enemies of democracy. Our government is working hard on
that problem.
It should be remembered that President Yeltsin has repeatedly
indicated that he has no problem with the inclusion in NATO of these
independent European neighbors. We do not help Russian democrats by
appeasing their opponents.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Those were two excellent
statements.
In doing a little housekeeping arithmetic, I note that we
have about 8 Senators here. I have to divide the time so that
we share it equally as nearly as possible. So I suggest that we
have a 5 minute time period each, at least on the first round.
Dr. Brzezinski, some critics of NATO enlargement are
alarmed by the negative reaction of Russia to this policy. If,
as we are led to believe by those critics, Russia has no
designs on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic, how does the membership of those countries in NATO
impact Russian interests?
Dr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it
impacts on Russian interests adversely at all unless Russia is
of the view that NATO is an enemy and that the United States is
an enemy. If that is the Russian view, then we have a very
serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that
reason as well.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. That's right.
Dr. Brzezinski. But I don't think the Russians think of
NATO as an enemy. I don't think the Russians think of America
as an enemy, though some members of the Russian foreign policy
elite--in almost all cases, in fact, former members of the
Soviet foreign policy elite--would like to have the potential
option in the future of exercising dominant political influence
in Central Europe. This is why they don't like the expansion of
NATO.
In my view, we shouldn't cater to these anachronistic
prejudices. But we ought to work to create conditions whereby
Russia is not tempted in that fashion and is, therefore, more
likely to become really a democracy.
Let me just quote one sentence from Andrei Kozyrev, the
former Russian Foreign Minister. He says that to pay too much
heed to the Russian critics of NATO expansion would play into
the hands of the enemies of democracy in Russia.
I completely agree with Kozyrev.
The Chairman. An excellent answer.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick--and I like to call you that because
you did so well at the United Nations--how will the memberships
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO enhance the
defense of democracy in Europe? What you said addressed this
very subject. What is the greatest strategic value, do you
think, of these three countries to the NATO alliance?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think that their principal value
to the NATO alliance is to expand in Europe and in an area of
Europe which has been, historically, one of turmoil and
victimization, to expand the zone of peace and the conditions
of peace and stability.
I believe that Western Europe as well as Central Europe and
Eastern Europe will, in fact, have enhanced stability and
confidence in the peace of their region if these countries are
accepted for membership in NATO.
Mr. Chairman, I read that you had said that it was an
historic opportunity. I think it is an historic opportunity and
I think it is the right thing to do, as well. I think the
people of these countries, having been denied by accidents and
tragedies of history that we all know about should be given the
opportunities for peace, prosperity, and stability that they
seek and would be very reliable allies. They would, as Dr.
Brzezinski said, and as I think Senator Roth said, strengthen
the armies of NATO. They will be enthusiastic, disciplined, and
effective members of NATO because they have already paid the
greatest price to join.
So I think both in war and in peace, militarily and
politically they would strengthen NATO and the context of NATO
operations.
The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here. You lend a great deal to this discussion.
I would like to parse this debate arbitrarily into two
pieces. The political argument up here is going to get down to
money, in my humble opinion, and whether or not there is any
use for NATO, period. It's the old Mansfield argument--bring
the boys home.
There is a strong strain of isolationism, stronger in one
party than in the other, but it exists in both, and there is
the question of why can't the Europeans do this. I mean, what
do they need us for?
I will leave that argument aside and focus on the arguments
that are made by the foreign policy establishment of which you
are two prominent members--and we are going to hear two
prominent members after you who are opposed to expansion--and
the intellectual community. They usually do not talk about
expansion in terms of money.
All of you will come up here--and I am a strong supporter
of expansion--and will say stability is the question. Mr. Dean
and Mr. Mandelbaum are going to argue that enlargement will
diminish stability rather than enhance it in Europe. I argue
that enlargement enhances stability and I think you will also
be making that argument.
I would like to lay out, as I have been doing for the past
6 months, what I think the arguments are devolving to. There
are only 3 or 4 arguments in opposition to expanding NATO and I
would like you to comment on them, if you will.
You mentioned the present President of Russia does not have
a problem--I might add that I met with Yavlinsky and he had no
problem. I met with Zyuganov and he had no problem. I met with
Lebed and he had no problem. I met with Baturin and he had no
problem. Not a single one of them had a problem in face to face
meetings each of which lasted a minimum of an hour. Not one of
them viewed the expansion of NATO as a threat, a physical
threat.
They viewed it in terms of being excluded from Europe. They
viewed it in terms of it having consequences for them
culturally and politically. They viewed it as a slap in the
face. They viewed it as an insult to their pride. But none of
them--and I asked the explicit question, ``Do you view it as a
threat?'' Not one of them has said that. Not one of the ones I
mentioned. I think I have covered the various political
factions.
Now here is what the arguments against expansion come down
to, as I see it, and then I would like you to comment. First is
that expanding NATO will diminish the organization's ability to
gain consensus on a lot of issues because 3 more countries are
being added to the 16, making a total of 19. It is hard enough
to get consensus now, and the added difficulty will unravel
NATO.
Second is that expansion will aid the Russian nationalists,
the Browns and the Reds, although I see no evidence of that.
This argument had much more saliency 10 months ago. It has
little now, in my view, in light of the NATO--Russian accord
that has been reached. But that is a second argument I have
heard.
The third argument is that expansion will require us to
station troops in the new member countries on the border of
Russia. Not one single head of state in each of these countries
that I visited, not one single defense minister, not one single
head of the military, not one single person of any authority in
any party in any of the 3 countries, has said they want
permanent troops stationed on their soil. We have all said we
are not going to permanently station troops. We are not going
to give Russia the right to veto stationing troops, but
regardless of that nobody has said we are going to permanently
station troops in any of those countries. That is the third
argument that I hear.
The fourth argument is that these countries cannot pay. My
counter to that is that if they do not pay to go this cheaper
route, does anybody think these regions are is going to sit
around and not try to increase their military capability on
their own; not try to establish bilateral or multilateral
relationships in that gray zone? And then aren't they going to
spend more money?
The other counter argument is that this power vacuum that
exists in Europe can be filled by the stability of extending
the hand of NATO to the east and stabilizing the situation in
Russia.
So I would like you to comment on: one, whether expansion
will diminish consensus; two, will Russian nationalism be
enhanced; three, are we likely to permanently station American
troops in those three countries; and, four, is joining NATO
going to cause them to drain their treasuries where otherwise
they would not, which is the implication?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brzezinski. If I may start, Senator, first of all,
these are very good questions. Second, you have answered most
of them very well. So I am not sure I can improve. But I will
give it a try.
Senator Biden. Well, do you agree or disagree? Maybe I
should put it that way.
Dr. Brzezinski. As for diminished consensus, I think you
are going to get new NATO members who are going to be really
gung-ho and who are very, very pro-American. I think it is
going to strengthen the tendency of NATO to be vital. New
members tend usually to be activists, and these are countries
which are very pro-American.
Will it aid Russian nationalism? This is one of these hoary
arguments that has been made for several years, that Russian
nationalists will come to power if NATO expands. Well, we have
announced that it will expand. Have they gained power?
What about the recent changes in the Russian Government?
Have they moved them more toward the nationalists or more
toward the reformers? There is simply no evidence for it.
All of the evidence we have in terms of public opinion
polls is that the vast majority of the Russian people don't
give a damn. This is an issue which preoccupies the Russian
foreign policy elite, the old Soviet foreign policy elite, that
hobnobs with some members of our foreign policy elite and tells
them well, of course, we know NATO is not a threat, but our
stupid people think it is a threat and, therefore, if you
expand NATO, they will move toward the nationalists.
Then they go back home and say to the Russian people that
NATO expansion is a threat, don't you think? And the most that
they get is a yawn. So it is a hoary argument.
The argument that this will bring American troops into
these countries on the borders of Russia is a particularly
perplexing argument because Hungary does not have a border with
Russia, the Czech Republic does not have a border with Russia,
Poland has a tiny strip of a border with the Kaliningrad
region, but basically is separated from Russia. So, first of
all, it is an argument made by people who don't know geography.
Second, the countries concerned don't want American troops on
their soil.
Senator Biden. That's what I think.
Dr. Brzezinski. All public opinion polls indicate that they
do not want foreign troops. They want to be part of the
alliance. They want to contribute to it. But I think they would
like to have a status, say, like Norway.
What about that they can't pay? Well, first of all, they
are growing. They are now beginning to spend more or less on
the NATO level. Poland I think actually is slightly above the
NATO average. They know damn well that if they are not in NATO,
they will have to spend a hell of a lot more.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. Dr. Kirkpatrick.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I have now heard two sets of good
answers to those questions from Senator Biden.
I think that the concern about consensus, how difficult
will it be to build a consensus on NATO is not only a valid one
but a very important one. But I think it is also true that as
for these three countries, their membership in NATO will
certainly not complicate or render more difficult the process
of achieving consensus.
I believe, as Dr. Brzezinski has just suggested, that these
countries will make splendid, enthusiastic participants in NATO
and will, indeed, strengthen American leadership in NATO,
which, in my judgment, is important and necessary.
Senator Biden. If you forgive me, Mr. Chairman, I must say
that it is a pleasure to be agreeing with both of you.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. On Russian nationalism, I also
agree with the view expressed by Dr. Brzezinski, and I think it
is your view as well, that it would not enhance Russian
nationalism.
I think, as Dr. Brzezinski has said, that there is a lot of
exaggeration of the strength of Russian nationalism by the old
Soviet foreign policy elite, which looks for new grounds to
make outrageous demands and support outrageous policies. I do
not think that NATO's enlargement will have any discernible
effect. It may have an effect on the argument, but I don't
think it will have an effect on the strength of Russian
nationalism. I don't think it is something we should lie awake
worrying about.
I think the Russian people have an agenda of their own
which involves a better living than they have had in their
lifetime and their history, and more peace and more freedom.
I don't believe it will bring U.S. troops to the borders of
Russia. That is for geographical reasons, as Dr. Brzezinski
made clear. Also it is because it just won't happen. These
countries don't desire troops just as we would rather not put
them there. We control our own troops. We don't send U.S.
troops anyplace that the U.S. Government does not decide to
deploy U.S. troops.
It is simply not true that these countries could not pay
their way in NATO. They could, or if they can't right now, all
of them soon will be able to, and I think they will be eager,
in fact, to assume the burdens of full membership in NATO. The
added security of NATO can only enhance their economic
prospects.
I fully expect that they will be very reliable participants
and contributors and will enhance the strength of NATO.
The Chairman. Representatives of all three countries with
whom we met recently indicated precisely what you said.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. OK. Good.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brzezinski, two sentences that you wrote in your
testimony I thought were really terrific. You talked about the
relationship to Russia and whether NATO's enlargement helps
democratize Russia by foreclosing the revival of any self-
destructive, imperial temptation. That is a different argument
or way of phrasing than I have heard and I think it is very,
very helpful.
But I wanted to ask about the preceding sentence as regards
America. You say that NATO's enlargement is about America's
role in Europe, whether America will remain a European power--
that is, America as a European power--and whether a larger,
democratic Europe will remain organically linked to America.
Now this makes sense, I think, to members of this
committee, to you, to Dr. Kirkpatrick and to others. But it is
a basic argument with regard to NATO altogether that we are
having or that many of us have never had before. In other
words, as I talk to constituents, they would say why are we a
European power, why do we want to be a European power and
organically linked. They say that really stretches the bridge
too far altogether.
What is your rationale, just as a help to all of us,
understanding why NATO is important, as to why America should
want to be a European power? What advantages are there to us in
this and if so, of course, this is the basic reason for being
in NATO. Try to express that, if you can.
Dr. Brzezinski. Senator, you have raised a very fundamental
issue. It has been addressed in part by Dr. Kirkpatrick and I
will follow her lead in that regard.
Europe is the place in which some of the worst human
suffering and some of the worst tragedies of this century were
precipitated. We were dragged into two world wars by the
dynamics of European politics.
Some of the worst suffering experienced by people in the
course of this century was a consequence of these wars.
We have created a system over the last 50 years which has
dramatically decreased the probability of war, which has
deterred aggression, which has created security in a very
important part of this very large Eurasian continent. I believe
that our future role in the world and the peace of the world
depends centrally on the maintenance of that relationship.
If we were somehow to begin to withdraw from Europe, if the
relationship with Europe started being loose, vague,
antagonistic, I think the world would be sliding, maybe if not
toward new wars since there are no immediate protagonists
threatening us, but certainly toward anarchy.
So I do think that the maintenance and enhancement of our
relationship with Europe and of our presence in Europe is
central to nothing less than global stability. The American
people, for all of their hesitations about use of force and
their uneasiness about casualties still instinctively
understand that.
I was struck by the fact that just today, as you have
launched this very important national debate on the enlargement
of NATO, a public opinion poll has been released regarding the
question of the enlargement of NATO. An overwhelming majority
of the American people favor the enlargement of NATO.
Well, that certainly does not signal to me a desire to
withdraw from Europe if at the same time the American people,
with only 18--18--percent opposing, say that we should enlarge
NATO. It seems to me that, instinctively, our people understand
that our fates have become inter linked, our values are the
same, and we share a common interest in making these values
more pervasive, in expanding the area that is safe and
democratic at the same time, that is strong and can, over time,
attract others, or, if necessary, contain and deter others if
they are threatening.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
I believe Senator Robb is next. Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I thank our two
distinguished witnesses. I regret that I had another commitment
and could not hear Dr. Brzezinski's remarks today. I did have
the privilege last evening of hearing one of the most
extraordinary and provocative addresses I have heard in
Washington in years and I suspect that it is taken directly
from his most recent book which I would, on the basis of last
night's remarks alone, commend to others who want to be pushed
in terms of some of their thinking.
Dr. Brzezinski. I hope this is being televised nationwide,
Senator.
Senator Robb. I am afraid that it is not, so this will have
limited value in terms of a promotion for the book, but
certainly for the speech. I won't go on beyond that. I think
there are matters in there that I hope you will bring and
repeat before this committee when different subject matter is
the focus of our attention.
But I would like to ask just one question of both of our
distinguished witnesses, if I may. I am not very good at
leading a friendly witness, which would give you some
indication of where I am coming from in this particular debate.
The question of cost is one which is raised frequently and the
question of cost avoidance is not always factored in. I am not
sure that it is possible to give precise numbers, even with a
great deal of study.
I believe last night and I know previously others have
alluded to the cost avoidance of Nunn-Lugar funds, for
instance, in terms of what we don't have to spend on our own
defense if we reduce the capability and, presumably, the
potential of a possible enemy at home.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick made reference to the amount of
money that we are spending in Bosnia as compared to the amount
of money that we would spend out of the U.S. Treasury for this
particular NATO enlargement as things now stand.
I wonder, if you can, put some sense of a comparative cost
avoidance to the U.S. Government in terms of the kinds of costs
that we might otherwise have to spend if we decided not to
pursue this scenario, if we decided, for whatever reason, not
to approve of the enlargement of NATO.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Robb, I have thought about
this quite a bit. We have CBO estimates, which I think, by the
way, are extremely exaggerated, about the costs of NATO
enlargement to us and to other NATO powers. I think the costs
can be kept substantially below those CBO estimates. But I
don't think we know what they would be compared to.
It occurred to me that one thing they could be compared to
is the cost of our military expenditures in non-NATO areas of
Europe today, and the most outstanding example is the former
Yugoslavia, and Bosnia quite specifically. I had a research
assistant who was formerly a member of the U.S. Government,
working in budget matters, do some very careful research for me
on the costs of some of the so-called U.N. peace operations. He
calculated the cost to us--our agreed-to share--as it were--of
those peace operations in former Yugoslavia.
I might say that these estimates do not include the very
large U.S. contributions that were made to what I call off
budget items, that is, funds or resources spent but never
submitted to the Congress for authorization or appropriation.
They were simply provided through the Pentagon.
The figures that I am about to propose were of expenses
that were authorized and appropriated in the formal process,
acknowledged by the administration and all parties. Those
figures put our expenditures in Bosnia at something around $4.5
billion between the end of 1992 and 1996. They put at about $2
billion our expenditures for Bosnian activities in 1996 and
1995. There is no year that we have participated that the
expenses have not been at or over $1 billion, which is several
times greater than anyone estimates the costs of enlarging
NATO.
Now why is that a relevant comparison? It is because if
NATO enlargement will have the effects that several of us have
suggested, it will enhance the stability and peace in the
region by both consolidating and strengthening democracies in
the region, but also consolidating stability in the region and
expanding the area that no aggressive government would feel
inclined to attack.
I cannot be certain that there would not be continued
efforts by Milosevic, let's say, to take such actions as he has
in the past. But I believe that an expanded, active, ready
NATO, who understands that neither the U.N. nor an exclusively
European security force provides an alternative, will be a big
deterrent to aggressive power and aggressive action.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I, too, would like to add my thanks to both of you for
contributing your distinguished voices to this debate.
Dr. Brzezinski, I was struck by the first paragraph in your
statement where you reference the global significance of
enlargement of NATO. I have thought for some time that this
might, in fact, be the most significant consequence of the NATO
expansion issue. All the other issues we have discussed today
that you both have thought through and written and talked about
are all critical, such as Russia. But when you really start to
think about the connection of security and stability as you
move South and East to Central Asia, to the Middle East, and,
as you say in your paragraph a step-by-step construction of
security internationally, I think that has a powerful amount of
insight into something that we need to really sort through as
we debate this issue.
I would very much like to hear in a little more detail from
you, Dr. Brzezinski and Ambassador Kirkpatrick, your thoughts
on this one issue.
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you.
If I may, let me just add one footnote to the preceding
very able answer by reading from a document prepared by former
Secretary of Defense Perry and Ashton Carter, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense. They say the following: ``Despite the
debate over the estimated costs of enlargement, the fact
remains all estimates of the costs to existing members of
adding the three new candidate members identified at Madrid
show them to be a small fraction of existing NATO expenditures,
the current U.S. burden of supporting its NATO commitments, and
the U.S. defense budget.'' Then they go on to estimate that it
will be, in any case, less than 1 percent.
So I think this cost issue, while important, should not be
blown out of proportion.
Now on your very large issue, I think we are entering a
phase in world affairs in which the long-range choice for us is
either a slow slide toward some form of international anarchy
with no new single power emerging as a threat to us the way
Nazi Germany was or Soviet Russia was, but a slow slide into
international anarchy, or a gradual expansion of genuine
international security cooperation by a process of building
blocks and ink blotting effect, expanding particularly the zone
of security and democracy.
Here I think the American--European connection is
absolutely central. But over time I would hope--and I hope it
does not sound too illusory--over time, over the next 20 or 30
years, I would think we would point toward the creation of what
might be called eventually a Trans-Eurasian or a
Transcontinental security system in which NATO, in effect, the
Euro-Atlantic alliance, involving America and Europe, would
become linked to some sort of cooperative security arrangement
with Russia, eventually pointing toward China, and America and
Japan allied together also in a security relationship with
China. In effect, this would be a kind of transcontinental
OSCE.
But we can only get there if we create solid, vital blocks
of cooperative States committed to the same values and sharing
the same interests. This is why the argument for constricting
NATO to a rump Europe--one look at the map today shows that
NATO really is linked to a rump Europe--is historically
irrelevant. It is an anachronistic way of looking at the world.
We are building here a long-term structure, a long-term
process of creating the architecture of peace across all of
Eurasia. The way to start is where we can start, with the
democratic, solidly philosophically committed to the same
values we are countries, countries that want to be our allies
and who are committed to the notion of cooperative security.
So we are engaged here in a long-term process, the first
step of which is being taken now. But I think it is going to be
a long-term process well into the next century. That is why
your task is so historic.
Senator Hagel. Well, thank you. I think it is significant
and I think there is no reason why we cannot connect it all the
way around the world. I think we must.
Dr. Kirkpatrick, I would be interested if you had any
thoughts here.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. No. In my testimony, I emphasize
the fact that the countries which are being considered for
inclusion in NATO are countries that share our culture, our
values, and our aspirations and goals. I think that is very
important and I think it is possible, basically, to build
really strong alliances where there are such shared goals and
values, and broad agreement on institutional arrangements.
I believe that an enlarged NATO will insure an enlarged
zone of security as well as democracy in Europe and that it
will serve as an even more powerful magnet for Russia and other
countries in the region who are themselves tending in that
direction in any case.
I think this process of building strength, consolidating
freedom and prosperity, which then serves as a magnet is a
process by which we can hope for an indefinite expansion of
this zone of peace and security.
I think I want to read Dr. Brzezinski's new book before I
comment on the extension to Asia. I do believe that Asia, some
countries in Asia, are likely to pose some difficult problems
to the security of that region. I believe that an active
American role in Asia is also important to the peace and
freedom in that region. That is a point, by the way, that was
made by the Australian minister of defense at a luncheon here
in Washington just a few days earlier this week. I think that
is valid as well.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know we are going to have testimony from Mr. Dean and Dr.
Mandelbaum, but the more I try to learn about this, I think the
more skeptical I become. I want you all to help me work through
these arguments.
I am not exactly sure why we are talking about expanding
NATO. I am not sure what the compelling need is. It certainly
does not seem to me to be a military threat from Russia, a
country that cannot even invade itself. It certainly does not
seem to me to promote economies in democracies because I don't
see how you do that in a military alliance and, in any case,
the more I hear the discussion, the more I am attracted to what
Senator Nunn used to talk about, which is we ought to be
talking about expanding the European Union. That seems to me to
be the way in which we focus on promoting market economies and
democracy and it is win/win from the point of view of what the
potential consequences are in Russia.
Moreover, I know that both you, Dr. Brzezinski, and you,
Dr. Kirkpatrick, are very committed and sincere in your
viewpoints and are professional and knowledgeable. You put a
tremendous emphasis on promoting peace and democracy in the
world and I agree with you. The question is whether this will
do that.
I mean, there are people like George Kennan, who is not an
isolationist, and Paul Nitze, who is not an isolationist, much
less our panelists to come, who are not isolationists, who
raise very real questions as to what exactly are we gaining
from this, what is even the reason to do this, vis-a-vis what
are the potential consequences or implications of this.
Now I just want to go a little bit further and get your
reaction.
I think that from everything I have read--and there is a
little bit of disagreement, I guess, with Ambassador
Kirkpatrick--the democrats in Russia are the most vociferous in
their opposition. The democrats--not with a large ``D'' but
with a small ``d''--are the most worried about this, though, I
must say, it seems to be the case that people of all political
stripes are very worried about it as well.
So the question becomes what is the reason to do this. The
final part of my question, which I raised the other day and I
want to go back to, is if the focus is on building economies
and building democracy, the countries we are talking about are
the most stable. We are talking about Czechoslovakia, Poland
and Hungary.
I would think we would be talking about Belarus, we'd be
talking about Ukraine, we'd be talking about the Baltic States.
Are we talking about them and if we are, are you going to tell
me that this does not have any consequences for what happens in
Russia?
Finally, shouldn't we be talking about Russia?
Secretary of State Albright spelled out the criteria for
choosing new NATO members: ``If we were creating a new alliance
today, we would not leave a democratic country out in the cold
because it was once, against the will of its people, part of
the Warsaw Pact. The only question we would consider is this:
which democratic nations in Europe are important to our
security and which are willing and able to contribute to our
security?'' That was before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, April 23, 1997.
Well, by these standards, it is Russia whose citizens
certainly were not consulted about joining the Warsaw Pact and,
by the way, whose officials have expressed the wish to belong
to the Atlantic Alliance. The Secretary said that this was not
the case, but that is not my understanding at all.
Senator Biden. She said not NATO.
Senator Wellstone. Pardon?
Senator Biden. Excuse me, Senator. I think she said not
NATO.
Senator Wellstone. Let me just finish. So wouldn't we be
talking about Russia? Wouldn't we be talking about Belarus?
Which countries should we be talking about?
This is a range of questions. Why are we doing this? What
is the military threat? How does a military alliance expand
economy and democracy? What are the consequences within Russia?
Isn't it true that the democratic forces in Russia are the most
opposed? Finally, would Russia be eligible, from your point of
view, to join an expanded NATO?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I can take part of your question and
then perhaps Ambassador Kirkpatrick can take part of it.
First of all, that the democrats are most vociferous in
opposition to expansion of NATO, that, of course, depends on
one's definition of ``democrat.'' I know that Zhirinovsky is
vociferous in opposition to NATO. But he is surely not a
democrat.
Senator Wellstone. I'm certainly not talking about him.
Dr. Brzezinski. Zyuganov is vociferous in his opposition to
expansion of NATO. He is not a democrat. Gaidar is not
vociferous in opposing the expansion of NATO. In fact, on
occasion he has indicated that they should not be so worried
about it and not make such an issue out of it.
Yavlinsky is not opposed to the expansion of NATO. Kozyrev
has written eloquently favoring the expansion of NATO. So I
think the picture is more mixed.
But there are some Russians who say they are democrats and
who are opposed to the expansion of NATO. Then I think they
have to explain what is it that they are really opposed to. Is
it because they think NATO is an enemy? Is it because they
think America is an enemy? Or is it just possible that they
really would like to have a sphere of influence in Central
Europe, which is exactly what the Central Europeans do not
want?
Insofar as the argument that we should be more worried
about Belarus or Russia than about the new democratic States of
Central Europe, I think there is something to the argument in
the sense that we should be worried about where they are
headed. But it certainly is not an argument for having them in
NATO.
I think NATO is an alliance of like-minded States that are
securely committed to the practice of democracy and share
common philosophical views regarding the nature of the
individual and his relationship to society and the State. That
is what is so discerning about the NATO alliance.
I do not think Belarus by that standard qualifies for
membership, though we should be worried about what is happening
in it. But worrying about what is happening in it I think gives
more salience to the idea of the adjoining States being
securely part of Europe.
What about that we should be expanding EU? Well, the United
States cannot expand EU. We are not a member of the EU. I would
like to see EU expand, but it is an infinitely more complicated
process than expanding NATO. You have to adopt something like
3,000 to 5,000 laws of the Common Market standard and implement
them domestically in order to qualify. It is a longer-range
process. But we encourage it. By the year 2002 or 2003,
probably the three candidate members that you are now
considering will be members of the EU as well.
Insofar as Russian membership in NATO is concerned, first
of all, it is a fact--and I think Senator Biden is correct--
that no Russian leader has stated clearly and explicitly that
they would like Russia to join NATO. Joining NATO does have
implications for them. It means that their armies should be
subordinated to an integrated command, currently headed by an
American and so forth. I see no evidence of Russia wanting to
be part of NATO.
Beyond that, there are certain objective criteria that
countries ought to meet to be members of NATO, and on this
there is consensus between us and the Europeans. They have to
be stably democratic. Russia is not yet so. They have to have
effective, working, market economies. Russia does not have
that, not fully, not yet. They have to have effective civilian
control over the military. Russia does not. They have to have
real respect for minority rights domestically. Ask the Chechens
about respect for domestic rights of minorities. They have to
have no border conflicts with their neighbors. That is hardly
true of most of Russia's southern and eastern frontier.
So simply on the basis of objective criteria, the issue is
not Russian membership in NATO. But there is a legitimate issue
about structuring a relationship of stability with Russia and
of reassuring Russia that NATO is not a threat, by: one,
promising them not to station American or German forces on the
soil of new members--we are doing that; no nuclear weapons on
the soil of the new members--we are doing that by creating
transparency in NATO, by having the Russians present there; we
are doing that by having systematic consultations with Russia
on NATO; we are doing that by having Russia participate in the
Partnership for Peace. We are doing that.
So I think we ought to strike a balance. I have advocated
for the last 3 years not only NATO expansion but a 2 track
approach: expand NATO and sign some accommodation, some
agreement, with Russia which reassures the Russians regarding
their legitimate concerns. But we should not cater either to
anachronistic prejudices or to hidden geopolitical designs.
Senator Wellstone. Just a clarification, by the way. My
argument was not necessarily that if there was going to be
expansion that Poland is not important, or Czechoslovakia. I am
just saying that if the concern is about stability and
democracy, it would seem to me there would be other countries
as well. I would still raise the question--though I have run
out of time and will come back to it--as to what exactly is the
reason for this. Is it a military threat? I don't see it. How
does a military alliance help these countries economically? I
don't see that, either.
Isn't it true--I quite agree with you that some people call
themselves ``democrats'' in Russia, but they are not. But my
impression from talking to a lot of people is there is a great
concern in that country among democrats as to where this is
going to take Russia.
The Chairman. I hate to do this, but the Senator's time has
expired a long time ago.
Would you like, Dr. Kirkpatrick, to comment?
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to say concerning the fact that Russians were
not consulted about their membership in the Warsaw Pact in the
previous regime and therefore should not be held responsible
for that membership, Russians were not consulted about anything
in the previous regime. This is one of the reasons that that
regime proved so brittle, I think, in the opinion of all of us.
Neither was any other member of the Warsaw Pact consulted about
its membership in the Warsaw Pact. They were not consulted
about anything.
I believe, too, that there are a lot of different reports
about how many of Russia's democrats oppose NATO enlargement
and how strongly. We know some who don't oppose it. I think it
is particularly significant, personally, that a very critical
Russian democrat, Boris Yeltsin, has repeatedly indicated that
he saw no problem, basically, about the expansion of NATO into
the area now in question.
He has from time to time backed off this clearly under
domestic political pressures as all prudent presidents do from
time to time. But we all know that there are Russian democrats
who oppose and Russian democrats who support. I think it is an
oversimplification to suggest that Russian democrats generally
oppose the enlargement of NATO. Even if they did, I would
simply say they have not thought that through because Russian
democrats have an especially large interest in the
consolidation of democratic governments and the strengthening
of stability and peace in Central Europe, which is closest to
them.
What are we trying to do and why are we trying to do this?
I ask myself this. Just as a personal note, I became an
advocate of the enlargement of NATO in 1992, and began at that
time to both write and speak about it. I concluded at a certain
point that maybe the time that we ought to enlarge NATO and
really work on it had passed and that maybe it was not as
desirable as it was in 1992, or 1993, or 1994, since the world
seems to be a good deal more peaceable and stable than we might
have dreamed--at least the European, the Western world is.
Why, then, should we do it? I think, Senator Wellstone,
that, first of all, NATO is a very great asset not for
Americans exclusively, or perhaps even principally, but it is a
great asset for democratic civilization and for Europeans who
have had a lot more trouble in keeping peace than, for example,
we in the Americas have had. NATO is a great asset, in my
judgment, to that end.
I have believed from the very beginning, and the more I
read and think about it, the more it seems to me that, from the
very beginning, NATO was a multi functional institution, which
we political scientists know most institutions are. From the
beginning it was engaged in the strengthening and consolidation
of democratic governments and again and again it incorporated
new democracies and provided and instilled in them the
reinforcement, training, and experience of the other democratic
countries. I think that has been particularly important with
the military establishments in a number of relatively new
democracies--Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, and other such
countries, not to mention the initial reorienting of the German
military.
I believe it will be important to the new democracies in
Central Europe and I believe always in conserving one's assets.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank you very much.
Dr. Brzezinski, I promised to try to get you out of here by
3:15. I missed it by 12 minutes for which I apologize, but not
very strongly because we are glad to have you and appreciate
your coming.
The same goes for you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.
Senator Biden. Thank you both.
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We will pause now momentarily while we set up
the second panel.
[Pause]
The Chairman. We are genuinely grateful to have two
additional experts here. They are Hon. Jonathan Dean, Senior
Arms Control Advisor for the Union of Concerned Scientists here
in Washington, headquartered here; and Dr. Michael Mandelbaum,
Professor and Director of American Foreign Policy of the Paul
H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University. I recognize that I may have mispronounced
your name, sir.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Dean, you may proceed.
By the way, your entire statements will be printed in the
record. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JONATHAN DEAN, SENIOR ARMS CONTROL ADVISOR,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want the thank
the committee for this opportunity to express my views on NATO
enlargement.
Mr. Chairman, I have been closely involved with NATO since
the early 1950's, when I helped with German entry into NATO. It
is painful for me personally to speak in opposition to
enlargement, but necessary. NATO in its present form and
present membership continues useful and important. But
enlargement of NATO will be costly, risky, and above all,
unnecessary.
The estimates of enlargement costs, and reference has been
made to that, are still very loose and imprecise. But, even if
we take the low, $30 billion, total for the first group of
candidates as estimated by the State Department in its February
report to the Congress, the United States is likely to have to
pay the largest part of that total if it is serious about these
force improvements.
Neither the European allies nor the candidate States can be
expected to pay the amounts allocated to them in these
estimates. Moreover, these estimates cover only the first three
candidates for membership--the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland. I believe that if the enlargement process continues,
the total cost at the end will be from 3 to 5 times this low
State Department figure of $30 billion for the first group,
with the United States paying at least half of this overall
total of $90 billion to $150 billion.
Nearly all of this expenditure would be, in my view,
wasteful because the need for the expenditure is created by the
enlargement program and not by objective factors.
My estimate here rests on the fact that including the
Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This
total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria,
Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th
country, Ukraine, on the horizon.
Continuous enlargement of this scope and possibly doubling
NATO's current membership insistently recalls the scenes in
Disney's ``Fantasia'' about the Sorcerer's Apprentice who cast
a spell to create a spring of water but ended with a flood
because he did not know how to say ``stop.''
NATO has already decided at its Madrid summit to entertain
the candidacies of five more countries--Romania, Slovenia, and
the three Baltic States. We very much hope that better wisdom
will prevail, but if in fact the first group of three is
actually admitted as NATO members, then there should be no
doubt anywhere that negotiations on Baltic State membership
will be seriously pursued.
If nothing else, partisan political competition in the
United States will push these negotiations fatefully forward.
No one will wish to be accused of faint-heartedness in the face
of certain Russian opposition.
If the Baltic States do become members of NATO, then the
costs to present NATO members of making a realistic effort to
defend these countries, which border Russia at the Eastern end
of the Baltic Sea, will include very large increases in NATO's
force projection capabilities, including naval forces and
combat aircraft, and, quite probably, explicit reliance on
nuclear weapons, matching a parallel and ominous development in
Russian nuclear weapons policy.
There is no room, of course, in the small Baltic countries
to station outside NATO forces. But defending Romania and
Bulgaria, if they become members, would, in practical terms,
probably require stationing large NATO forces there. Possibly
part of them may have to be United States troops.
As regards risks, enlargement on this scale would
dangerously expand the scope of current United States security
commitments. It would extend United States security guarantees
to States with traditional mutual hostility, like Hungary and
Romania, Greece and Bulgaria, not to mention Macedonia and
Albania.
Then there is Russia, which still has 20,000 nuclear
warheads. The Russian public, as has been mentioned here, pays
relatively little attention to foreign affairs. It has other
worries. But the political class in its entirety, with very few
exceptions, from President Yeltsin to Zhuganov, opposes NATO
enlargement and strongly. This is the group which will form the
views of the Russian public about the outside world for the
next generation, with the message that Russia is hostilely
encircled and has been cheated by the same countries on the
cold war outcome.
The NATO-Russia Joint Council is a useful device, but it
cannot contain the negative Russian reaction to actual NATO
enlargement, especially if that enlargement includes the Baltic
States bordering directly on Russia.
We have, of course, already seen adverse reaction to NATO
enlargement in the Russian Duma's refusal thus far to ratify
START II and its general blockage of arms control agreements.
Mr. Chairman, the main thing that every one of these costs
and these risks have in common is that they are completely
unnecessary. They are unnecessary because what Eastern European
countries most want and most need is a form of membership in
the Western community that provides support for their growing
economic, social, and political structures.
The European Union, as has been mentioned, is preeminently
qualified to provide this support. Negotiations to enlarge the
Union will begin next year. Among the first group of candidates
very likely to be admitted are the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland, the same three countries who are today the leading
candidates for NATO enlargement.
Because of its nature and its mission, the European Union
can do this job better than NATO. It is significant that public
opinion in all three candidate countries sees this and shows
stronger support for European Union membership than for NATO
membership.
Moreover, Mr. Chairman, the European Union should do it. It
is their primary responsibility, not ours, to nurture
democratic and free market institutions among their European
neighbors. They can do this without incurring the risks of NATO
enlargement. European Union enlargement causes no problems with
Russia.
It is true that these negotiations for entry to the
European Union may take considerable time, perhaps, as Dr.
Brzezinski has mentioned, until 2003 or 2004, or even longer.
But Eastern Europe has plenty of time for this. It is making
continuous political and economic progress. There is no crisis
in Eastern Europe and no military threat to the area to require
rapid action.
However, a special, fast track European Union enlargement
program for the Baltic States is needed as a substitute for
their NATO candidacy.
NATO enlargement is also unnecessary because an improved
Partnership for Peace program provides close bilateral security
relationships between the candidate countries and NATO.
Finally, NATO enlargement is unnecessary because NATO, in
its present form and membership, effectively provides stability
in Europe, tying the United States to Europe, reassuring
European countries that a united Germany will not become
dominant, and providing very adequate residual insurance
against Russian misbehavior. NATO today performs all three of
these functions without increasing the possibility of Russian
misbehavior as the enlargement project does. It performs these
functions at no extra cost to the United States.
Mr. Chairman, I believe these circumstances justify a
request from the Senate to the administration to suspend action
on its present enlargement program until it has rethought this
issue and has presented to the Congress and to the American
public a detailed plan for organizing European security which
is genuinely comprehensive and which has a specific place in it
for all of the potential NATO candidates and also for Russia.
Such a plan would place European security on a far more stable
footing without the heavy costs and risks of the present NATO
enlargement program.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dean follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Dean
I am Jonathan Dean, adviser on international security issues of the
Union of Concerned Scientists. I am also speaking on this occasion as a
board member of the Council for a Livable World.
I have been involved with NATO since the early 1950s, when I helped
with German entry into the alliance.
NATO in its present form and present membership continues useful
and important. But enlargement of NATO will be costly, risky and, above
all, unnecessary.
Costs
The costs to the United States of NATO enlargement have been
estimated at from two to twenty billion dollars for the first group of
candidates over a ten to fifteen year period. These estimates are still
very loose and imprecise. But even if we start with the very low $30
billion total for the first group of candidates estimated by the State
Department in its report of February 1997 to the Congress, the United
States is likely to have to pay the largest part of that amount if it
is serious about these force improvements.
A great deal of evidence, including well attested statements by
French President Chirac and German Chancellor Kohl as well as the views
of UK, French, German and Netherlands defense ministers reported in the
Washington Post of October 3, points to the conclusion that current
NATO members will not pay the shares allocated to them in these
estimates--and that the United States will consequently have to take on
a much larger proportion of the enlargement costs.
For their part, the Eastern European candidate countries are faced
by a costly and unneeded remilitarization precisely at a time when they
have to focus their resources on economic and social reconstruction.
They will not be able to afford these force increases, whose cost has
been estimated by the Congressional Budget Office at six times their
current defense budgets. Again, if the U.S. is serious about these
improvements, it will have to pay for most of them itself.
Moreover, these estimates cover only the first three candidates for
membership--the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The total cost of
NATO enlargement will probably be three to five times this low State
Department estimate of $30 billion, with the United States paying at
least half of that total.
This is because, including these three countries, there are now
twelve candidates for NATO membership. The others are Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and
Macedonia. This total of twelve candidates can easily increase to
fifteen if Austria, Sweden and Finland decide to apply for NATO
membership. In fact, I see a sixteenth country--Ukraine--on the
horizon. Internal discussion in Ukraine about applying for NATO
membership has gone back and forth. If the candidacy of the Baltic
States appears to be malting progress, then Ukraine will either apply
for full membership or fall into very serious internal dissension.
Enlargement of this scope, doubling NATO's current membership,
recalls the scenes in Disney's ``Fantasia'' about the sorcerer's
apprentice who cast a spell to create a spring of water but ended with
a flood because he did not know how to say stop.
The Risks
NATO has already decided at the Madrid Summit to entertain the
candidacies of five more countries--Romania, Slovenia, and the three
Baltic States. We very much hope that better sense prevails, but, if in
fact the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are formally admitted as
NATO members, there should be no doubt that these negotiations on
Baltic State membership will be seriously pursued. If nothing else,
partisan political competition in the United States will propel them.
No one will wish to be accused of faint heartedness.
If the Baltic States do become members of NATO, then the costs to
present NATO members of making a realistic effort to defend these
states bordering Russia at the eastern end of the Baltic Sea will
include very large increases in NATO's force projection capabilities,
including naval forces and combat aircraft, and quite probably explicit
reliance on nuclear weapons, matching a parallel ominous development in
Russia. There is no room in the small Baltic countries to station NATO
forces, but defending Romania and Bulgaria would in practical terms
probably require stationing large NATO forces there. If this happens,
part of them will have to be U.S. troops.
With these points, we also come to the risks of NATO enlargement.
Holding to the present twelve candidate states, enlargement would
dangerously expand the scope of current U.S. security commitments. It
would extend United States security guarantees to states with
traditional mutual hostility like Hungary and Romania, and Greece and
Bulgaria, not to mention Macedonia and Albania. More work has to be
done to resolve the quarrels of these countries, but it is very
doubtful that internalizing them in NATO is the most productive or the
safest way to go about it.
Then there is Russia. The Russian public is confronted by difficult
problems of daily life. Consequently, it pays relatively little
attention to foreign affairs. But the Russian political class in its
entirety opposes NATO enlargement. And this is the group that will form
the views of the Russian public on its outside environment for the
entire next generation. Russian policymakers are also worrying about
the activities of the Clinton administration and U.S. oil companies in
the Central Asian republics. Together with NATO enlargement, their
concerns reinforce the image of hostile encirclement that has already
played such a negative role in Russian history.
We have already seen negative reaction to NATO enlargement in the
Russian Duma's refusal thus far to ratify START II and its general
blockage of arms control agreements.
The NATO-Russia Joint Council is a useful device, but it will not
contain the negative Russian reaction to actual NATO enlargement,
especially if that enlargement includes the Baltic States bordering
directly on Russia.
Do we really want to deliberately add a decade of trying to cope
with this issue to the tasks of Russian governments already tottering
under the burden of economic and social reforms--in a country that
still has 20,000 nuclear weapons? It defies common sense to believe
that applying more and more pressures like this to a weak political
structure can have positive results.
Costs and Risks Not Necessary
The main point that every one of these costs and risks have in
common is that they are completely unnecessary.
They are unnecessary because what Eastern European countries most
want and most need is a form of membership in the Western community
that provides support for growing economic, social, and political
structures. The European Union is preeminently qualified to provide
this support. Negotiations to enlarge the European Union will begin
next year. The first candidates--very likely to be admitted--will be
none other than the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the same three
countries who are today the leading candidates for NATO enlargement.
Because of its nature and mission, the European Union can do this
job better than NATO. It is significant that public opinion in all
three candidate countries sees this and shows stronger support for
European Union membership than for NATO membership (see NATO Review,
#3, May-June 1997, p. 17). Moreover, it is appropriate that the
European Union and not the United States take on these economic and
political responsibilities for the Union's European neighbors. The
European Union can do so without the risks that arise from foisting off
this task on a less suitable NATO. It is true that these negotiations
for entry to the European Union may take considerable time, perhaps
until 2003 or 2004 or even longer. But Eastern Europe has the time for
this--it is making continuous political and economic progress, and
there is no crisis in Eastern Europe and no military threat to the area
to require rapid action. A special European Union enlargement program
for the Baltic States is urgently needed.
NATO enlargement is also unnecessary because an improved
Partnership for Peace backed by a coordinating Euro-Adantic Council
provides close bilateral security relationships between the candidate
countries and NATO.
And NATO enlargement is unnecessary because NATO in its present
form and membership provides stability in Europe--tying the United
States to Europe, reassuring European countries that a united Germany
will not become dominant, and providing very adequate residual
insurance against Russian misbehavior. NATO today performs all three of
these functions without increasing the possibility of Russian
misbehavior, as the enlargement project does, and it performs these
functions at no extra cost to the United States.
In sum, there is no perceptible logic or gain to the NATO
enlargement project, while the project entails many serious but also
superfluous costs and risks to this country. I believe these
circumstances justify a request from the Senate to the Administration
to suspend action on its present enlargement program until it has
rethought the issue and has presented to the Congress and the American
public a plan for organizing European security which is genuinely
comprehensive and which has a place in it for all of the potential NATO
candidates and ultimately also for Russia.
Such a plan would place European security on a far more stable
footing without the costs and the risks of the present NATO enlargement
program.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Mandelbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you
and my friend, Senator Biden, for giving me the opportunity to
share my views with this committee.
I have submitted for the record and a copy has been made
available to all members of this committee a pamphlet I have
written, entitled ``NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the 19th
Century,'' which sets out in detail my reasons for opposition.
In that pamphlet, I make at some length two points that I wish
simply to state here without elaboration because time is short.
[See appendix for the material received for the record.]
Dr. Mandelbaum. First, I believe that we get no benefits
whatsoever from NATO expansion. All public policy must weigh
advantages and disadvantages. Whatever the costs of NATO
expansion--and I will be talking about that--I believe that the
advantages we incur are zero.
Second, I believe that the only coherent reason for
expanding NATO is to contain Russia. This is a military
alliance. Russia might some day become a threat to its
neighbors, but it is not a threat now and, therefore, NATO
expansion, as planned by the administration, is at best
premature and at worst counterproductive.
Rather, Mr. Chairman, than dwelling on those points, I wish
to address five others that I think are important for the
committee and the Senate to consider: first, the costs of
expansion; second, the status of the former communist countries
that are not being included; third, an argument we are likely
to hear with ever greater frequency, that we must proceed with
this plan because our credibility is at stake; fourth, some
alternatives to our current course; and, fifth, some comments
on how this policy is being managed.
Let me also state for the record, Mr. Chairman, that I do
not agree with much of what was said about Russia and Russia's
attitude toward this policy by the previous panel. I would
hope, Mr. Chairman, that you and your distinguished colleague,
Mr. Biden, would convene one or more sessions of this committee
to hear the testimony on this subject of our best experts on
Russia, those with a lifetime of study, reflection, and dealing
with that important country.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I should
point out to the witness that we have ordered just such a
hearing and the very people you are talking about will all have
a chance to testify.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. As
often, you are ahead of me.
As for the costs, I believe that the administration has
dramatically underestimated both the total and the American
share of these costs. The administration's estimate of the
total is $35 billion, but the Congressional Budget Office
estimate is 4 to 5 times that. Moreover, as my colleague,
Ambassador Dean, has pointed out, the administration's
estimates presume 3 or 4 new entries, but I believe we are now
committed in some form to at least 8, with more to come.
Moreover, the administration assumes that no American troops
will be stationed in any of these countries.
But I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will be
possible to guarantee the security of the Baltic States without
the deployment of Western troops. That, at least, is a question
that I hope the Senate will ask the Department of Defense.
As to the share, the administration forecasts the United
States paying 15 percent of the fixed costs and 6 percent of
the total costs. I do not believe that is remotely likely, Mr.
Chairman.
The administration foresees the Central Europeans, the new
members, paying 35 percent of the total costs. I believe they
will not be able to pay. They have steadily reduced their
defense spending since their liberation. They have been warned
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund not to
increase defense spending. In no poll of public opinion in any
of the three prospective members have I ever seen more than 20
to 25 percent of respondents say that they are willing to spend
more on defense.
As for the Western Europeans paying 50 percent of the total
cost, as the administration predicts, this reminds me of a
story about the great Duke of Wellington, the victor at
Waterloo, who was once approached on the battlefield by a
junior soldier who did not recognize him and who approached him
by saying, ``Mr. Smith, I believe.'' The great duke turned to
him and said, ``If you believe that, you'll believe anything.''
How do we know that the Western Europeans won't pay 50
percent of the total cost--because they have said so. At the
Madrid Summit, Chancellor Kohl, President Chirac and Prime
Minister Blair all said on the record in one form or another
that their countries would pay nothing. Nor, Mr. Chairman, do I
believe that this is political posturing. It is politically
impossible for these countries to spend more money for NATO
expansion.
Germany and France are under enormous pressure to reduce
government spending in connection with the project of a single
European currency which, despite all of the claims that have
been made for NATO expansion, is far more important to them
than anything having to do with NATO.
Britain is under similar pressure.
All the Europeans regard NATO expansion as an American
initiative for which America will pay. So if we are going to do
this, Mr. Chairman--and I believe we should not, but if we
are--let us go in with our eyes open. No one else will share
the burden which occasions a number of reflections.
First, it may be that we won't have to spend very much
money. But if there is no need for more spending, that means
there is no threat to these countries, in which case there is
no need to expand NATO.
Second, whatever the near-term costs, we are undertaking
the mother of all unfunded mandates here.
Third, I believe that the refusal of the Europeans to bear
what we would regard as their fair share of the burden will
lead to a Transatlantic quarrel within NATO about burden
sharing which will weaken the Atlantic Alliance, which I favor
retaining, far more than expanding NATO could strengthen it.
Fourth, and finally, given that the Europeans will spend
nothing, this will raise one of two questions in the minds of
those of us American taxpayers who do have to pay. First, if
NATO is, indeed, a security organization, why is European
security more important to Americans than to Europeans? If, on
the other hand, as the administration sometimes claims, NATO is
being turned into a social welfare organization, the question
is why are American tax dollars being used for social spending
in Europe rather than for social spending, or, as some would
prefer, tax relief in the United States?
Perhaps, Mr. Chairman. There are good answers to these
questions, but I personally have never heard them.
The next point I would like to address is the status of the
former communist countries not being included in this
expansion, notably the Baltic States.
I believe that expansion as planned confronts the United
States with a problem with respect to these countries that we
can neither avoid nor solve. We have promised the Balts
membership. We have made statements to that effect. They expect
membership, and if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are
entitled to join NATO, certainly Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia
are equally, if not more, entitled. Yet the Russians have said
unequivocally from Yeltsin on down that this is unacceptable
and that they would respond negatively.
If they should do so, Mr. Chairman, that would leave us
with three options, each of which is worse than our present
circumstance is not having expanded NATO.
First we could expand NATO membership to the Baltics,
meaning that we would bring the Western military alliance to
Russia's border. At the very least, I believe we would have to
expect a sharp diminution in cooperation with Russia and the
remilitarization of the line between Europe, between NATO and
Russia.
Second, we could try to bring in the Baltic States but fail
because our Western European allies vetoed this. This, I
believe, they would do. I believe that Baltic membership is
unacceptable to the Western Europeans, which means that we
would have a huge Transatlantic quarrel with our Western
European allies over this issue.
Or, the third alternative where the Balts and Ukrainians
are concerned is that we would fail to expand and thereby do
precisely what the administration claims NATO expansion is
designed to avoid. We would renege on a promise. We would give
Russia a veto over NATO's affairs. We would draw a new line of
division in Europe and we would strand new democracies on the
wrong side of it.
Now some argue privately that we can avoid this issue, that
we can just expand to these three countries and let it go at
that. I do not believe that this is feasible, even if it were
proper, which I don't believe it is.
First, we are on record as promising the Balts membership.
Second, they will press us on this issue, and rightly so.
Third, no American president will ever unequivocally rule
out Baltic or Ukrainian membership, which means that the
Russians will always have to assume that we may expand to
Russia's border, which means at the very least that this issue
will become a central one in relations between us and the
Russians as far as the eye can see with no benefit to us.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address an argument that
we have heard already and will hear I think more insistently in
the future. That argument is that, whatever reservations one
may have about NATO expansion, it is now too late to turn back.
The failure to ratify NATO expansion, as indicated by the
administration, it will be said will shatter American
credibility and the U.S. position in the world.
I do not believe this is remotely the case. The argument
about maintaining credibility was a powerful one during the
cold war. It was the reason that we fought a major war in
Korea. It was the reason we stood firm in West Berlin. It was
the reason that we fought and continued to fight in Vietnam.
That argument was persuasive because of its context. We
were engaged in a global conflict with a militant, militarized
adversary. It was reasonable to fear that retreat in one place
would invite aggression elsewhere.
But that context has disappeared completely. The cold war
is over. The Soviet Union has collapsed. If the Senate decides
that the course recommended by the administration is not the
wisest one from the standpoint of American national interest,
will the Soviet army be in West Berlin the next day? The
question answers itself.
I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to address another version
of this issue, that is that this vote is a test of American
international commitment and that if we fail to expand NATO as
indicated, we will be guilty of isolationism.
Now as a professor of American foreign policy, let me
assure you that there is not now and never has been a policy of
isolationism in the United States. No significant American
figure ever imagined that the United States could or should
isolate itself from the rest of the world.
George Washington was not an isolationist. He was a shrewd
and effective geopolitician. We could use some of his
shrewdness now.
More to the point, even if the Senate should decide that
this particular course is not a wise one, this would not leave
the United States disengaged from Europe. We would still be
central to NATO. We would still be central to the Partnership
for Peace. We would still be central to the unprecedented and
under appreciated arms reduction treaties designed by President
Reagan and negotiated by President Bush. We would still be part
of a multiple series of bilateral and multilateral political,
economic, and cultural ties with Europe and with the rest of
the world.
This would hardly signal a retreat from engagement.
What is the alternative, then? Well, I echo my colleague's
injunction that there is certainly no need to do anything
rapidly, if at all. By the administration's own testimony,
there is no threat, there is no urgency. If you want to get a
sense of what is possible with respect to NATO expansion,
listen to those now urging expansion to Central Europe on the
subject of the Baltic countries.
They have said and will say well, there is no hurry. We
don't have to rush into bringing the Balts into NATO. We can
devise different arrangements for them.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that whatever security
arrangements are adequate for the Balts are more than adequate
for the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Czechs. Moreover, we
have an excellent security order now in place consisting of
NATO, the Partnership for Peace, arms treaties, and a Russia
that is not a threat. We cannot be sure that that will always
be true. But if circumstances change, we can change our policy,
and we will have plenty of advance notice to do so.
We should, I think, concentrate on the real security issues
in Europe: clearing up the status of the Russian finger on the
Baltic, Kaliningrad, getting some assurances on the status of
Belarus, getting START II ratified and proceeding to reduce
nuclear weapons even further, and proceeding further with the
reduction begun in the Reagan and Bush administrations of
reducing non-nuclear weapons in Europe.
Ironically, NATO expansion is at best a distraction from
and at worst a hindrance to dealing with the real security
threats.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would echo my colleague's
suggestion, first put forward by your distinguished former
colleague, Senator Nunn, that we harmonize the expansion of
security guarantees in Europe with European Union membership.
I have one final set of comments, Mr. Chairman, on the way
that this policy is being carried out.
As I have said, I see no benefits whatsoever to this
policy. But I recognize that there are those whom I deeply
respect, including the two gentlemen who flank you, one of whom
is present, also Senator Lugar, who have made important
contributions to American foreign policy in the past and who I
hope will in the future, who see things differently, who are
able to detect what I cannot find in this policy, namely some
merit.
But I believe that, even those who do find some merit,
ought to be concerned, indeed alarmed, about the way this
policy is being carried forward. I believe that that way is a
recipe for failure.
We know from bitter experience, since 1945, that the
foreign policies of the United States fail when they lack
public support. Public support, in turn, has three
requirements, none of which has been fulfilled here. The first
requirement is clear aims. But they are muddled. Is NATO an
organization to promote security or social welfare? Are we
including or containing Russia? Is this the old sturdy NATO or
an entirely new organization? The American public simply does
not know what it is being asked to support.
The second requirement for public support is a clear
strategy. I do not mean necessarily an exit strategy; I simply
mean a plan, some sense of how goals are to be achieved. There
is an old military axiom that says don't take the first step
without knowing the last.
In this case, not only do we not know the last step, we
don't know the next step. I find the way the issue of Baltic
and Ukrainian membership is being treated by the administration
particularly disturbing. In response to the question what comes
next, they simply say well, this process is open ended and we
won't name names.
Mr. Chairman, that is not an answer and it's not a policy.
It is an evasion. It amounts to saying to us, the American
people and you, our elected representatives, in response to
what may be the most momentous question hanging over this
issue, we won't tell you. Well, that means either they know but
won't disclose the answer or they won't disclose the answer
because they don't know it.
The first of these is constitutionally dubious, the second
strategically alarming.
The third requirement for attaining public support in any
major undertaking of the United States is candor about cost. As
I have said, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the discussion of
costs is characterized by an absence of candor.
The failure, finally, to fulfill these three requirements
has led, bitterly, to failure for the United States--in Vietnam
in the 1970's, in Lebanon in the 1980's, in Somalia in the
1990's, and I fear in Bosnia in the future.
Failure in Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and Bosnia was costly
and tragic. But failure where NATO expansion is concerned, at
the heart of Europe, involving the two greatest European
powers, Germany and Russia, and the most destructive weapons on
the planet, nuclear weapons, failure here, Mr. Chairman, could
be far worse.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I will say to you, sir, that I am very much
interested in your questions, and that is precisely the reason
these hearings have been scheduled.
Now there are at least three more hearings and I can
guarantee you, sir, that we are going to try to get to the
bottom of all the questions that you have asked plus the
hundreds that we have ourselves. So this is no done deal.
Mr. Ambassador, there is a large volume of public
information available for anybody who wants to find it that
Russia is cheating or has cheated on the ABM Treaty, the CFE
Treaty, the START I Treaty, the Missile Technology Control
Regime, the Biological Weapons Convention and, already in
advance, the as yet unratified Chemical Weapons Convention,
which, by the way, I oppose vigorously.
With the words of Sam Ervin ringing in my ears, I am going
to quote him because I thought he had a point. He said, up to
that time, when he was serving in the Senate, that the United
States had never lost a war or won a treaty. I think that is
what you are warning about here, both of you.
Now with the backdrop of the cheating that I have just
enunciated, could you be suggesting that the NATO enlargement
should be put off so that the hard line elements in the Russian
State Duma will approve the START II Treaty?
Ambassador Dean. Well, Mr. Chairman, I do expect that the
Yeltsin Government will make an effort shortly to gain Duma
approval of the START II Treaty.
I am not proposing, making the proposal you describe, but a
different one, which is that the administration should develop
a comprehensive program for, if you want to call it NATO
enlargement or for European security, which term I think I
would use, which has a place in it for all of these candidates,
including the Baltic States, Ukraine, Romania and all of the
other present candidates and possible future ones, and also
which lays out a timetable and requirements for possible
Russian membership in this system.
It is not accurate to say, as some have been saying here,
that Russia has expressed no interest in NATO membership.
Gorbachev several times suggested this as a possibility.
Yeltsin has several times suggested it as a possibility. Only
last year, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, speaking at Davos,
again suggested it as a possibility.
It is true that they have never pressed a specific claim
for it.
But what I have in mind is a program which would allow NATO
enlargement, which would defuse its negative aspects, and
which, at the end of the road, would have a real prospect of
Russian membership, but in a situation where they, because they
had such a prospect, would not object to the membership of
Baltic States, Ukraine and other potential candidates. That is
what I find missing from the administration's approach: We
should either not enlarge, or do it right.
The Chairman. I am not going to try to play ``gotcha'' with
you. But back in 1993--and I know you were going to be asked
about this if you have not been before, and I do it for no
reason whatsoever except to give you an opportunity to explain
now for the record what others may ask you--in 1993, you wrote
an op-ed for the ``Washington Post'' that made one of the best
arguments I have ever seen in support of NATO expansion. You
wrote that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic would be ``good for them, good for the West''--and I'm
quoting you--``and good for Russia, too, provided that it is
accompanied by a clear definition of a new NATO policy toward
the former Soviet Union.
[The information referred to follows:]
[From the Washington Post, September 6, 1993]
Open the Ranks To Eastern Europe
(By Michael Mandelbaum)
An event of symbolic significance took place in Warsaw last month
when President Boris Yeltsin became the first Russian to visit Poland
as the leader of a free and equal country rather than as an imperial
master. The Polish government used the occasion to advocate a measure
with practical consequences for the future, especially for the United
States. Polish President Lech Walesa issued a joint statement with
Yeltsin noting Poland's desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the Western security alliance that had opposed the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, and stating Russia's understanding of this
desire.
The idea is a good one. The inclusion of Poland--and of Hungary and
the Czech Republic, the two other formerly Communist countries most
firmly committed to democracy and free markets--would be good for them,
good for the West and good for Russia too, provided that it is
accompanied by a clear definition of a new NATO policy toward the
former Soviet Union.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic seek full participation in
NATO along with membership in the European Community as a way of
anchoring themselves firmly and irreversibly in the West. Their pro-
Western governments wish to strengthen the forces within their
countries committed to consolidating democracy and building market
economies.
Poland, the largest and strategically most important of them, faces
no immediate threat: It is on cordial terms with its historical
adversary to the west, Germany, and the collapse of the Soviet Union
means that, with the exception of the detached Baltic fragment of
Kaliningrad, it no longer shares a border with Russia, its great
imperial tormentor to the east. Membership in NATO is, for the Poles, a
way to ensure that no threat will arise in the event that Russian
political forces opposed to Boris Yeltsin and democracy and interested
in recreating the Soviet empire should take power in Moscow.
Because Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic face no imminent
threat, the West would not risk war by admitting these countries to
NATO. Nor would their membership saddle the alliance with internal
territorial and political disputes of the kind that set Greece and
Turkey at odds with each other during the Cold War.
Including the three Eastern European countries in NATO would bring
benefits not only to them but to the West as well. It would ensure
stability on Germany's eastern border. It would extend the zone of
stability and democracy in Europe eastward, thereby consolidating some
of the gains of the Cold War. Perhaps most important, NATO membership
for these three countries would begin the long complicated and
necessary process of transforming NATO from a defensive alliance
against a threat that no longer exists into a broader security
community capable of contributing to the establishment of democracy and
the maintenance of peace from the English Channel to the Pacific coast
of Russia.
Part of that process may well involve undertaking ``out of area''
missions, such as policing a negotiated settlement in the former
Yugoslavia. Here Poland could be particularly useful. As a country with
a proud military tradition and a strong sense of international
responsibility, Poland would likely be more willing to furnish troops
for such operations than many Western European members of the alliance.
NATO's European members are not unanimously enthusiastic about
opening their ranks to Eastern Europe. Many in Western Europe want the
alliance to remain exactly as it is, as an insurance policy against the
revival of a threat from the east and as a mechanism for preventing the
``renationalization'' of defense policy, by which they mean independent
German foreign and defense policies.
The only way to perpetuate NATO, however, may be to change it.
Unless the alliance adapts to the new circumstances of the post-Cold
War world, public support for it, especially in North America, may
wither. As Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the most influential
Republican voice on foreign policy and a supporter of expanding
alliance membership, recently put it, ``The choice is not between the
current NATO and a new NATO but rather between a new NATO and no
NATO.''
Were it to accept the three Eastern European countries, the
alliance would have to establish a timetable for their accession to
membership. The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is
NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically,
expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises
the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most
important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and
multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between
these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on
their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive
on the planet today.
An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful
relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of
constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any
concern for Ukrainian security.
There is no more difficult task for the United States and its
European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their
accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task
seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed
yet another service for the West.
The Chairman. Now how should I put this.
Have Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic veered so far
from the course of democratic and economic reforms in the
intervening years that you now oppose their membership in NATO?
As I say, I am not trying to play ``gotcha'' with you. Take
your time.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. It is a good
question, a fair question, and it bears on your hearings and on
the process that you and your colleagues are going through.
I wrote that article in the fall of 1993 when it appeared
that the expansion of NATO would be acceptable to the Russian
political class, and you quoted a crucial point in that
article--provided we could find appropriate arrangements for
the countries between Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
and Russia.
The administration has come up with no such proposals and
that is what my colleague, Ambassador Dean, was suggesting and
what I think is needed.
But let me go further, Mr. Chairman. I wrote that piece and
then I got detailed responses from people whom I deeply respect
who said, we think you're wrong. You should rethink this issue.
Because I respected them so much, I did sit down and
rethink them, leading, incidentally, to a book that I published
last year. I concluded that my critics were right and that I
had been wrong. I believe this is important for the following
reason, Mr. Chairman.
This is one of those issues that sounds good at first
glance. When you first hear about it, you think why not? Let's
be inclusive. Who could object to that?
But then, when you look further into it, you discover all
the snares and pitfalls and disadvantages. So I changed my
mind.
If I can change my mind, Senator, so can others. It is
never too late to be right. I would say to some of my friends
that if you change your mind on this issue, you will feel
better and you will be doing your country a service.
The Chairman. Now you know how I felt about the Chemical
Weapons Treaty.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. I wonder if I could follow up your question
with the gentleman.
The Chairman. Sure.
Senator Smith. It seems to me that the NATO--Russia
agreement provides the very kind of security arrangement that
you propose that they needed to make this all work. Yet, that
is one of the things that gives some of us heartburn, that
maybe it gave them too much.
Is it defects in that agreement that caused you now to
change your view?
Dr. Mandelbaum. No. I changed my mind some time before. But
I'm glad you raised the NATO--Russian agreement, Senator,
because I think that does deserve some comment.
I would make two comments in particular. First, this
agreement has been put in place on the basis of publicly stated
and diametrically opposite interpretations by the American and
Russian Presidents. President Yeltsin said on television,
publicly, to the Russian people that this gives Russia a veto
over all the issues of concern to Russia in Europe. President
Clinton told us just the opposite.
So I fear that this could be a recipe for misunderstanding.
More to the point, Senator, President Yeltsin and every
other Russian has asserted that the NATO--Russia charter is
null and void if and when NATO expands beyond these three to
former Republics of the Soviet Union. That is why I say,
Senator, that the current expansion, as planned, puts that
second expansion irrevocably on the agenda, presents us with a
problem that we can neither avoid nor solve, and to no benefit
to ourselves.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, in the 24 years I have been here
I have called on both of you to ask for your advice. I respect
you both a great deal. I think on almost every issue, certainly
with you, Mr. Ambassador, we have been in agreement.
But I think you are dead wrong here. Let me tell you why. I
think you are unintentionally disingenuous when you assume a
dynamic situation in Eastern Europe and a static situation in
Russia. Thank God you are not doing planning from this
perspective regarding what the future of the United States and
Europe will be.
All of the criteria you lay out assume a static situation
in Russia. All the criteria you set out assume a dynamic
situation in Eastern Europe.
Second, you ended, Professor Mandelbaum, with the comment:
what purpose for NATO if not to contain Russia?
Well, Ambassador Dean can tell you the purpose. It was not
merely to contain Russia. It was to harness Germany; it was to
bring stability in Europe; and it has never, never, never only
been to contain Russia.
Now if you accept the proposition you stated, then we
should not only not expand NATO, we don't need NATO. We don't
need NATO.
Third, this idea that all of a sudden all of these arms
control agreements have been put on hold because of expansion
is a perversion of recent history. They were on hold before
they got anywhere, before there was any serious discussion of
expanding NATO. There wasn't anybody who believed it was going
to happen.
I visited Russia on several occasions; sat in the Duma;
went and spoke to those folks. Mr. Ambassador, they were going
nowhere fast. The reason is one of the arguments you have
presented. From the Russian standpoint, they need START III,
not START II. They cannot afford START II.
It didn't have a damn thing to do--with all due respect--
with NATO expansion. Also, this idea that we must have clear
aims, clear strategy, and candor about costs. If the costs are
as you stated, I am the only one who has stated from the outset
that there will be no expansion of NATO. We will not vote for
it--flat out.
I spent one entire week--and the Polish Ambassador is
sitting back there and probably remembers that week--
embarrassing people on occasion, sitting with them and saying,
``if you think you get a first class ticket without paying your
35 percent, forget it.'' Our State Department folks sat there
and thought oh, my God, what is he saying?
Well, it is real simple, real basic. If you are correct and
if the 15 European members of NATO have not gotten the message
that they have to pay 50 percent of the cost and the expanding
countries 35 percent, then there will be no vote here. You
don't have a thing to worry about. Nothing will expand. I
promise you that.
It will not happen.
The last point regards the projection of force, Mr.
Ambassador, that was part of a 1991 NATO agreement before there
was any discussion--any discussion--of NATO expansion. They are
not meeting their agreement--``they,'' meaning the 15 European
nations currently in NATO. They are not doing it. But it is not
because of NATO expansion.
Now, I could not agree with you all more if the costs are
as you state, misrepresented and likely to be unmet. I agree
with you. Expansion of NATO is a dead letter.
But I find it fascinating to go back to this notion of the
rationale for NATO in the first place. It is true that no one
feels a threat. I sat in every Eastern European capital. No,
that's not true. I didn't get to Romania. But I listened to
them, all the leadership, opposition as well as elected
leadership. None of them feels any threat from Russia right
now. None. Zero. None.
So if it is the Russian threat that propels the rationale
for NATO, let's save ourselves $120 billion now. I'll tell you
what I am more worried about. I am more worried about Germany
and France 20 years from now. They have not yet established a
degree of political maturation after over 100 years of being
nation-states, where they are at peace with one another without
the United States playing an integral role in Europe. That is
what I worry about.
I think that is a more real prediction and I'll bet you, if
you have a differing view, our grandchildren will read that the
more likely scenario than the amputated Russian bear lumbering
across Europe to attack, is that Germany and France are at it
again 30 years from now--maybe not in open war but in open
conflict.
So all these false premises create false choices. The
choice between knowing now exactly how all of Central Europe
and Eastern Europe are going to mature, or, without that
precise knowledge now, doing nothing. You sound like the former
general and revered figure in America today, General Powell. He
is the reason why we did not get to the point that you and I
think we should have gotten to in the Balkans. He said unless
he could be guaranteed that no American would be killed or
guaranteed that we could put 500,000 forces there, America
should do nothing.
That is a prescription for paralysis.
You point out that if the rationale for NATO relates to a
Russian threat only, we should not expand. Well, we should not
have NATO, I would respectfully suggest, if that is the only
rationale for its existence. We could save a lot of money.
Second, what I am curious about is how we got to the point
where anyone is thinking about permanently stationing troops in
the Baltics or permanently stationing troops in Romania. You
are correct, Ambassador, that if there is an open threat, we
will have to do that. But, guess what? If they are not part of
NATO, what do you think we are going to do?
What do you think we are going to do? Are you all taking
the position similar to what the Brits took in 1937, 1938, and
1939, which said by the way, if there is a threat, we are not
going to respond?
If there is a threat to Romania, if Russian troops are
massing on the border, or to the Balts, we are going to do one
of two things. We are either going to capitulate or Europe will
respond. All the President is saying is wherever we have new
members coming in, we will put infrastructure in place, no
permanent stationing of American forces, to accommodate the
very thing that we would have to accommodate if this threat
becomes a reality.
So I think it is somewhat disingenuous to suggest that the
Duma, because of its reaction--and by the way, I read every
word of what you write, Doctor, every word; I can probably
quote some of it from memory--that the Duma didn't go along
with these arms control agreements because of expansion.
Malarkey. I think it is disingenuous to suggest that if we are
going to bring in a country to NATO, it means that we would
have to permanently station troops there. That assumes that we
would not react if, in fact, there was a threat to them anyway.
So look, I think there are problems with expansion. But I
think the idea of the Russians eventually becoming part of
NATO, relies on their definition of NATO as an OSCE. It is not
a NATO like you and I define NATO.
No Russian leader that I am aware of has said--and it would
be wonderful if I could stand corrected on this; I will not say
it again and make the ``mistake'' again--no Russian leader has
said they are willing to subordinate Russian forces under the
command of an American general as required by the way NATO is
now constructed. They have said a redefined NATO, i.e., OSCE,
is something they could think about.
So I just think it is real important for such impressive
people for whom I have such great respect, not to raise the bar
here in a way that creates a problem. It's a little bit like
saying to me that if, in fact, in 1949, you couldn't tell me
exactly whether or not Germany could ever become a member of
NATO, we should have no NATO because we would be isolating
Germany like we did after World War I. We are going to put new
NATO members in that position.
I think I have talked too much and I apologize.
Senator Wellstone. Let's hear from the witnesses.
The Chairman. Have at it.
Dr. Mandelbaum. If I could respond, Mr. Chairman, certainly
no one could accuse Senator Biden of lacking candor.
Let me confine myself to three points by way of
clarification and rebuttal. First, I do not take the position
that the only justification for NATO is containing Russia.
Senator Biden. What is the justification?
Dr. Mandelbaum. The only justification for expanding NATO
is containing Russia. But there is a continuing a continuing
justification for NATO, which I have set out in my 1996 book,
``The Dawn of Peace in Europe,'' and I would be happy to supply
you and other interested members of the committee with a copy.
Senator Biden. Can you summarize in a paragraph what the
rationale for NATO is?
Dr. Mandelbaum. The rationale for NATO is three-fold: to
keep the United States engaged in Europe; to prevent the
Germans from having to pursue an independent policy; and to
serve as an insurance policy in case things go wrong in Russia.
Let me add, since you ask me, Senator, that does not
require any particular level of force or any particular level
of expenditure. I remind you that in 1949, when the NATO Treaty
was first signed, it was envisioned as a guarantee pact, not as
an integrated military force on the continent.
I certainly favor keeping that guarantee in place
indefinitely, and I think that the military force we need in
Europe, if any, to carry it out really depends on the nature of
the threat, which depends on Russia. So we should be flexible
on that as the founders of NATO intended.
Senator Biden. With all due respect, how is that different?
I'm sorry. We should debate this later, I guess. I'm sorry.
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Mandelbaum. I would be happy to return and I have
presumed on the chairman's patience. Could I have one more
minute, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Sure.
Dr. Mandelbaum. I would like to comment on the widespread
assertion that NATO is a school for democracy, that being a
part of the Western military alliance fosters democracy.
Senator Biden. No straw men. I didn't say that.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Well, this is widely said, Senator. I don't
impute it to you, but I believe it is false. I believe there is
no evidence for it.
To give you an example, Germany, West Germany became a
member of NATO in 1954, 9 years after the end of the war, when
democracy was fully established. So many things are now imputed
to NATO. In fact, such great claims are made for the
democratizing benefits of NATO for which, as far as I can tell,
there is no evidence that I sometimes think that one of the
great miracles of history is 150 years of democracy without
NATO membership in the United States.
But I would like to say for the record that I believe these
three countries are democracies. They are civilized, Western
countries. They do not need NATO membership to behave properly.
They have a wide range of problems, all of which stem from 40
years of communism, all of which they will deal with
successfully, none of which has anything to do with NATO.
Senator Biden. Why does Germany need NATO, then?
Dr. Mandelbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
indulgence.
The Chairman. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I think you ought to
have some time, too.
Ambassador Dean. It would be difficult to respond to all of
the issues that Senator Biden has raised.
Senator Biden. Oh, we'd be here at midnight.
Ambassador Dean. Yes, we would, or something close to it.
Senator Biden. I apologize, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Dean. However, I did not hear anything in what
he said which would do anything other than strengthen my point
of departure, which was that NATO, in its present form, is
adequate to these tasks without enlargement.
Senator Biden. I agree. We have not gotten to that. I was
just pointing out the criticisms you made of expansion. We have
not gotten to the next piece.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell you, when
that light turns red, I am not going to pay any attention to
it, either.
Senator Biden. You have to be here 25 years to do that,
Paul, or be the Ranking Member, one of the two.
Senator Wellstone. Then, Joe, I will do it proportionally
and still won't pay any attention to that light.
The Chairman. Just try.
Senator Wellstone. Seriously, there are just a couple of
specific points I want to pick up on that went back to my
question earlier.
As I understand the position that you all have taken--and,
first of all, I am just trying to find out as somebody who is
trying to work his way through this and trying to decide what
is the right position to take, that is, the why of this, why
are we expanding NATO--I think what I understood your
testimony, what I think you have said is that it does not
really make sense if you are trying to think about it from the
point of view of expanding democracy or stability in these
countries; and that probably the reason for expanding would be
for containment; but then the question is who are we trying to
contain. Am I correct or not correct, just in terms of what you
said?
Ambassador Dean. Yes.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Yes.
Senator Wellstone. The second point is cost and we will
come back to that. I think that is a big issue in our country.
I think we all agree on that. Senator Biden has made it crystal
clear that, in fact, if some of the estimates of cost severely
underestimate what we are going to be faced with, or the
European countries are not going to be paying, then that is
going to become a big concern in our country.
But I still want to focus now on this. If there does not
seem to be a clear reason to do this, let's then go to the
downside of it beside cost. I want to go back to Russia because
I keep feeling that what happens in Russia is going to
crucially affect the quality of our lives and our children's
lives for better or worse. I want for it to be better. I want
the forces of democracy to triumph there.
There are two points. You said, Professor Mandelbaum, that
you did not agree--at least I thought I heard you say this, but
you did not get a chance to comment on it--with the analysis of
opinion, at least among the political class, the positions that
President Yeltsin has taken, and so on and so forth, in regard
to expansion. Could you spell that out a little bit more
because the testimony prior to your testimony was very
different.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Yes, Senator. I am delighted to hear that
you will have a panel in which people who are genuine experts
on Russia will come and tell you this.
What I would say is what I believe is a fact is that no one
in Russia favors NATO expansion, period.
Now there are many things you can say about this. You can
say that they can't stop it, which is true. You can say that
they will get used to it over time which may be true. We simply
don't know. You can say that NATO expansion is so important
that it is worth paying whatever price we have to pay with the
Russians in order to secure it. Of course, I don't agree with
that because I don't think it is worth anything at all. But
that is certainly a legitimate position and I assume that the
two panelists who preceded us would take that position.
But I do not believe there is any basis in fact for saying
that any Russian of any political stripe is at all well
disposed toward NATO expansion. I also believe that it is the
democrats who are most concerned because they care most about
cooperating with the West and NATO expansion makes it more
difficult--not impossible, but more difficult--for them to
promote the policy that they prefer.
Senator Wellstone. My final question is this. That, to me,
is a very important issue. I think that is a serious question
and one that we need to think deeply about.
Now my last question is more one for the record because
Senator Biden did not get a chance to follow up on this and I
want to do so for him. There is the whole question of the
definition of NATO and whether or not Russia has said that it
would like to join an expanded NATO or not. Senator Biden was
very vociferous in saying that he would like for somebody to
clarify the record.
Could one of you do that?
Dr. Mandelbaum. Well, Senator, in my pamphlet I cite a
number of published instances where senior Russian officials
inquired on this and were told in no uncertain terms that they
were not going to be allowed to join NATO.
I would add, Senator, that I do not favor bringing Russia
into NATO. I think we have the best of all possible worlds now,
and it is only what I regard as the ill-advised plan to expand
NATO that raises this issue at all. Were there no NATO
expansion, I don't think the Russians would be interested.
Given my view of NATO's continuing relevance, I see no purpose
in Russian membership.
Senator Wellstone. If there is no expansion, it is a moot
point. If there is expansion, then the question becomes how
this is perceived within Russia.
Dr. Mandelbaum. Let me add one other point, Senator. If we
expand to Central Europe, then the pressure will be enormous,
and rightly so, to expand to the Baltic countries and to
Ukraine. At that point, we may find ourselves in the position
in which the only way we can honor the promise to the Baltic
countries is to bring in the Russians at all.
Now that might or might be a good thing. It might or might
not be disastrous. But I would regard that as less good from
the point of view of American national interest to the status
quo, which I favor.
Senator Wellstone. Ambassador Dean, is there anything you
want to ask--and I am out of time?
Ambassador Dean. Yes.
Senator Wellstone. I'm sorry. I mean is there anything you
want to add.
Ambassador Dean. I think it is quite clear that the Baltic
State membership issue is the danger line in this entire
complex of questions. There is no doubt whatever about the
record there, that both Yeltsin--and Chernomyrdin said it only
2 weeks ago in Lithuania--feels that this would be a matter of
the gravest security interest to Russia.
That is the problem that I see. That is the reason why I
suggested that there be a fast track European Union method of
giving membership in the European Union to these three
countries as a substitute for their membership. I believe since
they are small and their economies are not large, this could be
done and should be done.
The Chairman. The distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Biden,
wants 5 minutes, and I tell him that I have the wire clippers
in my hand.
Senator Biden. All right and thank you.
Gentlemen, Mr. Ambassador, I agree with you absolutely
about the Balts. That is the fault line.
Really, much of what is being said here is that if, in
fact, we had said at Madrid only these three and never anybody
else, concern would be significantly diminished for both of
you--I think, diminished. You still would not be for NATO
expansion, but it does not rise to the level that you are most
concerned about.
I fully agree with you and made the very point you made
when I met with our European colleagues. I think when Senator
Roth and I were with the NATO Observer Group and met with
European defense ministers and foreign ministers, although they
could not make such a judgment, we felt that a rapid move
toward EU membership would really diffuse an awful lot of this.
Next, would your view change if tomorrow the Duma passed
the START Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention? If a week
from now or a month from now that happened, what would you say
then about whether or not this emboldens the Reds and the
Browns, emboldens the nationalists, and undermines U.S.-Russian
relations? Would it change your view at all if those arms
agreements are passed by the Duma? That is for either one of
you.
Ambassador Dean. It would change my view as to the present
impact. But the souring of Russian political opinion toward
relations with the United States did take place earlier and has
been a constant. My worry, of course, is about the long-range
implications of this development over a period of decades.
Senator Biden. I think that is a legitimate concern. I am
not dismissing that concern.
I remind you that 2 plus 4 was the same argument. I just
want to remind you of that. The same, exact argument was made.
It does not mean it should not have been made and it does
not mean the argument should not be made now. My point is about
dynamic change in Russia.
The question I have is what do you think happens in the
gray area? I read with great interest in your piece, Doctor,
about moving the fault line East. We are just drawing new lines
in Europe. That's a legitimate point that you made.
Regarding the Poles and the Romanians who have not been
invited to joint NATO thus far, what do you think these
countries in this gray zone now do about their military
relationships? I am not making the argument now that if we
don't do this such and such will happen.
The chairman and I agree. If, in fact, this thing goes down
for whatever reason, that the idea of American credibility is
not lost. We have credibility because we are the 10,000 pound
gorilla. It does not matter what anybody thinks. There is
credibility, period. I agree with that argument. So I am not
making that argument in a back door way here.
But what happens? What do you think will develop? Just as
you feel it is appropriate to ask the President to be able to
tell you now how that region is going to develop so that he has
a comprehensive plan, you tell me how you envision Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet States evolving in terms
of their security architecture over the next 10 to 15 years
absent this move.
Ambassador Dean. Maybe I could start.
Absent this move, I think the main slack in the situation
should be taken by the European Union and its expansion of
membership.
Senator Biden. Do you think they will?
Ambassador Dean. Oh, yes. I do think so. As a matter of
fact, most experts do agree that the first tranche will be
accepted by the year 2003 or 2004.
Senator Biden. Six months ago, those same experts did not
think there was going to be one. I spent the last 2 years of my
life doing nothing but this. I read the same experts.
Ambassador Dean. Yes. But I think it will happen. Maybe the
timing will be off. I think we realize that Estonia is in this
first group.
Senator Biden. That's right.
Ambassador Dean. And I think there is good prospect that
the other two Baltic States will get in, too.
I think NATO in its present form should continue. I think
the European Union should expand and that, indeed, the OSCE,
which you have mentioned, should be built up somewhat. I have
no objection whatever to the NATO--Russian Founding Act. I
think it is a good thing which should be expanded. So it, too,
should play a role. Those are the components, I think, of a
stable European security order.
Senator Biden. I will leave you with only one thought. The
red light is about to go on, and I take the chairman seriously.
I leave you with only one thought. Just as I will entertain
the argument you have made--and sincerely, because I have an
inordinate amount of respect for both of you. That is not
hyperbole. You know that. You know what our relationship has
been all these years.
I would like you to think about the dynamism that exists
within Russia now and why you feel we have to view it in a
static sense rather than a dynamic sense.
I cannot predict to you exactly how it is going to turn
out. But I am prepared to predict, and my political future is
resting on this prediction, that the dynamism in Russia is a
dynamism that looks West. Russia sees, or ultimately will see,
security and stability among its former ``charges'' and will
moderate, not exacerbate, its attitudes toward dominion. I see
that dynamic movement.
I am not suggesting you agree with it. I just respectfully
suggest you at least entertain the prospect that if past is
prologue, the recent past, I think there is argument that my
view is at least as probable as the one you have.
The last point I will make is this. I have noticed in the
French legislature, the German legislature, and the British
legislature, that when it comes to a choice between farmers and
foreign policy, farmers always win. Did you hear what I just
said? Farmers always win.
One thing I do know more about than either of you is
politics. I mean that sincerely. Just look at the past. The
reason why there has been any movement, in my view, on the EU
is because of the movement on NATO.
The Chairman. As they say it in order, so might it be.
Senator Biden. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you, all. I hope that we have
ventilated this. We have tried to. This is the way we want to
do all hearings.
The record will be kept open for 3 days for Senators to
submit written questions.
Thank you for appearing.
We stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 2 p.m., October 22, 1997.]
QUALIFICATIONS OF POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC FOR NATO
MEMBERSHIP
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee was scheduled to meet, pursuant to notice, at
2 p.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon.
Gordon H. Smith, presiding.
The Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the
Qualifications of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for
NATO membership was canceled at 2:00 p.m. on October 22 due to
an objection under Rule 26, Sec. 5a. Per the unanimous consent
request of Senator Smith of Oregon on November 5, 1997, the
testimony submitted for this hearing is included in the written
record of the hearing on NATO enlargement.
Prepared Statement of Marc Grossman,
Assistant Secretary of State,
European and Canadian Affairs
Senator Smith, Senator Biden, members of the committee It is an
honor and a privilege to have this opportunity to appear before you
today.
On October 7th, Secretary of State Albright appeared before this
Committee to make the case for NATO enlargement and to ask for your
consent to the addition of three new members to the Atlantic Alliance.
Today I hope to help contribute to your deliberations by talking
about the reasons the United States and our NATO allies extended
invitations to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. As Secretary
Albright said here on October 7: ``Let me assure you that we invited
only the strongest candidates to join the Alliance.''
NATO membership entails the most solemn security commitment one
country can make to another--the commitment to come to their defense in
a crisis. NATO's decision in 1994 to enlarge the Alliance, and the
Alliance's decision in 1997 to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic to begin accession negotiations were made only after a careful
review of America's strategic interests and the qualifications of the
countries involved. In making the decision to invite Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic to begin the process of accession, we put
America's interests first.
Secretary Albright reviewed for this committee the reasons NATO
enlargement is in America's interests: extending the zone of stability
which NATO provides to the countries to NATO's east would further our
goal of a united, peaceful Europe.
NATO must remain the strong Alliance that has served us so well for
the last half century. That is why we have said from the onset that we
will only admit countries that are willing and able to assume the
responsibilities of membership and whose inclusion will serve the
overall strategic interests of the Alliance. NATO is not a charity or a
political club; it is and will remain a military Alliance.
All aspiring nations must meet each of these two tests: first, they
must prove that they are willing and able; second, we in the Alliance
must agree that their membership serves our common interests.
Before turning to the qualifications of these three countries, let
me describe why their admission passes the test of being in the U.S.
national interest.
The United States is a European power. If we have an interest in
the lands west of the Oder river, then we also surely have an interest
in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between
the Baltic and Black Seas. We fought World War II in part because these
nations had been invaded. We waged the Cold War in part because they
were help captive. Had Poland, Hungary, and the Czech republic been
allowed to choose in 1949, when NATO was first founded, there is little
doubt that they would have chosen to join the Atlantic Alliance.
As Secretary of State Albright said yesterday, now that the nations
of central Europe are free, we want them to succeed and we want them to
be safe. For if there were a major threat to the security of the
region, I am certain we would chose to act, enlargement or no
enlargement. Expanding NATO now is the surest and most cost effective
way to prevent that kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to
make that choice.
Poles, Czechs and Hungarians do not look at NATO as a one way
street. They are committed to the Alliance's principles of shared
responsibilities. They want to join NATO for the same reasons current
allies want to keep it. History has taught them to believe both in a
strong Alliance and a strong American role in Europe. They want to
start taking responsibility for their freedom and security. They want
to contribute to the security of the trans-Atlantic region.
But recognition of our strategic interest and their aspirations is
not enough to earn an invitation to the world's most successful
Alliance. These countries have to demonstrate to all current NATO
members that they are qualified. NATO is a first class Alliance and we
expect all new members to make a first-class contribution.
Decisions on who to include in the Alliance are made by the
Alliance. There are no set criteria for NATO membership. There is no
checklist that countries can meet in order automatically to gain entry.
But there are five basic principles which we have established as
benchmarks and we have insisted that each prospective member meet.
These five principles are based on the NATO Enlargement Study of 1995
and were subsequently laid out by former Secretary of Defense Perry in
a speech in Norfolk, Virginia in June 1996. They are:
<bullet> commitment to democratic reform;
<bullet> commitment to a free market economy; good neighborly
relations;
<bullet> civilian control of the military; and
<bullet> military capability to operate effectively with the
Alliance.
Twelve Central and Eastern European Partners have expressed their
desire to join NATO. Last spring at the NATO Ministerial in Sintra, we
discussed with our allies which of the aspiring Partners met this twin
test of being in our strategic interests and being qualified. In the
run-up to the July Madrid summit, we consulted closely in the Alliance
on our choice. The discussions were vigorous.
At the Madrid summit, President Clinton and the allies reached
consensus to extend invitations to the three countries we are
discussing today: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Why these three? Because Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
have not only met the requirements for NATO membership; they have
exceeded them. Because Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be
security producers, not just security consumers. Because Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will make the Alliance stronger and
will enhance European security and stability. And because Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic will make America safer for future
generations.
I will address the first four principles, my colleague, Assistant
Secretary Kramer will address the military capabilities and
contributions of each of the three invitees.
POLAND:
Poland has a solid track record of nearly eight years of reform. It
has just witnessed its second democratic change of government since the
collapse of communism. It has held seven fully free and fair elections
at various levels since 1989. The press is free and the government has
been a strong supporter of human rights. Poland has a new Constitution,
approved by national referendum in May, 1997, which codifies the
division of powers among the President, Council of Ministers,
legislative and judicial branches.
Poland's economic growth rates since 1993 have been among the
highest in Europe. Economic reforms in 1989 removed price controls,
eliminated most industry subsidies, opened markets to international
competition, and imposed strict budgetary and monetary discipline.
Poland was admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in 1996. The government is committed to
privatization, and the private sector accounts for nearly \2/3\ of GDP
and employs 60 percent of the workforce. In 1996, Poland spent
approximately 2.3% of GDP on defense.
Poland has resolved outstanding differences with its neighbors.
Last May, President Kwasniewski traveled to Kiev to sign a declaration
of reconciliation with Ukrainian President Kuchma, and Poland and
Ukraine are exploring the possibility of establishing a joint
peacekeeping battalion. Poland has strong economic ties with Russia and
expressed support for the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed last May.
Poland's relationship with the Baltic states, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and with its NATO neighbors, Germany and Denmark, is excellent.
Poland's new Constitution codifies civilian control of the military
and Poland is establishing legal and administrative structures to
ensure such control is effective and provides for parliamentary
oversight of the military. The 1996 National Defense Law subordinated
the Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of Defense.
HUNGARY:
Hungary has had two complete democratic changes of government since
1989, in fully free and fair elections. All six parliamentary parties
strongly support Hungary's entry into NATO. The government upholds
human rights, freedom of expression, the rule of law, and an
independent judiciary. The government has taken steps to improve the
conditions of its ethnic minorities and to deal more effectively with
the growing problem of organized crime.
Economically, in 1995, Hungary engaged in a successful strict
stabilization program to cut the current account and budget deficits
and to accelerate structural reform. Since 1990, Hungary has attracted
almost \1/3\ of all foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern
Europe (approximately 16 billion dollars). Hungary has privatized
almost all of the telecommunications and energy sectors, and has almost
completed the consolidation and privatization of its banking sector.
Hungary joined the OECD in May, 1996. In 1996, Hungary spent 1.6% of
GDP on defense and has committed to increase military spending by .1%
of GDP per year for the next five years.
Hungary has also resolved all outstanding differences with its
neighbors. In 1996, Hungary concluded Basic Treaties on Understanding,
Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with Slovakia and Romania, ending
long-standing disputes among those countries. Hungary and Austria have
a joint peacekeeping battalion which is part of the UN peacekeeping
force in Cyprus, and Hungary and Romania are working to establish a
joint peacekeeping battalion. Hungary's relations with Slovenia, Italy
and Croatia are strong. In the last year, Hungary and Ukraine have
signed bilateral cooperation agreements against organized crime,
terrorism and drug trafficking.
Hungary has effective civilian control of the military, guaranteed
by legislative and constitutional mechanisms which provide oversight of
the military by the Defense Ministry, and oversight of the Defense
Ministry by the Parliament. The constitution gives Parliament control
of the military budget, structure, deployment, fielding, stationing,
and senior leadership. The 1993 National Defense Law specifies that the
Minister of Defense, who is a member of Parliament, is the superior to
the Chief of Staff (Commander) of the Armed Forces.
THE CZECH REPUBLIC:
The Czech Republic has three fully free and fair elections since
1989. In 1996, two national elections were held: one for the lower
house and one for the newly-created Senate. The Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary and guarantees internationally recognized
human rights. Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of the
press are fully protected.
Since 1989, the Czech Republic has engaged in tight fiscal and
monetary policies, liberalization of trade and prices, and
privatization of state enterprises.
Real GDP has been rising since 1994, inflation is controlled, and
unemployment is low. The Czech Republic has, nonetheless, recently
faced trade and current account deficits. The government has increased
capital markets regulation and instituted fiscal austerity measures to
address these problems.
The Czech Republic entered the OECD in December 1995 and has
concluded an association agreement with the EU, as well as free trade
agreements with the members of the European Free Trade Area and the
Central European Free Trade Area. The Czech government has committed to
increase military spending by 0.1% of GDP per year with a goal of
reaching 2.0% by the year 2000.
The Czech Republic maintains excellent relations with its
neighbors. In January 1997, the Czech Republic and Poland agreed to
harmonize their countries' approaches to NATO and EU membership.
Relations with Germany are especially strong and Germany is by far the
Czech Republic's leading foreign investor. Austria and the Czech
Republic have strong historical and economic bonds and Austria is the
Czech Republic's sixth largest foreign direct investor. Relations with
Slovakia are fundamentally sound, although some residual issues from
the split of Czechoslovakia still remain. But ties and travel between
the people of the two countries are very strong.
Under the Czech Republic's constitution, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the military. The Minister of Defense is a
civilian and the Parliament is increasingly active in defense and
military issues. Parliament is expected to enact a defense law this
year that will formally confirm in law the civilian command structure
mandated by the constitution.
CONCLUSION:
We chose these three countries because we were convinced they will
be good allies. They each have a track record that underscores their
commitment to the values the Alliance is pledged to defend and uphold.
In the past eight years, these countries have been among America's
staunchest friends. Their forces fought with ours in the Gulf War and
are with us today in Bosnia. They have joined with us on issues that
are of vital importance to us, such as human rights, nonproliferation
and the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are prepared to meet the
responsibilities of NATO membership, including paying their share of
NATO's costs. Our citizens and their citizens share many historical,
familial, and cultural ties.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic may not be as advanced as
other current allies. They have work to do which require sacrifices to
meet the obligations of NATO membership. They have challenges ahead of
them.
But, they know that the benefits of NATO membership outweigh the
costs. And we know that their membership in NATO will make NATO
stronger, and America and Europe safer.
__________
Prepared Statement of Franklin D. Kramer,
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: I welcome the
opportunity to testify on the issue of NATO Enlargement, and, in
particular, on how the military capabilities of the three select
countries--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--will contribute to
the effectiveness of the NATO Alliance and the achievement of security
and stability in Europe.
Fundamental to answering this question is a recognition that Europe
is changing and will continue to change in the 21st century. The
preservation of security, including through military means, likewise is
changing. The objective of NATO enlargement is to enhance security in
the face of, and as part of, this change.
Now, and in the 21st century, the United States has and will
continue to have a vital interest in Europe, as critical to preserving
our own security and stability. We likewise seek to preserve and ensure
the expansion of freedom and democracy throughout Europe. For these
reasons, we fought two World Wars and we stayed the course during the
45 years of the Cold War. To serve these objectives in Europe in the
century to come, we seek to avoid a power vacuum, the boiling over of
ethnic divisions, the redress of old hatreds, or the establishment of
any conditions that would create instability and insecurity and lead to
future conflict. And we look to be able to perform the military
missions, with our allies, that the 21st century may bring.
Those 21st century goals will be achieved and those 21st century
military missions will be performed by NATO in a changing European
context where:
<bullet> NATO itself is changing, from an Alliance committed to a
fixed defense to one that is mobile and can deploy to where new
threats may occur;
<bullet> Allies are working with Partner countries outside the NATO
Alliance, in particular, through the Partnership for Peace;
<bullet> But where NATO retains its core capabilities, including,
most importantly, its ability to perform collective defense.
NATO enlargement is part of the process of the adaptation of
security in Europe. The military capabilities of the three new
countries therefore must focus on NATO's missions. Let me discuss them
each, but let me begin with a context, the context of the existing
capabilities that each country brings:
It is important to recognize that each of these countries has
military forces that will add to the Alliance's existing capabilities:
<bullet> Poland has a force of 230,000, roughly the size of the
forces of the United Kingdom (228,000) and Spain (200,000).
<bullet> The Czech Republic and Hungary have forces of 57,000 and
60,000, respectively, roughly the size of the armed forces of
Portugal (56,000) and Canada (64,830). Combined, the three
invitees will add almost 300,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen
to the Alliance, including units with unique and specialized
capabilities such as chemical decontamination and combat
engineering. All three countries have begun training their
troops in NATO doctrine in earnest, and all three will be able
to make a substantial contribution to the force projection,
strategic depth, and capabilities of the Alliance. Put simply,
from this perspective, an Alliance with nineteen committed
Allies has more to offer than one with sixteen, and a larger
Alliance can spread the fiscal and operational burden more
evenly.
It goes without saying, of course, that these three countries need
to make improvements in a number of areas, including operational
capabilities, force structure and modernization. I would like to
address how Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic plan to improve
their capabilities and readiness and how they can make their
contribution to the Alliance most effective.
I. CONTRIBUTING TO AN ADAPTED ALLIANCE
In the 21st century, NATO must be able to deal with the problems of
instability and insecurity, and each of the new countries has
demonstrated already the ability to contribute to these new missions.
With the largest and most capable military in Central and Eastern
Europe, Poland has brought its 25 years of peacekeeping experience to
NATO's efforts in Bosnia. Since 1974, Poland has participated in more
peacekeeping operations than any former Warsaw Pact country, and it
currently has more personnel in UN peacekeeping, military observer and
civilian police missions than any other country. These deployments with
multinational operations have enabled Polish troops to gain experience
which has greatly enhanced their NATO-interoperability. It currently
has a 400-person airborne infantry battalion in SFOR's U.S. sector, a
355-person logistics battalion in the Golan Heights (UNDOF), an
infantry battalion and military hospital (632 troops) in Lebanon
(UNIFIL), 53 soldiers in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), and troops
supporting eight UN observer missions. In 1989, they established a
military training center for UN operations in southeastern Poland. In
1992, the Poles deployed an infantry battalion with UN forces in
Croatia. Since then, Poland has shown an increased willingness to
provide combat forces in support of peacekeeping, as reflected by their
commitment to IFOR and SFOR. Poland is currently working to establish
joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania, and the Poles
have contributed to UN efforts in Rwanda (UNIMIR), Georgia (UNOMIG),
Tajikistan (UNMOT), Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM), the Western Sahara (MINURSO)
and Cambodia (UNTAC).
The Czech Republic currently has a 620-person mechanized battalion
in SFOR, and prior to that it contributed an 870-person mechanized
battalion to IFOR and a 985 person infantry battalion in UNPROFOR. The
Czechs also deployed a 200-man decontamination unit to DESERT SHIELD/
DESERT STORM and have provided observers to UN observer missions in
Croatia (UNTAES), the Prevlaka Peninsula (UNMOP), the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Georgia (UNOMIG)
and Liberia (UNOMIL).
Hungary contributed a 400-500 man engineer battalion to conduct
bridging and other engineering operations in support of IFOR. This
battalion, now reduced in number to 200-250, is currently deployed in
support of SFOR. Hungary's support to IFOR and SFOR also included
allowing U.S. and NATO forces to transit its airspace, station at its
airfields and use its facilities. Hungary demonstrated its ability to
operate as part of the NATO team with every bridge that was built and
every plane that landed and took off from its airfields. Over 80,000
U.S. military personnel rotated in and out of IFOR and SFOR assignments
through the Hungarian airbase at Taszar. U.S. armor units calibrate
their guns at Hungarian ranges prior to deploying to Bosnia, and again
upon re-deploying.
Past Hungarian peacekeeping contributions have included a 39-troop
contingent in Cyprus (recently increased to more than 100) as part of
an Austrian battalion assigned to UNFICYP; a 26 soldier and 15
policemen contingent in the Sinai (MFO); and 20 observers in Iraq/
Kuwait (UNIKOM), Angola (UNAVEM), Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique
(UNOMOZ), Tajikistan (UNMOT), and Georgia (UNOMIG). Hungary may also
provide forces to the UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG).
In short, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are already
working with NATO and NATO Allies in the field.
II. AVOIDING NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE
NATO must also work with the other countries of Europe to keep new
dividing lines from being created. The Partnership for Peace and its
recent enhancements are integral efforts in this regard. Each of the
three new countries has many substantial outreach efforts, including
significant involvement in the Partnership for Peace, which will
strengthen the bonds between NATO and those countries not yet selected
for membership.
The Czech Republic has served as a political role model for Central
and Eastern Europe. It has made great progress in establishing broad
democratic control over its armed forces; it is fully dedicated to a
free, open market economy and since 1989 it has been a fully
functioning democracy. The Czech Republic has also cultivated close
ties with all of its neighbors. No border is in dispute with Germany,
Austria, Poland or Slovakia, and the Czechs have no conflicts with
neighboring countries relating to minority ethnic groups. Since the
Madrid Summit, Prague has also increased its trilateral regional
defense cooperation with Warsaw and Budapest. The Polish, Hungarian and
Czech militaries agreed to jointly address the NATO Defense Planning
Questionnaire (DPQ), air defense, logistics, human resources
management, and the preparation of delegations to the accession
negotiations. Bilaterally, the Czechs have also contributed to the
security of Central Europe by resolving historical disputes and
developing close ties with Germany. In 1993, they signed a military
cooperation agreement with Germany, and they have worked closely with
the German military since then.
Poland is forming joint NATO-interoperable peacekeeping battalions
with both Ukraine and Lithuania, efforts which not only improve its
ability to deploy to peacekeeping operations, but which also reassure
both Kiev and Vilnius that their future lies with Europe. It is also
working with Germany and Denmark to form a trilateral mechanized
infantry corps that would be fully integrated into the NATO force
structure.
Outreach initiatives like these, combined with Poland's geographic
location, will enable Poland to serve as an important ambassador for
NATO to the East. Poland has also undertaken active defense cooperation
with the Baltic states, particularly Lithuania, to reassure them of
Europe's commitment to their security. Poland has also made efforts to
normalize relations with Moscow, which reinforces the increasingly
close cooperation between NATO and Russia. Finally, Poland's internal
reforms, including enhancing civilian control of the military and
taking steps to strengthen its democratic polity and market economy,
serve as a role model for other Central and Eastern European states
which aspire to increased integration into Western political, economic
and defense institutions.
Hungary participates in several Central-European regional
cooperation organizations that indirectly reduce the effects of risks
and instability. Hungary has concluded more than 170 cooperation
agreements with its neighbors, encompassing a broad variety of fields.
Especially noteworthy are agreements with Slovenia and Italy to form a
trilateral peacekeeping brigade; an agreement with Romania to form a
combined peacekeeping battalion; and a treaty with neighboring Slovakia
on good-neighborly relations and friendly cooperation that covers
everything from protecting the environment, to protecting minorities,
to pledging never to use force against each other. Hungary is also a
participant in the U.S.-established secure ``hot line'' network, which
provides secure communications among most central European Ministers of
Defense in the event of a crisis.
Each of these countries' outreach efforts helps to strengthen ties
with current NATO members, as well as to build bridges from the
Alliance to important non-NATO allies and Partners. Their efforts are
thus already contributing to the enhancement of the Alliance.
III. ENHANCING THE ALLIANCE
The three new countries have, as I have already discussed, shown
the ability and willingness to contribute to the Alliance's new
missions and to work in Europe to erase old divisions and to bring all
European countries into an effective security structure. Ultimately,
however, NATO depends on its ability to perform collective defense.
Each of the three new countries is taking steps in the right direction
to perform that collective defense mission. To understand these steps,
let me again give some context.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic all maintained their
militaries for four decades under the Warsaw Pact. Not surprisingly,
then, the current status of these militaries reflect Warsaw Pact
doctrines and approaches. In our working with these countries, we have
sought to make their militaries more like NATO militaries, for such a
transformation is important to make their inclusion into NATO as
effective as possible. We recognize that they will not have fully
transformed militaries by 1999. Instead, we have sought to ensure that
each country has a plan to effect such a transformation over time. We
have done so in NATO and also through bilateral efforts, as have other
members of the Alliance. In NATO, we have focused on interoperability
through the Partnership for Peace and, since the Madrid Summit, on the
NATO Defense Planning Process. We have also focused on the key national
priorities for each country to make it most able to work effectively
with NATO. As we considered such priorities, we found that there were
three broad, critical categories: personnel reform; training and
doctrine; and interoperability, this last with a focus on command,
control and communications, air defense architecture, logistics, and
infrastructure to facilitate reinforcement.
Let me discuss the plans of each of these countries to deal with
these critical NATO and national issues. Each of the three countries
has recognized that NATO compatibility depends on the implementation of
a well thought-through plan. As noted above, these plans include
involvement with PfP, the NATO Defense Planning Process, and the
establishment of national efforts.
A. Interoperability Through the Partnership for Peace
I have discussed previously the benefit of PfP toward avoiding
further divisions of Europe. But the PfP program, particularly the
conduct of military exercises, has also been a training ground for NATO
enlargement. For example, in 1997 alone, Poland will have participated
in 22 PfP exercises in which the United States also took part; the
highlight of these events was exercise BRAVE EAGLE, one of the largest
and most complex Pfp exercises to date, which Poland hosted. Poland
also participates in a hundreds of bilateral and multilateral
exercises, seminars, and other activities with other Partners and NATO
Allies, all of which contribute to increasing their interoperability.
The Poles have emphasized military training and tactical exercises in
their PfP participation.
Hungary has been an enthusiastic participant in the PfP program and
the enhanced PfP effort, as the Hungarians believe that PfP activities
contribute directly to the establishment of NATO interoperability and
its declared objective of NATO integration. Hungary was, in fact, the
first Partner to include a PfP line item in its defense budget. Like
Poland, Hungary has participated extensively in bilateral and
multilateral military exercises and activities which have produced
valuable lessons learned. The Hungarians have participated in seventeen
multilateral PfP exercises in 1997 in which the United States also took
part, and it will host a major exercise next Spring. The invitation in
Madrid will gradually alter the nature of Hungary's participation in
PfP, making Hungary not only a consumer but more and more a contributor
to the enhanced PfP program. Since the Madrid Summit, for example,
Hungary has offered to mentor Romania on the DPQ process, and they have
volunteered to participate in the twelve NATO teams assessing Albania's
post-conflict military.
The Czechs participated in eighteen multinational PfP exercises
with U.S. involvement in 1997. They have also conducted numerous joint
training activities and joint exercises with a majority of other
Allies, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. They have conducted joint
company, battalion and brigade training with the French 7h Infantry
Division and the British Royal Marines, just to name a couple of the
major training partners. In overall numbers of activities, they have
been particularly closely involved with Germany, where they signed up
for 100 joint activities for 1997 alone.
In addition, during the last three years all three countries have
participated in PfP's Planning and Review Process (PARP), in which NATO
established 41 specific Interoperability Objectives (IOs). Examples of
these objectives include: C3/SAR, ground refueling of aircraft,
commonality of airfield procedures, use of NATO communications
procedures and terminology, aircraft IFF system, logistics support, and
interoperability of communications equipment and of air navigation
aids. Poland committed to attain all 41 IOs by 1999, Hungary pledged to
reach 38, and the Czech Republic promised to meet 31.
As NATO assessment teams have visited each country over the past
two months they have increasingly discovered evidence that PfP and PARP
have produced results directly relevant to NATO enlargement. For
example, when the American general heading the NATO team visiting
Kecskemet Air Base asked how Hungary would accommodate a squadron of
NATO F-16s, he was surprised by the precision and level of detail of
the Hungarian response--and the level of installation readiness
achieved. He was told that the Hungarians has not just ``planned'' for
the accommodation of NATO's F-16s--they had done it. Through a PfP
exercise, Hungary had hosted a squadron of Dutch F-16s for several
weeks in 1996.
In many cases, the selectees have used the interoperability
objectives as guideposts for procurement decisions--decisions they have
made and implemented--in advance of NATO membership. For example: a
SHAPE analyst monitoring the NATO Common Fund Cost Study's progress
noted that even though communications and information systems
requirements were increasing, the prospective costs to the Czech
Republic kept dropping. Upon closer inspection, it turned out the
Czechs had already anticipated the requirements for secure and non-
secure digital communications programs and had applied NATO standards
to the national programs they are pursuing on their own. In short,
because of PfP the Czechs have already spent their own money to fund
some projects that we had assumed would be paid for by NATO as a whole
through the common budgets.
All three countries' active participation in PfP activities and
exercises have helped them understand how to operate with NATO forces
and are preparing them for the burdens and responsibilities of NATO
membership. Experience gained through PfP was integral, for example, in
each country's preparation of its DPQ reply.
B. Successful Completion of Initial DPQ
Since Madrid, the three invitees have gone beyond PfP activities
and worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a special
Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) as their initial step into the
NATO Defense Planning Process. These questionnaires, which all NATO
allies submit annually, are a disclosure of each country's force and
financial plans. Each of the invitees was visited in July and September
by the international staff, which delivered and explained the DPQS.
Teams with the international staff met frequently with the invitees to
assist their defense ministries in preparing their replies. I am
pleased to be able to tell you that all three of the invited countries
submitted their DPQ replies by the deadline of 1 October--a deadline
that was not announced to them until the Madrid Summit in July. To put
this in perspective, only four of the current NATO allies met their
deadline this year--and the United States was not one of them.
Poland has declared its willingness to commit all of its
operational military forces to NATO. One-third will be designated as
``NATO-Assigned,'' meaning they will be fully integrated into the NATO
force structure and placed under the operational command or control of
a NATO commander when called upon. These NATO-Assigned forces, which
include both immediate and rapid reaction forces, are already partly
capable of joint operations with NATO and should be fully interoperable
by 2002. The types of units to be assigned to NATO include airborne,
armor and air defense units, as well as fighter squadrons and transport
aircraft. Poland will designate the remaining two-thirds of its armed
forces as ``NATO Earmarked,'' meaning they could be put under NATO
operational command or control in time of need.
Since its DPQ submission, Czech officials have noted that they are
willing to earmark up to 90 percent of their operational forces to NATO
in times of crisis. The Czech Republic is also expected to assign to
NATO's force structure elements of both their immediate and rapid
reaction brigades, as well as fighter and combat helicopter squadrons,
search and rescue units, chemical defense units, and mechanized and
artillery brigades. The military and MOD staffs will also continue to
refine the DPQ Reply with NATO and help develop its Target Force Goals,
which are due early next year.
Presently, Hungary has assigned to NATO both immediate reaction and
rapid reaction forces, consisting of combat brigades and battalions,
support brigades and battalions, fighter squadrons, artillery units,
and anti-air, anti-armor and combat helicopter assets. These forces are
only partially able to conduct joint operations with NATO at present,
but the Hungarians are working hard to increase capabilities. Hungary
has also earmarked to NATO a number of air force units.
C. National Efforts
PfP and NATO defense planning efforts are only part of the work of
these countries to be able to perform the task of collective defense. I
have regularly worked with the governments of these countries on NATO
issues. In mid-September, I traveled to Budapest, Prague and Warsaw to
discuss with senior civilian and military officials the steps which
these countries are taking to prepare themselves for NATO membership.
In extremely candid sessions, they provided their assessments of their
own strengths and weaknesses, and they discussed in great detail their
plans for improving their interoperability with NATO forces. Remedying
many of the shortcomings they identified will be costly, and some will
take time. I was, however, pleased with what I heard. Let me review
some of their efforts.
1. Military reforms and modernization
In Poland, I was briefed last month on the wide range of military
reforms and modernization programs that will reshape Poland's military
doctrine, restructure the armed forces, and modernize military
technology and capabilities. The Ministry of Defense has developed a
comprehensive 15-year plan to modernize the military and make it
interoperable with NATO, assisted by the defense planning skills
learned from the processes of compiling Poland's Defense Planning
Questionnaire Reply and cooperating with NATO Staff on the development
of Target Force Goals. The initial focus of the long-term plan will be
on several key areas: command, control and communications (C3); air
defense and air traffic control; logistics and infrastructure; and
personnel reform, including a 21 percent reduction in forces and an
increase in the quality of training provided to those that remain.
These areas of focus are identical to those we see as critical.
Hungary has developed its own plan, ``Force 2000'', to better
prepare it for NATO admission. Its goals are to downsize the armed
forces, standardize structures along NATO lines, further
professionalize and increase the volunteer personnel in its force, and
improve the quality of military life. This plan is scheduled for
completion in 2001. After 1998, the Hungarians will focus on additional
NATO adaptation requirements and the modernization of land and air
force equipment. Hungary has an integrated system of defense planning
compatible with the NATO system. The new command and organizational
structure, to be in place by the end of 1997, places the main emphasis
on establishing NATO compatibility. The medium-term plan priorities
include the modernization of air defense, reconnaissance, information
and control systems, the acquisition of modem armored and transport
vehicles, modernization of aircraft and helicopters, implementation of
NATO standards, and training and equipment interoperability for NATO
designated units. Hungary has devoted a large amount of staff time to
learning the NATO defense planning process. The staff is now turning
its attention to completing the process and focusing on the development
of NATO-directed Target Force Goals by early next year.
The Czech defense leadership is well aware that their process of
creating a new defense establishment is far from complete. They know
that they need to take steps to increase public support for membership
(and recent polls do show much increased support); that serious,
effective military personnel reform must take place; that a series of
defense acts must be passed by parliament to legalize the reforms being
implemented in the Czech Armed Forces; and that interagency
coordination on defense issues must be improved. They realize that they
have much work to do in these areas; while they are working with us and
other Allies to overcome them, the Czechs know that they will have to
do the majority of work themselves. The Ministry of Defense will be
working hard to implement the recommendations of its recently-approved
long-term defense plan, ``National Defense Concept 2005,'' which
addresses most of the Czech Republic's crucial defense reform
challenges.
2. Allocating Sufficient Resources
The reforms called for in each country's long-term modernization
plan will not come cheap, and each country has pledged to commit the
resources required to achieve their objectives. Poland has carefully
thought through the financial implications of the broad reforms in its
15-year plan, which calls for annual increases in defense spending
which are pegged to the levels of GDP growth to cover the necessary
costs. Based on a conservative estimate of 4.2 percent annual growth,
defense spending will increase approximately 3.2 percent annually. In
1996, Poland spent 2.3 percent of its GDP on defense, a higher
percentage than half of current NATO Allies.
Hungary has also focused on the need to provide adequate resources
for defense. The total national defense budget for 1997 is about $800M,
which represents about 1.8% of projected GDP. Hungary has stated that
it plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP growth and
to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by 0.1 percent
annually for the next five years. If so, Hungarian defense spending may
increase in real terms by three to eight percent annually during the
next four years. Between 80-85% of future planned defense budgets will
be dedicated to the maintenance of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF),
and 15-20% will be allocated to its development. Hungary assesses that
this budget may not provide the necessary funds for a significant
degree of modernization in the armed forces. Until the end of 1998,
Hungary will allocate 12% of its military budget to procurement and
modernization; in 2001, Hungary plans to increase the amount allocated
to 25%. Lacking sufficient overall fiscal resources for modernization
of the entire force, we can anticipate that Hungary will concentrate
its efforts in specific areas such as modernizing air and air defense
forces, modernizing C41 capabilities and preparing selected ground
units capable of operating alongside NATO forces in peacekeeping and
out-of-area operations.
Czech military, defense, foreign affairs and parliamentary
officials assured me in September that the Czech Republic plans to
increase its defense budget by 0.1 percent of GDP for each of the next
three years, bringing defense spending up to 2.0 percent of GDP by the
year 2000. For 1998, using Czech Defense Ministry figures, this would
raise total defense spending from approximately $900 million to $1.1
billion dollars. Such a decision is a positive sign, particularly in
light of the devastation caused by the recent floods, which hit about
one-third of the country. I am confident that their determination to
implement crucial reforms and their decision to devote substantial
resources to the restructuring and modernization of the armed forces
will help make the Czech military a net provider of security by 1999.
D. CORE CAPABILITIES AND INTEROPERABILITY
The Czechs, Poles and Hungarians are all focusing on the
deficiencies that we believe present the greatest challenges:
personnel; training and the adoption of NATO doctrine; and
interoperability.
1. Personnel
We have made it clear to all three that serious, effective military
personnel reform must be accomplished as soon as possible within the
Armed Forces, and all three have begun to take the necessary steps. The
Czechs agree that they need to create a Western structured military,
reliant on an effective Non-Commissioned Officer corps, with quality,
well-trained forces that are properly recruited, paid, housed, and
retained. To accomplish these goals, they understand that they need to
dedicate the required resources and, in some cases, pass appropriate
legislation.
Personnel reforms will encompass perhaps the most drastic and the
most difficult changes to the Polish military. The military has
announced plans to cut total forces from 230,000 to 198,000 by 1999,
and to 180,000 by 2004. It will increase the number of career soldiers
from 36 percent to 50 percent of total troops, and it plans to improve
the junior-to-senior officer ratio from its current 50:50 to a more
appropriate 70:30 by the year 2012. To reflect better the reliance by
NATO militaries on a skilled, professional NCO corps, Poland plans to
increase the number of NCOs to one-third of its total forces and to
invest heavily in their training.
Difficult personnel reforms are also needed in Hungary. Hungary's
priority areas for personnel also include improving the ratio of junior
to senior officers and of officers to NCOS, but they also plan to
address quality of life issues for the military, win a 23% pay raise
for the military in 1998 (Parliament votes on this issue in early
December), and enact legislation on pay standards (scheduled to take
effect on January 1, 1999). The military has stated that it will cut
ground forces personnel from the present 59,715 to 34,000 by 2005, and
Air Force personnel from the current 17,500 to 14,000. Hungary hopes to
have a 60:40 professional to conscript ratio by the end of the century.
Another important objective is to increase the present one-to-one
proportion of NCOs to officers to two-to-one, and ultimately three-to-
one. The length of service for conscripts will be reduced from 12 to 9
months.
Like Poland and Hungary, personnel reforms will be perhaps the most
drastic and most difficult change for the Czech military to implement.
The Czechs assured us during a recent visit to Prague by Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy Fred Pang that
personnel reform is their number one military priority. They pledged to
develop, with our support, a concrete action plan that will address and
correct their personnel deficiencies.
The Czechs began the process of implementing personnel reform back
in March when it approved the National Defense Concept. The primary
objective of the concept is to reorient the military away from the
heavy, manpower-intensive Soviet-style corps of the Warsaw Pact and
toward smaller, more mobile, NATO-compatible units in both the Czech
Ground Forces (Army) and Air Forces. The plan aims to downsize the
armed forces to 55,000; develop a professional cadre of career
soldiers; standardize structures along NATO lines; improve the quality
of military life; and, most importantly, develop a professional NCO
corps. The implementation of this plan, which started on July 1, is
scheduled for completion by the end of 1998.
2. Training and NATO Doctrine
Each country has begun to aggressively adopt NATO doctrine and
incorporate it into their training programs. Within the PfP framework,
all have obtained NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) and
regulations and are translating them as fast as they receive the
documents from Brussels. All three have also set up NATO Integration
departments in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, as well
as in the General Staff, to help achieve their prioritized
interoperability goals and facilitate their swift operational
integration into the Alliance.
Training will become a crucial element of each country's
integration plans. The operational experience gained through active
participation in PfP exercises has greatly improved the ability of all
three invitees to operate jointly with NATO forces. Each country is
conducting staff exchanges with the United States in such areas as
acquisition, budget and finance, logistics, public affairs and
legislative affairs.
The one million dollars Poland received from the United States
under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
has provided training in such key areas as English language skills, NCO
development, and logistics. Poland has also received training from
other Allies in logistics, English language, C3, and defense planning.
English language proficiency is a critical element of NATO
interoperability. and Poland plans to have 25 percent of officers in
NATO-designated units proficient by 1999. Over 1,100 officers per year
are currently studying NATO languages (primarily English).
The Hungarians have placed a great deal of emphasis on training.
Two of Hungary's highest priorities are to increase English proficiency
and to improve the quality of professional training, and the one
million dollars in IMET funds which the United States provided in 1997
has been spent wisely in both areas. NATO Allies also provide training
to Hungary in NATO doctrine, recruitment, defense planning, and force
modernization.
Training provided by the United States and Allies has directly
impacted both Hungarian operational capabilities and senior-level
defense planning and reform. The Chief of the Defense Staff and
Commander of the HDF is the first officer of his grade and
responsibility from all of Central and Eastern Europe to attend the
U.S. Army War College. His First Deputy Chief of Staff is also a U.S.
War College graduate. Together, based on their U.S.-training, they have
successfully restructured the Hungarian General Staff and Service
Staffs along NATO lines to be more compatible and interoperable with
NATO.
The Czech Republic rightfully views the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program as the most direct path to achieving NATO compatibility, and
its participation with the United States and other Allies have enabled
it to begin developing the capabilities needed for it to operate with
NATO forces. Active PfP participation, coupled with its peacekeeping
activities, already allows Prague to contribute well-trained and
seasoned personnel that are familiar with NATO procedures and
operations. The Czechs have used the $800,000 in IMET funds provided by
the United States in 1997 for training in such areas as English
language skills, NCO development, and defense planning. The Czech
Republic has also received training from other Allies--the United
Kingdom, France and Germany, among others--in C3, logistics, air
defense, and air traffic control.
3. Interoperability
The third broad area of national effort for each of these countries
is interoperability with a focus on C3, air defense architecture,
logistics, and infrastructure. All three invitees will be making
significant investments to infrastructure improvements--some of which
they would have made whether they were invited to join the Alliance or
not--and they know that those improvements will be costly. We are
finding, however, that some of the infrastructure inherited from the
Warsaw Pact is adequate and does not require significant modifications
for NATO use. When a SHAPE assessment team visited Poland in September,
for example, they asked a Polish major familiar with the details of a
particular rail complex whether we could reasonably expect to transport
a NATO armored division through it in one week's time. The amused major
replied by asking the SHAPE general how many Soviet heavy divisions he
thought they planned on moving through the same location when the
trains were heading west.
All three countries are also moving quickly ahead on initiatives to
improve interoperability in key areas. For example, sweeping reforms to
existing air defense and air traffic control systems have greatly
improved the three invitees' ability to defend and manage their
airspace. When their Air Sovereignty Operations Centers (ASOC) come
online in 1998, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have
consolidated control of their civilian and military air traffic control
networks into one streamlined system and be ready to establish a future
link with NATO's air defense system when the political decision to do
so is made. Hungary has already completed the installation of
``identification-friend-or-foe'' (IFF) transponders to their modem
combat aircraft, and Poland and the Czech Republic plan to do so by
1999.
POLAND
Poland has ensured that most senior unit commanders are familiar
with NATO command, control and communications procedures by
incorporating NATO C3 procedures into its training, by participating in
C3-related Partnership for Peace exercises, and by adopting NATO
command structures, military maps, and hundreds of standardization
agreements (STANAGs). U.S. Warsaw Initiative funds are being used to
acquire NATO-interoperable communications equipment, and a U.S. Air
Force team conducting a C3 interoperability study reported that Poland
already has ``an excellent foundation for achieving NATO
interoperability objectives'' in this area.
Poland has selected two air defense squadrons for full NATO
interoperability, and it is working to implement NATO air defense
doctrine across the board. Improvements made under the Warsaw
Initiative-funded Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI) have enabled
Poland to cut air defense personnel from 110,000 in 1991 to 56,000 in
1997, and it is striving ultimately to bring this number down to
38,000.
Poland's ports, airfields, rail and road networks and other
infrastructure are already largely capable of receiving NATO troops and
materiel, and its logistics forces are working to improve their ability
to support NATO troop deployments to Poland and Polish troop
deployments abroad. Poland has identified specific areas where
improvements continue to be required, and it has included them in its
15-year modernization plan. Poland's defense infrastructure includes
nine training facilities that are available to NATO, several of which
have already been used by NATO Allies.
HUNGARY
Along with the Poles and the Czechs, the Hungarians are moving
ahead with their new NATO-interoperable Air Sovereignty Operations
Center. Force modernization is required in all services but will take
many years due to lack of available funds. Approximately 70-80% of
major equipment is becoming antiquated, for example, and the current
air defense capability is limited.
In the area of command, control, and communications (C3), the
Hungarians have incorporated NATO C3 procedures into training, ensured
that all major unit commanders are familiar with NATO C3, stressed
English language training, and made very effective use of the funding
Congress has made available through the International Military
Education and Training program. All Service schools and academies
include NATO C3 in their curricula. Active participation in C3-related
PfP exercises has helped them adopt NATO-compatible procedures. They
are using over $3 million in Warsaw Initiative funding to acquire NATO-
interoperable communications equipment, and plan on spending more this
fiscal year.
In the area of Air Defense and Air Traffic Control, the Hungarians
are in the process of merging civilian and military air traffic control
networks. They hope to see the ASOC operational in 1998 and already
have aircraft equipped with IFF systems, as previously mentioned. In
addition to the U.S., Belgium and the Netherlands are providing Air
Traffic Control assistance.
In the area of infrastructure, the Hungarians are well on their way
toward the creation of a NATO-compatible air base at Taszar that can be
used as a staging base. Their assistance has allowed us to throughput
more than 80,000 U.S. military personnel for rotation into and out of
IFOR/SFOR assignments, and Hungary will continue to provide such host
nation and transit support for Allied forces.
As far as logistics are concerned, the Hungarians have set a
medium-term objective to improve interoperability and the capability to
receive NATO troops and materiel. They hope to have NATO fuel
classification and increased distribution capabilities by 1999. They
have established a NATO logistics liaison unit in the General Staff,
and the U.S.-contracted Logistics Management Institute conducted a very
successful logistics exercise last month.
CZECH REPUBLIC
The Czech modernization program also focuses on C3; air defense and
air traffic control, and infrastructure. In the area of C3, the Czechs
have incorporated NATO C3 procedures into training; all major unit
commanders are familiar with NATO C3 and they have stressed English
language training. All Service schools also include NATO C3
instruction. In the area of Air Defense and Air Traffic Control, the
Czechs are in the process of merging their civilian and military air
traffic control networks (considered state-of-the-art), a process which
will be completed with the introduction of their Air Sovereignty
Operations Center (ASOC) in 1998.
In the area of infrastructure, the Czech Republic's airfields, rail
and road networks, as previously mentioned, are already capable of
receiving some NATO troops and materiel. It is also working closely
with NATO to make sure its infrastructure will be NATO-compatible.
As far as logistics are concerned, the Czechs, like the other two
invitees, have set a medium-term objective to improve interoperability
and the capability to receive NATO troops and materiels They are
working with NATO on a number of key issues, including plans to
increase their distribution and storage capabilities by 1999. They have
also established a NATO logistics cell in the General Staff. They have
flexible and redundant distribution networks for petroleum, oil and
lubricants; are increasing their links to western oil and gas
pipelines; and possess sufficient munitions for their current weapons
systems.
CONCLUSION
Reforming military doctrine, overhauling personnel systems, and
modernizing weaponry and equipment are not small tasks, and all three
countries' armed forces certainly have hard work ahead of them. It goes
without saying that much still needs to be done to turn their plans
into reality. However, their Political and military leaders are firmly
committed to their integration with the West and to their membership in
NATO. They have promised to dedicate the necessary resources to improve
their military capabilities, and the defense establishments of the
United States and other NATO Allies will continue to help them achieve
their objectives by providing training, advice and material assistance.
I am fully confident that, with the reforms and strategies currently
being implemented in all three countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic will be both reliable allies and net Producers of security to
the North Atlantic Alliance.
Thank you.
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Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone,
Senior Fellow, Political-Military Studies Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before this Committee to
discuss with you my judgment of the military capabilities of Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic, each of which have been invited to
accede to the Washington Treaty and become members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
My judgment of the candidates' military capability is based on two
factors. First, the strategic objective of the United States in seeking
the enlargement of NATO. Second, on an estimate of the contribution to
be made by the military capabilities of the enlarged alliance to the
achievement of that objective. I will define both factors, briefly,
because I derive the criteria for judging the military capabilities of
the candidates from them.
Strategic Objective of Enlargement
By enlarging NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, the US can reasonably assure itself that economic, political
or military developments in the heart of Europe will not provide the
occasion, as it has repeatedly in the past, for tension, crisis and
war. Those occasions in the past have been rooted in what seem to be
two, immutable, facts of European history, over the last three
centuries. The first is the inherent weakness of the states within the
Central European region. The second is their location between the
powerful states of Europe to their west and east. Over those three
centuries it is possible to trace the origins of Europe's major wars,
in whole or in part, to these two immutable facts.
We enter the fourth century of Europe's modern history with the
facts of European political, economic and military life fundamentally
unchanged. Western Europe possesses political and economic power
unimaginable only fifty years ago and far in excess of what any state
in Central Europe can hope to approach for a generation or more.
Russia, while weak as it recovers from the ravages of communism, it is
not without substantial political, economic and military potential.
That potential is fully within its reach and if realized its power
would dwarf the states in the Central European region within a
generation. We are hopeful that these facts will not lead to tension,
crisis and war in the coming generation. We also are hopeful that the
states of Europe have renounced war as an instrument of state policy.
But prudence dictates that we not rely on our hopes and that we
ought not to allow chance the opportunity to play its fickle role in
our affairs. This is especially so when we have at hand the means to
assure, so far as it is possible, that the immutable facts of
political, economic and military power in Europe do not follow their
historical course. The enlargement of NATO to the states of Central
Europe can provide this assurance. Through enlargement the members of
the alliance, and none more than the US, can assist the candidate
states to complete their transition to modem liberal states and
establish friendly relations with their neighbors. But more than this,
the enlargement of NATO creates the conditions under which these states
are shielded from pressures from their east while permitting the US and
its allies to extend through them a liberal and liberating influence
into the Baltics, the Balkans and eastward toward Minsk, Kiev and
Moscow.
For those schooled in the old concept of geopolitics, enlargement
consolidates in Europe the political victory of the democracies over
tyranny in the Cold War, deters those who might seek to exploit the
real and potential disparities of power on the continent and defends
the still nascent civil society of Europe against aggression of any
form. For those schooled in the new concept of preventive diplomacy,
enlargement further reduces the likelihood of conflict today, protects
the newly founded liberal regimes in the heart of Europe and increases
the possibility that nations further to the east will find in the
success of their immediate neighbors examples worthy of emulation.
The Military Contribution to our Strategic Objectives
The achievement of our strategic objective requires a combination
of political, economic and military initiatives. Our attention here is
on the contribution to be made by our military capabilities to
achieving our objective. With respect to those capabilities, the US
chose to ally itself through the Washington Treaty and to combine its
forces in NATO with those of its allies in order to assure that in
Europe sufficient military capability would exist to accomplish the
following missions.
<bullet> a defense by each ally of its borders and its air and sea
approaches,
<bullet> collective defense among the allies to maximize their
individual deterrent and defense capabilities,
<bullet> and, in the aftermath of the Cold War, ``out of area'' or
peace support operations by any combination of allies operating
as a combined force.
This mission list remains the priority listing for allies within
NATO. The priority is dictated by the requirement of a sovereign state
to see first to its own security, to that of its allies and then to
that of the regional or international system. But if the list reflects
the obligations of states to their citizens, circumstances dictate how
best to accomplish these missions. During the Cold War each ally had to
provide substantial forces to defend its borders and air and sea
approaches. But each ally understood that no member of the alliance was
capable of providing for its security alone. The collective
capabilities of all were needed to lend to each the confidence that
together they could defend themselves should deterrence fail.
The decisive victory of the Cold War has made it possible for the
allies individually and the alliance as a whole to pursue these
missions in ways different than they did during the Cold War. Today,
the maintenance of the collective defense capabilities of the alliance
remains essential to the defense of each ally. But today, and into the
future, the absence of a massive, imminent and direct hegemonic threat
means that the requirements imposed on each ally to defend itself are
substantially lower than they were during the Cold War. Yet the risks
to allied nations have not disappeared by any means. A few examples
illustrate the point. Kaliningrad is still a depot for a large number
of competent troops that could be used to influence affairs in the
Baltic region or in Belarus, with direct consequences for Poland.
Ukraine and Russia are closer today than at any time in the post-Soviet
era. But Ukraine has embarked on a security policy that is not entirely
coincident with that of Moscow. Tension between Russia and Ukraine will
affect Poland, Hungary and the rest of NATO. We have seen how crisis
and conflict in the Balkans can threaten allied security. Iraqi and
Iranian arms build-ups pose a threat as well. So, too, do developments
along the African littoral. Again, these are not threats of the same
kind as posed by the Red Army and the USSR. But they are threats to the
territory of NATO's member states that must be addressed by a
combination of national defense establishments and collective defense
efforts.
In this reduced threat environment all allies have agreed that
their security depends more today than in the past on their ability to
conduct military operations on or beyond the periphery of the alliance.
A reactive defense doctrine does not meet the strategic conditions of
the day. Based on this assessment, and given the logic and the habits
of allied cooperation the allies have reached agreement on two points.
First, they will continue to maintain collective defense capabilities
to deter the lower but not insignificant probability of a direct and
massive attack on one or more of them. Second, some or all of them may
draw on those capabilities to conduct operations on or beyond the
periphery of the alliance to deter or defeat threats that each of them
believe undermine their security.
It is into this newly revised framework for collective defense that
the national capabilities of new members of the alliance must be
fitted, And it is in the context of that framework, and the
requirements for collective defense and power projection that it
imposes on the allies that the contributions of the new members should
be judged.
NATO's New Standards
Mr. Chairman, it is not so long ago that we measured the military
capability of NATO in terms of armored division equivalents. But such
measurements have been rendered anachronistic by two developments. The
most obvious is the absence of an immediate and massive armored threat
to NATO. The second, and more important, is that modem military power
is no longer measured in the terms associated with armored division
equivalents--general defense positions (GDPs), forward edge of the
battle area (FEBA), echeloned forces, etc. In today's combat
environment the silicon chip has all but conquered rolled homogenous
steel. Precision strikes, launched by platforms in the air, on land and
at sea, are replacing massed forces. High speed, secure communications
to relay information to combatant forces are now rivaling traditional
lines of communication as the essential arteries of combat operations.
While seizing and holding territory may remain the key to securing the
aims of a war, it is now possible to think of winning battles and
campaigns by destroying an enemy's forces and supporting infrastructure
from long range and without having to mass friendly forces on the
adversary's soil.
Whether one views these changes in warfare as a revolution or as
the natural progression in technology and tactics over the last twenty
years, the fact is that the military forces required to conduct
operations today and into the future are very different from those
fielded in the past. Among the allies, the US has moved swiftly to
exploit these new technologies and tactics. The reasons for this are
complex but may boil down to this: Americans have a penchant for
adapting to new technology and a pressing need to increase the
effectiveness of our forces to meet our unique global commitments in an
age of fixed military budgets.
Our allies have not moved to exploit the new technologies and
tactics as quickly as we have, but they have made substantial progress
nonetheless. Like us, each of them has taken the difficult steps of
reducing their manpower overall, reducing the proportion of their
forces made up of conscripts and making the transition from military
capabilities designed in the late 1970s to those designed for the next
century. The pace of this transition, begun later than ours, is
hampered by the fact that allied defense spending is not directed by a
central authority, but by the governments of each ally. The result is
that the efficiency of spending on new technology and the adaptation of
their forces for new tactics is degraded.
That said, the allies are confident enough in their own progress to
have adopted a new approach to NATO defense planning. Instead of the
fixed GDPS, FEBAS, etc., of the past, the alliance has decided to plan
its defense around ``projection forces.'' That is, rather than suffer
the expense of maintaining large numbers of troops for deployment to
pre-planned defense positions when the threat does not demand such
deployments, the alliance has agreed that it would rely on the rapid
assembly and deployment of forces to conduct both traditional
collective defense missions as well as newer, out of area and peace
support operations. As a result smaller, more professional forces
supported by advanced C41SR (command, control, communications,
computational, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance)
capabilities and armed with more lethal weapons for ground-, air- and
sea-based combat are being introduced into national forces and assigned
to NATO to meet allied mission priorities.
Converting Cold War Forces
The United States has led the way in converting its forces from its
Cold War emphasis on national defense and contributions to allied
collective defense forces. A few example suffice to make the point.
In 1985, the US spent 6.5% of its GDP on defense. By 1995 spending
had fallen to 3.8% of GDP. In 1995 constant dollars, this means we are
spending <difference>$90 billion less a year than we spent in 1986.
This absolute decline in spending is reflected in the forces. Over the
same period the armed forces were reduced by some 600,000 personnel.
The number of active army divisions shrank from 18 to 10; the number of
navy combatants from nearly 600 to less than 350 and the number of
active air force fighter wings from 25 to 12. Equally important,
weapons acquisition spending has been cut in half, from about $150 B in
the mid-1980s to about $80 B today with only half of that in
procurement. Procurement is slated to increase after the turn of the
century, but for much of the 1990s the US bought only a handful of
tanks, aircraft and ships.
Allied military capabilities have been adjusted as well. In 1985,
allied spending amounted to 3.1% of GDP; by 1995 it was 2.3%. In 1995
constant dollars the decline in allied spending is not so great as that
of the US: today the allies are spending <difference>$10 billion less
in a year than they did in 1985. The armed forces shrank by about
600,000 troops as well. Weapons acquisition spending in 1996 was about
$40 B, down from about $50 B in 1990. Substantial efforts are being
made in national and multinational programs to bring on line modern
fighter aircraft (France: Rafale; IT/GER/UK: EFA), transport aircraft
(UK: C-130J, others: FLA), communications and surveillance satellites
(UK; FR/GER/SP); new transport and attack helicopters and self-
propelled artillery, new frigates, minehunters, amphibious ships (UK
and FR) and an aircraft carrier (FR). These efforts are being slowed by
domestic budgetary restrictions and the difficulties experienced by the
Europeans in multinational program management.
It is the case that the US and its allies are presently out of
phase with respect to modern military capability. The reason is the
high level of procurement spending by the US in the 1980s which was
nearly three times that of its allies. These so-called legacy systems--
displayed to such effect in Iraq--were designed in the late 1970s and
early 1980s and began coming on line in the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
They will carry us through the 1990s and will form the backbone of US
forces until 2005-2010. New technology forces--advanced C41SR systems
and processes, the F-22, the digitized army, new navy ship designs,
more accurate and lethal stand-off weapons, etc.--will begin to come on
line in large numbers post-2010.
The advent of new technology systems in the US will occur about the
time allies are completing the process of fielding the systems they are
currently procuring. These systems, designed in the mid- to late-1980s
for the most part, will not possess the most advanced ``stealth''
characteristics of American aircraft, be able to provide the
situational awareness available to US Army forces or be able to provide
the volume and variety of firepower US navy ships will be able to
project from the sea. But for all that, allied forces will be not be
interior to anticipated threats and will be interoperable with US
forces. The silicon revolution and constant training makes it possible
to do with software and tactics what hardware would otherwise prevent.
The more troubling aspect of the modernization efforts of the
current allies is the lack of funding for those assets that operate
above the corps level--C4ISR, long-range air transport, air refueling,
hospital units, engineering units, logistics and supply capabilities.
That is, the allies are not investing as heavily as they might in those
elements of military power essential to the sustained projection of
military power. The allies are conscious of their shortfall and, within
what they believe are real constraints related to enlarging the EU and
bringing about European monetary union, are doing their best to
overcome it.
France is determined to develop in the next ten years the ability
to project 40,000 troops at a distance of 2,000 km and sustain them
indefinitely. This effort is hampered by its need to shed itself of
thousands of conscripts and its determination to equip the force out of
European industry. The UK is procuring amphibious ships and shorter-
range C130Js to give them greater lift and mobility. Its desire to
balance procurement between the US and Europe, however, leads it to
hesitate to commit to a buy or lease of a US C-17 capability so long as
there is a reasonable prospect of the future large aircraft being
launched by its European industrial partners. Germany is putting
together a KRK or crisis reaction corps of 50,000 men for projection
missions. But it is reluctant to provide it with above corps echelon
capability because it does not want to give the impression that it is
able to conduct modern military operations independently of its allies.
The projection shortfall of our major allies can be overcome. But
it will require a political agreement between the US and them on a
major issue--defense industrial base reform and long-term procurement
practices. This is beyond the scope of NATO enlargement, but it is
critical to its success.
Candidate Member's Capabilities
Mr. Chairman, in providing insight into the capabilities of the
candidate members it is always helpful to have a few static figures in
mind. These figures do not by themselves tell us enough about the
potential of candidates. But they are useful for comparative purposes.
Poland: In 1985 Poland had some 320 thousand personnel in the
armed forces. It spent about $7.8 billion (in 1995 dollars) or 8.1% of
its GDP on defense. Today, Poland deploys about 215 thousand personnel;
it spends about $3.6 billion or 2.4% of GDP. Its plans call for it to
further reduce its armed forces to around 180 thousand and to maintain
spending at the current level of 2.4% of GDP. The EIU estimates GDP in
1997 at about $136 billion and real growth at an average of 5.7%
between 1996 and 2004. Thus, a roughly $163 billion GDP should yield
about $4.0 for defense in 2001, an increase of $600 million in
comparison to today.
Hungary: In 1985 Hungary had some 106 thousand personnel in the
armed forces. It spent about $5.2 billion (in 1995 dollars) or 7.2% of
its GDP on defense. Today, Hungary is reducing its armed forces to
about 44 thousand personnel; it spends about $630 million or 1.4% of
GDP on defense. Its plans call for it to increase spending at a rate of
0.1 percent of GDP per year until it reaches 1.8% of GDP. The EIU
estimates GDP in 1997 at about $43 billion and real growth at an
average of 4.5% through 2001. Thus, a roughly $60 billion GDP should
yield about $1.0 for defense in 2001, an increase of <difference>$400
million in comparison to today.
Czech Republic: Figures for the Czech Republic are not comparable
due to the ``velvet divorce'' between it and Slovakia. Under the
settlement the Czech Republic took a roughly 2:1 share of defense
assets. Today the Czech Republic deploys about 60 thousand troops, it
spends about $850 million or 1.7% of its GDP. Its plans call for an
increase in spending to 2.0% of GDP by 2000. The EIU estimates GDP at
about $50 billion today and real economic growth through 2001 at about
3.3% Thus, a roughly $60 billion GDP should yield about $1.2 billion
for defense in 2001, an increase of $350 million in comparison to
today.
These figures should not be viewed as predictions and some
variations in the numbers are possible, depending on deflators, which
elements of the budget are counted against defense, etc. Nevertheless,
what then, tell us is that, all else being equal, the three candidate
countries in 2001 could have, in comparison to 1997, some $1.3-1.4
billion a year among them in additional funds to spend on defense. This
suggests that the cost of enlargement, reasonably defined, are
certainly affordable.
But the availability of funds is not an indicator of a willingness
to spend those funds or to spend them in ways that make sense from the
perspective of the military capabilities of the alliance. With respect
to a willingness to spend, we can only take the word of the ministers
and parilaimentarians of the three countries. With respect to spending
in ways that make sense, that depends on a close collaboration between
national authorities and those of NATO. And in this regard developments
tend to support the view that these nations have begun to make concrete
decisions that will yield substantial military capability for
themselves and the alliance in about a decade's time.
Manpower: I have already indicated that each of the candidates has
dramatically reduced their overall manpower. Now they are taking, or
about to take, two very difficult decisions. The first is to reduce the
overall ratio of senior officers to junior officers and to raise the
percentage of quality of non-commissioned officers. The surplus of
officers and lack of trained NCOs is a product of their Warsaw Pact
heritage when command structures were oriented to top-down orders to
execute set-piece battle plans. NATO armies have always favored
initiative by junior officers and NCOS. The new technology and tactics
require that these junior officers and NCOs have a great deal of
responsibility. To improve the ratios of officers and the competence of
NCOS, Hungary introduced mandatory retirement at age 55, leading to a
reduction of 25% of existing general officers in 1995. An additional 10
generals were expected to retire in 1996. The Czech Republic has
promised to reverse the 2:1 ratio of officers to NCOs and began that
process in 1996. The issue is more sensitive for the Poles, but they
have committed to make the changes. In order to bring up new talent,
they are offering retirement at 15 years and 40% pay to currently
serving officers.
The second significant manpower-related decision is to increase the
ratio of professionals to conscripts in the armed forces. Poland and
Hungary plan their forces to be 60% professional; the Czech Republic is
moving to a 50% ratio. In all three cases the increased ratio does not
represent a dramatic increase in the total number of professionals
because in all three cases the dramatic cut in armed forces personnel
since 1985 has occurred in the conscript ranks. But what it does mean
is that the per soldier cost will rise. In return, each will have a
professional-based units available for NATO operations.
Modernization: Existing stocks of weapons in each nation, except
perhaps for aircraft, are not so inferior in age or technical
capability as compared to those of other NATO powers. All three are
committed to upgrading their C41 capability, air defense forces, and
ground force components, the last primarily through upgrades of
existing equipment. To be sure, each of the three is faced with the
need to replace the bulk of their fighter aircraft. However,
appreciating the cost of aircraft and in light of NATO assurances that
Brussels is not expecting the candidates to invest heavily in new
platforms (specifically aircraft), all three nations have delayed
making firm plans or commitments to new purchases. Nevertheless, Soviet
MiGs and Sukhols will eventually need to be replaced (more on this
below). But in keeping with the overall commitment to make the less
glamorous and often unseen changes to infrastructure first so that the
effects of subsequent modernization can be maximized, all three nations
have committed to bringing a modem regional air control system on line.
The military and civilian systems inherited from the Warsaw Pact were
unacceptable to NATO. The new regional air control system will both
improve civil and military air traffic control and improve safety while
making the next step in the process--settling on IFF (identification
friend or foe) codes and procedures--easier and quicker to implement.
Thus, when replacement aircraft are deployed, they will operate in a
NATO-compatible environment.
Military Contributions: The internal reform of the armed forces and
their modernization are intended to make the military forces of the
candidates capable of operating alongside their NATO allies. But none
of the three has waited for NATO membership to contribute.
The Czech Republic offered chemical warfare detection vehicles to
the coalition forces in the Gulf War. It has deployed a mechanized
infantry unit of some 850 men to Bosnia as part of IFOR/SFOR. This unit
is made up of volunteers from the Czech rapid deployment brigade, which
is already considered to be NATO compatible. It is also the view of
many that the Czech infrastructure--roads, rail nets and stations,
pipelines, airports, etc.--is already adequate to support NATO's rapid
reaction corps.
Hungary has made its airspace and its base as Taszar available to
NATO forces to support operations in Bosnia. And given the modest
amount of upgrading needed at Taszar, its infrastructure may prove,
like that of the Czech republic, to be in better condition to support
allied forces than has previously been thought. The allied use of
Hungarian airspace has resulted in its completion of efforts to equip
all of its aircraft with NATO-compatible IFF. In addition to its
airspace and bases, Hungary has also made available a 450 man
engineering battalion for service with IFOR/SFOR. Individuals from this
unit are now reconstructing the bridge in Mostar. By 2005 It is
expected that Hungarian reforms and modernization will allow it to
deploy as many as three rapid reaction brigades fully NATO compatible.
Poland, like the Czech Republic supported the coalition in the
Gulf, allowing transit rights and sending medical teams to Saudi
Arabia. It has contributed an airborne battalion of troops in Bosnia
under IFOR/SFOR, deployed as part of the multinational Nordic Brigade.
(It also has a battalion in Syria as part of the UNDOF.) The Poles have
made at least two brigades and a field hospital unit available to NATO
in 1997 and plans to have two more brigades sufficiently NATO
compatible to conduct peace support operations by 2000. Observers
believe its infrastructure generally adequate to support all elements
of NATO's rapid reaction corps.
All three are full and eager participants in PFP. Since 1995, all
three have participated in a dozen or more PFP exercises. Hungary funds
its PFP activities outside the military budget, a sure sign of its
commitment. Poland has become a favored location for armored training
by the UK.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, it is evident that the candidates will
have the financial resources to meet their anticipated obligations,
they have made significant efforts to reform their military forces,
began modernization efforts and are contributing to allied military
operations.
Looking to the Future
Does this mean that all is in hand and we can rest assured of a
successful outcome? No. Economic forecasts are notoriously unreliable
and growth projections could fall short. But even if their economies
grow less than suggested earlier, the combination of force draw downs
and reform and real economic growth should provide the three together
with additional defense funds to meet their new obligations to NATO.
There are four additional factors which, if managed with a clear
eye on our ultimate goal, could smooth the integration of the candidate
nations into the alliance and substantially enhance the capability of
its member states to provide for modern national defense forces, to
contribute to collective defense and cooperate in ``out of area''
missions. They are listed in increasing order of importance:
<bullet> the evolution of the transatlantic defense industrial base
and national procurement policies. US industry has a
substantial lead on its European counterparts in the process of
down sizing and consolidation. European efforts are hampered by
the complicating issues of policy within the EU. But the
introduction of the Euro (European Monetary Union) will speed
the process in Europe as fiscal and budgetary policies are
harmonized in the Euro's wake. This will affect the candidate
members as well, all of whom are also EU candidates. The US and
the EU need to put in place soon the laws and regulations that
will allow for two consolidated defense industrial bases to
maximize their comparative advantages while minimizing
politically disruptive economically unproductive competition.
<bullet> the candidate states have been given assurances by NATO that
they are not expected to undertake large, near-term purchases
of expensive defense equipment and platforms. This assurance
makes good sense in light of the earlier discussion.
Nevertheless, the obsolescent state of their air forces will
require that each of them put in place soon a long range plan
to reduce their force structures, upgrade units where feasible
and plan for the financing of replacement aircraft. It will be
important that the effort be financed in a business-like way.
``Give away programs'' will not, in the end, provide the
necessary incentives to the West to moderate their offers or
for the candidates to ration their acquisitions. Loan
guarantees, ``lease-to-buy'' and other arrangement using US FMS
funds or other programs need to be explored.
<bullet> the progress of the next round of the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE II) needs to be monitored for its potential effect
on the force goals and structures of new alliance members. The
assurances given by NATO that it would not deploy a large
number of NATO forces on new members' territory was based on
current and foreseeable circumstances. Those circumstances
could change. We must be careful not to convert current
requirements into legally binding restrictions. Otherwise, we
could find ourselves in the future in the embarrassing position
of wanting to take a decision in Brussels to deploy forces to
allied territory but deterred by the prospect that the
deployment would require the receiving ally to reduce its own
force structure to remain compliant with CFE II.
<bullet> NATO's current Strategic Concept, drafted in 1991, is under
review and likely to be revised in the next year or two to take
account of the changing strategic circumstances in Europe and
the addition of new allies. It is important that the final
document preserve as the core mission of the alliance the
collective defense of its members and the European region for
two reasons.
<bullet> Each ally bases a significant fraction of its
national military requirements on that mission statement and
NATO's military components derive their own requirements from
it. As noted earlier, modern technology and tactics have made
it possible to satisfy the collective defense mission in the
coming decades with forces smaller in size, higher in mobility
and more lethal in their effects than was imagined just a
decade ago. It is from the collective defense capabilities of
the alliance that the means for conducting ``out of area''
missions are drawn. No ally, including the US, has yet to
identify ``out of area'' requirements in such a way that they
yield forces adequate to meet either the collective defense or
national military requirements.
<bullet> Apart from the impact of the collective defense
mission on technical military capabilities, focusing on it
rather than the ``new'' missions of the alliance is important
for political reasons. We are only in the earliest stages of
defining the ``new'' missions of the alliance. We have not yet,
at the current sixteen or the projected nineteen, taken time to
assess the strategic situation outside the NATO area, compared
our interests in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and beyond,
and agreed on a common political and military agenda. The
successful conclusion of such an effort is surely a long way
off and its outcome should not be prejudged by a near-term
revision of the alliance's strategic concept.
Conclusions
An assessment of the military component of the qualifications of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic must be conducted in two
dimensions, The first is the contribution, today and anticipated in the
future, of the current allies to the security of Europe. Each of them,
including the US, has experienced a sharp draw down in military
spending and reductions in force sizes. At the same time each has made
a longer-term commitment to modernize its forces and take a new
approach to meet their enduring Article 5 obligations. Past approaches
have been made obsolete by the collapse of the USSR and the advent of
new technology. The new approach will depend less on the prior
deployment of massive forces by each ally than the rapid projection of
highly lethal ground- air- and sea-based multinational task forces to
perform all alliance missions. The modernization of US forces is well
advanced and noticeably ahead of its allies. But the allies are making
a sustained effort to close that gap. This effort may, in the end it
may require that they increase their defense spending modestly.
The second dimension is the capability of the candidate members,
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Like the current 16, each of
them has experienced a sharp reduction in manpower and funding for the
military. But their forces are not so old or incapable that they cannot
make a contribution to NATO's capabilities, even today. All three have
troop contingents in Bosnia. All three are reforming and retraining
their troop structures and units. All three are taking a measured
approach to the upgrading and modernization of their forces.
Most importantly, all three have economies that are expected to
grow in the coming years by an average 4.5-5.0% per year. As a result,
on present plans their base defense budgets could be as much as $1.3-
1.4 billion higher in 2001 than in 1997. This growth, even if it should
slow some in succeeding years, in combination with military reform,
ought to allow them to meet the costs of enlargement.
Mr. Chairman, the success of the candidate member's efforts, and
therefore to the enlargement of the alliance, rests in an important way
with the US Senate.
The advice given to the president by the Senate ought to insist
that the new allies be provided by NATO with realistic defense planning
guidelines and time lines informed by the collective defense mission of
the alliance. The Senate should make clear its preference that the plan
stress infrastructure improvements, the installation of modern C41
capabilities, near-term upgrades of critical platforms and systems and
on internal reform and that these take precedence over major platform
purchases and drastic restructuring. Such an insistence will help set
the expectations of the US in this matter and help to bound within
reasonable parameters the military requirements of the new members. The
combination ought to set the stage for a successful enlargement of the
alliance.
Prepared Statement of Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee,
RAND
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity
to testify today on the issue of NATO enlargement. This is an issue of
vital importance--both for the United States and for European security
more broadly.
In my view, NATO enlargement is clearly in the U.S. national
interest. It will lead to a more secure, more stable and more
integrated Europe, one that can act as a more reliable partner in
helping to manage the challenges the U.S. and the Alliance are likely
to face in the coming decades.
NATO ENLARGEMENT IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE
Before discussing the qualifications of the three candidates for
membership in NATO--Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic--I would
like to make a few preliminary remarks designed to put the issue of
NATO enlargement in perspective.
First, NATO enlargement cannot be seen in isolation. It must be
seen as part of a much wider comprehensive strategy to enhance security
in Europe. The goal of this strategy is to project stability to the
East. For this a multiplicity of institutions is needed. No one
institution alone can provide this type of comprehensive security. NATO
has an important role to play. But it is not the only institution.
Other institutions such as the EU, WEU, and OSCE, also have a role to
play. Together they are part of the larger process designed to enhance
stability in an expanded Euro-Atlantic space.
Second, membership in the European Union (EU) will contribute to
enhancing stability in Eastern Europe. But EU integration alone is not
enough. EU integration must be complemented by a security framework.
The main institution providing that security framework is NATO. Only
NATO can provide ``hard security''--as developments in Bosnia have made
clear.
Third, NATO enlargement is not being carried out because there is a
specific military threat but as part of a broader process of promoting
stability and integration. The goal is to anchor the countries of
Eastern Europe in a broader European and transatlantic framework and
prevent a ``return to history.''
Historically, Eastern Europe has been a region marked by
instability and a geopolitical bone of contention, especially between
Russia and Germany. The Western goal is to prevent a return to the old
19th Century geopolitical rivalry and nationalism that led to
instability--and eventually to two world wars. This can best be done,
if Eastern Europe is integrated into a broader transatlantic and
European framework rather than being left as a political gray zone.
Leaving Eastern Europe as part of such a gray zone would only encourage
the type of geopolitical rivalry and maneuvering that has created so
many problems in the past.
It is well to remember that the three candidates for NATO
membership--Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic--were historically
part of Europe. Prague, after all, is further West than Vienna. The
Cold War artificially separated these countries from their historical
and cultural roots. These countries now want to return to their roots
and join Euro-Atlantic institutions.
NATO is the keystone of this Euro-Atlantic structure. If they meet
the qualifications for membership, they should become members. This is
the best guarantee that these countries will develop healthy economies
and democratic institutions and avoid becoming the objects of
geopolitical rivalries of the past. The Western goal should be to
project stability into the area and help those countries develop stable
democratic institutions--that is, the type of political institutions
and culture that developed in Western Europe after World War II.
Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not
admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability
even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is
that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of
political, economic and military maturity before they can become
members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just
``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a
collection of economic and political basket cases and both
organizations would be unable to function effectively.
Indeed, NATO membership provides an incentive for reform. Aspirants
know that they will be considered for membership only when they have
achieved a certain level of economic and political reform and have
resolved their internal problems, including minority problems. This has
given aspirants--especially the three prospective new members--a strong
incentive to carry out the political and economic reforms necessary to
qualify for membership.
The prospect of membership has also provided an incentive for these
countries to regulate their relations with their neighbors. The desire
for EU and NATO membership, for instance, was a major factor behind
Hungary's efforts to sign the bilateral treaties regulating its
minority problems with both Slovakia and Romania. The same is true for
Poland, which has signed important bilateral treaties with Ukraine and
Lithuania regulating long-standing territorial disputes and differences
over minority issues.
The importance of these treaties should not be minimized. They
represent an important contribution to stability in the region. And
they would not have taken place--certainly not with the same speed and
impact--if the West had not made clear that a regulation of territorial
and minority problems was prerequisite for entry into NATO.
This is not to say that integrating the new members into NATO and
transforming their militaries so that they can function effectively
with NATO forces will be easy--either for NATO or the new members
themselves. But the United States--and the Senate--should not lose
sight of what is at stake. We have a historic opportunity today to
stabilize Eastern Europe and prevent a return to old 19th Century
nationalism and a rivalry that was so destructive and led to two world
wars. History--and our grandchildren--will not forgive us if we fail to
seize this opportunity.
NATO membership alone will not do this. But together with EU
enlargement it provides a prudent insurance policy against a return to
history.
However, as NATO enlarges, we need to ensure that NATO's core
functions--particularly collective defense--are not weakened. New
members must be able to contribute to carrying out NATO's core
functions as well as be able to participate in NATO's new missions
elsewhere on NATO territory and, if required, beyond it. In order to
perform these missions, the forces of new members need to be capable of
working effectively with NATO forces.
THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE NEW MEMBERS
Now let me turn to the issue of the qualifications of the
prospective new members. How qualified are the three countries for NATO
membership? Will they contribute to Alliance security?
I believe the answer to both questions is clearly ``yes''. This
does not mean that there are no problems or that the three countries do
not have a lot of work to do to modernize their military forces and
make them compatible with NATO forces. They do. But all three countries
have demonstrated that they are committed to the values of the Alliance
and are willing to undertake the reforms--economic, political and
military--necessary to qualify for membership.
Since 1989 the three prospective new members have made significant
progress in four important areas:
DEMOCRATIC REFORM
All three countries have established stable democratic political
systems based on the rule of law. Democracy, to use Juan Linz's phrase,
has become ``the only game in town.'' All the major political forces in
the three countries accept the democratic rules of the game and are
prepared to abide by them. In addition, there is a broad consensus in
all three countries about the basic strategic directions of policy,
whether it be market reform, membership in the EU, or membership in
NATO. These goals are espoused not only by the former democratic
opposition but also by the post-communist parties. Indeed, in Poland
and Hungary these post-communist parties have pursued EU and NATO
membership just as aggressively as their noncommunist predecessors.
The recent elections in Poland illustrate this growing political
maturity. The elections in September 1993 led to the formation of a
left-wing government led by former communists. On most major issues,
the post-communist government continued the basic policy of its non-
communist predecessors. In, September of this year, the non-communist
forces were returned to power. This alteration of power illustrates the
health and viability of the new democratic political system. In short,
politics in Poland--as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic--is
increasingly beginning to resemble politics in Western Europe.
ECONOMIC REFORM
The three countries have also made significant progress in
implementing market reforms. Today nearly 80 percent of the Polish and
Czech economy is in private hands; the figure is only slightly lower in
Hungary. Last year Poland's growth rate was 6 percent--one of the
highest in the Western industrialized world--far higher than in most
countries in Western Europe. After several years of slow growth,
Hungary has begun to emerge from the recession that characterized its
economy in the last years. The Czech economy has begun to witness some
problems lately but it still maintained a very respectable growth rate
of about 4 percent last year.
MINORITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
All three countries have also made substantial progress in
regulating their relations with their neighbors and in assuring the
rights of minorities. Hungary has signed bilateral treaties with
Slovakia and Romania, which provide important provisions for minority
rights. Poland has signed similar treaties with Lithuania and Ukraine.
These treaties have served to enhance stability and significantly
defuse potential tensions in the region. All three countries have also
become members of the Council of Europe.
This does not mean that there are no minority problems in these
countries. But these differences have diminished significantly since
the signing of the bilateral treaties and are not of such a magnitude
as to pose a threat to regional security.
The prospect of NATO membership played an important role in this
process. Indeed, without the prospect of NATO membership the bilateral
treaties might not have been signed. All three countries knew that they
had to regulate their minority problems if they were to have any hope
of entering NATO. Thus NATO has already contributed in important ways
to enhancing stability in Central Europe.
MILITARY REFORM
At the same time, the three candidate members have also begun to
undertake important military reforms designed to restructure their
militaries and make them more compatible with those of NATO.
They have also taken important steps to establish civilian control
over their militaries. For instance, in Poland the 1996 National
Defense Law clearly subordinates the Chief of the General Staff to the
Minister of Defense. Similarly, in Hungary the 1993 National Defense
Law specifies that the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is
subordinate to the Minister of Defense.
Some critics have expressed concern that the East European
countries will be consumers rather than producers of security and that
they will require a massive assistance program in order to bring their
militaries up to NATO standards. This is not the case. The three
prospective new members do face important challenges in the military
field but these challenges are by no means insurmountable if the
countries implement prudent defense policies.
These countries do not face a major military threat in the
foreseeable future. In order to modernize their armed forces they do
not need--and should be discouraged from embarking on--crash military
programs that might weaken their economies. What is needed in each case
is a well thought out and well designed long-term defense program over
the next 10 to 15 years to modernize their military forces and bring
them up to NATO standards.
The basic problem these countries face is to increase the quality
of their forces while reducing the quantity. The manpower levels of the
prospective new members are significantly above those of NATO members
of comparable size, while their quality does not match that of NATO.
The new members can significantly reduce the size of their forces and
still fulfill their defense requirements to join NATO. The money saved
from the reductions can then be reinvested to improve the quality of
their forces.
Again, the answer to this dilemma is not a crash military program
designed to bust the budgets of these countries. But rather a prudent
long-term defense program designed to increase the quality of their
forces in key areas--modernization, readiness, logistics support,
technical compatibility, and interoperability--while reducing the
quantity of their forces, in some cases by 30 to 40 percent.
Doing this will not bankrupt the economies of their countries.
Their economies are growing at an average rate of about 4 percent a
year. This is higher than the growth rate of most of our West European
allies. They do not have to allocate a far larger share of GIDP to
defense in order to restructure their militaries. They can retain the
current share, while steadily elevating defense spending as their
economies grow.
Indeed, one of the great attractions of NATO membership to these
countries is that it will allow them to keep their defense expenditures
modest and to focus their resources on economic reconstruction.
Alliances save money. If they were not members of NATO, they would have
to spend even more money for national defense.
This does not mean that NATO membership will be a free ride. On the
contrary, NATO membership will require these countries to spend their
resources differently than they otherwise might if they had to provide
for their own defense using national means, and to increase spending in
some areas while decreasing it in others. But it will allow them to
purchase a greater degree of security at a much lower cost than would
otherwise be the case if they were not members of NATO.
Moreover, the types of changes needed to make the forces of the
three prospective new members compatible with those of NATO do not have
to be built overnight. As noted, what is needed is a prudent long-term
defense modernization program. During the Cold War, NATO had to begin
to build a posture in Central Europe almost from scratch in 1950. It
took three decades for the Alliance to meet many of its military
objectives, but it managed to do so gradually in a step-by-step fashion
by laying out prudent defense modernization programs. A similar result
is achievable in Eastern Europe over the long run.
The three prospective members have already begun to take steps to
modernize their militaries and make them better able to work
effectively with the forces of NATO.
Poland has advanced the farthest in this regard. Poland recently
presented a detailed 15-year plan for the modernization and reduction
of the Polish armed forces. The plan calls for a reduction of the armed
forces to 180,000 men, with a complete overhaul of the officer corps
structure, and the introduction of professional NCOs and warrant
officers. Under the new plan the Polish forces will be systematically
upgraded in order to meet NATO standards of readiness and
interoperability.
In addition:
<bullet> Poland is currently preparing two airfields, two ports, and
two large depots for operations with NATO.
<bullet> It has established national military centers for language
education.
<bullet> more than 100 officers a year are enrolled in courses at
Western higher military schools and universities (including
West Point and the National Defense University).
<bullet> Poland has also set up a joint peacekeeping battalion with
Ukraine (operational by Summer 1998) and Lithuania (expected to
be operational in 1999).
The Czech Republic has also begun to modernize its military forces.
The Czech government recently pledged to increase defense spending by
.1 percent of GDP a year for the next three years. This commitment is
reflected in the new budget and was maintained despite the severe
floods this Summer that caused millions of dollars of damage. As a
result, defense spending will rise 17 percent this year. While the
Czech government still has a way to go, this increase reflects the
government's commitment to take the steps necessary to modernize the
Czech military and make it more compatible with NATO forces.
Hungary has also committed to increase defense spending by .1
percent of GDP a year over the next five years. It has introduced a
comprehensive military reform designed to restructure the Hungarian
armed forces and make them compatible with NATO. In the process its
forces have been reduced from a little over 100,000 in 1985 to 48,000
today.
In addition, Hungary plans to set up a peacekeeping battalion with
Romania and a Hungarian Italian-Slovenian peacekeeping brigade. Indeed,
military-to-military relations between Romania and Hungary are
excellent. This underscores the way in which NATO can contribute to
promoting peace and stability among once antagonistic neighbors.
Perhaps most important, Hungary has made facilities available for
U.S. troops in Bosnia. This is a very strong indication of Hungary's
commitment to NATO. Hungary may not yet be in NATO, but NATO is already
in Hungary.
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MEMBERSHIP
There is also strong public support in all three countries for
joining NATO In all three countries, support has remained steady or
increased. Support is highest in Poland (83 percent), followed by
Hungary (65 percent), and the Czech Republic (59 percent). \1\ In
addition, publics in all three countries have expressed a willingness
to continue with political and economic reform that would allow these
countries to qualify for NATO membership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Figures are based on USIA opinion data taken in the Spring and
Fall of 1997. See 'NATO Enlargement: The Public opinion Dimension,'
office of Research and Media Reaction, United States Information
Agency, October 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This support, moreover, is likely to grow as the publics in these
countries come to better understand the benefits and obligations of
NATO membership. One of the reasons for doubts on the part of some
parts of the population in the Czech Republic and Hungary is ignorance.
Many Czech and Hungarian citizens do not really know what NATO is; for
others, the idea of an alliance has a negative connotation. They
associate it with domination and loss of sovereignty--their experience
as members of the Warsaw Pact. However, the governments in Hungary and
the Czech Republic have undertaken efforts lately to better educate
their publics and this has led to a rise in support for NATO in both
countries.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Mr. Chairman, I believe the three prospective members are
fully qualified to become members of NATO. Their inclusion in NATO will
contribute to a stronger, more stable and more secure Europe, one that
is a more reliable partner for the United States. Such a Europe is
clearly in the U.S. national interest.
Thank you.
__________
Prepared Statement of Dr. John S. Micgiel,
Director,
East Central European Center,
Columbia University
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to address this
distinguished body today on the matter of extending membership in NATO
to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
Two world wars began in the region between Germany and Russia in
this century. After World War II, NATO provided a shield against
aggression behind which Western European states could build a community
of democracies, prosperous market economies, and civil societies.
Postwar arrangements effectively barred the Czechoslovak, Hungarian,
and Polish nations from being able freely to elect governments, from
participating in the Marshall Plan, the 50th anniversary of which we
are celebrating this year and, in short, from acting as sovereign
states.
The implosion of the Soviet system and the emergence of
democratically elected governments in most of the states in the region
beginning in 1989 resulted in those governments pursuing European and
Euro-Atlantic policies, joining Western multilateral organizations like
the Council of Europe and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, and being invited to enter into accession talks with the
European Union and NATO.
The mere prospect of membership in the latter has acted as a
catalyst for political reform and served a point of reference for
decision makers. In Poland, for example, prospective membership in NATO
resulted in the clear establishment of civilian control over the
military. The precondition of friendly relations with neighboring
countries has had a dramatic impact throughout the region. Poland has
Good Neighbor Treaties with all seven of the states that now adjoin it:
Belarus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Russia, the Slovak
Republic, and Ukraine. Hungary concluded Basic Treaties with Ukraine,
Romania, and Slovakia. Following its peaceful separation from Slovakia
in 1992, the Czech Republic concluded a much awaited Treaty with
Germany, The prospect of being included in the first group of countries
invited into NATO also caused the Romanians to conclude controversial
Basic Treaties with Hungary and Ukraine. And the very tone of political
discourse and culture has changed, with much less anti-Russian rhetoric
in evidence today than just a few years ago, a sure sign of increasing
political maturity and self-confidence,
The three prospective member countries have each taken a proactive
role in cooperating with their neighbors and sometime former
adversaries. Poland, the only country among the three bordering on
Russia, has led the field here by engaging the Germans and Danes in
plans for a European Corps, and it has engaged the Lithuanians and
Ukrainians separately in the establishment of joint battalions. Poland
has also begun a wider political strategic partnership with both
Lithuania and Ukraine. Hungary and Romiania are cooperating militarily,
and the Czech Republic is now cooperating with Poland and Hungary on a
regional air defense network.
The desire to demonstrate the ability to cooperate regionally
resulted in the establishment of the Central European Free Trade
Agreement, and what is now known as the Central European Initiative,
both of which have brought politicians on various levels together at
regular intervals to discuss trade issues, the reduction of tariffs,
and the development of infrastructure throughout the region. And trade
within CEFTA doubled between the organization's inception in 1993 and
1996, as economies grew and tariff barriers dropped. The declaration by
the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish ministers of defense regarding plans
for joint military procurement are another logical step in the
direction of increased regional cooperation.
Inclusion in multilateral organizations, and the concomitant
legislative, political, and economic reforms have played and continue
to play a great role in attracting direct foreign investment (FDI).
Hungary, in particular, has been successful in obtaining investments of
over $16 billion, while in Poland, FDI jumped from $6 billion in 1995
to $14 billion in 1996. Each has obtained an investment grade rating
and is making progress in meeting the economic criteria for European
Union membership. Much progress has been made in constructing viable
market economies, all of which have demonstrated growth despite
occasional setbacks. Current account deficits in Hungary and the Czech
Republic resulted in the implementation of difficult and generally
unpopular stabilization measures. Yet each country has declared its
ability and willingness to adequately support its membership in NATO.
The Czech Republic has announced that military spending will rise in
each of the next three years to a level of two percent of GDP in 2000,
while Hungary's defense budget will rise from 1.4 percent of GDP in
1996 to about 2 percent by 2001. Poland is already devoting and will
continue to devote about 2.5 percent of GDP. As the economies grow, the
funds devoted to the military will grow substantially in absolute
terms. In the Polish case, for example, the economy has grown an
average of seven percent over the last 3 years, and if that tempo were
kept up, the amount in absolute terms would double in a decade.
Each of three candidate countries has adopted different
modernization strategies for their armed forces. They share, however,
several commitments: to implement and drop below CFE limits; to
reorganize and restructure units to bring them into alignment with NATO
standards; and to cooperate with NATO in PfP exercises, in Bosnia,
Eastern Slavonia, and other Unapproved operations. Each candidate
country has a modernization plan that aims toward enhancing the
interoperability of its armed forces with NATO, All three are reducing
their armed forces, by 40 percent in the Czech case, 35 percent in the
Polish case, and nearly 60 percent in the Hungarian case.
And following the third round of discussions between Poland and
NATO in Brussels earlier this month the Poles declared their
willingness to contribute 1-9 percent of the current NATO budget. It is
worth noting that seven of the current sixteen members of NATO make
lower contributions.
Are Czech, Hungarian, and Polish citizens in favor of joining NATO?
A Hungarian public opinion survey taken in September 1997 indicated
that 75 percent of those people who indicated that they would
participate in a referendum on NATO would vote in favor of joining
NATO; they will have an opportunity to do so on November 16 when a
referendum on NATO accession will be held. A USIA survey of Czech
citizens in May 1997 indicated that 60 per- cent favored entering NATO.
Polish surveys have consistently reported approval ratings of above 83
percent.
The fact is that these countries share Western values and
principles and want to contribute to, not merely benefit from, the
stability and security that accompanies NATO membership. Suffice it
here to mention Czech and Polish participation in Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, Polish action on behalf of American interests in Iraq following
the war, active participation in SFOR by Poland and the Czech Republic,
and Hungary's support of SFOR by permitting NATO bases to be
established in Hungary, and allowing NATO troops to pass through and
over Hungarian territory to and from Bosnia.
At present, no real major threat to the peace and security of any
of the three candidate countries exists, including Russia. However, the
perception of a Russian threat, still exists in Poland and Hungary,
based on a shared historical experience and, in the Polish case, the
proximity of a quarter million Russian troops in Kaliningrad blast and
the establishment of the recent Russian-Belarusian Union. NATO is seen
as being the only ready and tested structure that can effectively
discourage potential trouble before it occurs.
Despite the posturing we see in some Russian circles, NATO
expansion does not pose a threat to a democratizing Russia that, after
all, has a special relationship with NATO. According to a recent Brown
University poll Russian elites express greater fear of Chinese
demographic pressure and Islamic fundamentalism. Nonetheless, the
failure to ratify the accession treaties would be perceived as a clear
signal of U.S. disinterest in a region over which the United States had
waged a forty-year struggle against the Soviet Union. That would result
in a grey zone, a security vacuum, and temptation for the radicals that
today are on the fringes of Russian politics.
With dynamic economies, solid democratic values, excellent
relations with neighbors, strong moral and political support for and a
record of cooperation with NATO, and strongly pro-American attitudes,
the three candidates have much to offer the Euro-Atlantic community. At
a meeting of the New Atlantic Initiative on September 9, 1997, former
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake spoke of the relatively low
priority that NATO expansion holds for the average Russian, and
concluded that enlargement ``is the opportunity of a generation and it
would be the shame of our generation if we do not now seize it.'' The
overwhelming majority of the 60 million inhabitants of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the 11 million co-nationals residing
here in the U.S., and the many more Americans who see a safer America
in an enlarged NATO, would only echo that assertion.
COSTS, BENEFITS, BURDENSHARING AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO
ENLARGEMENT
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1997
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Biden, Robb, Feinstein and
Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I would
say, for the record, that we are in the midst of the end of
session frustration. At the moment, the Senate is trying to get
a quorum, which may take a while. They may have to go to a live
quorum to get a vote on it.
And then, we have at least one vote to follow immediately
after that. So rather than have the witnesses sit here all
morning, not to mention the guests, I am going to start it and
I think we can get pretty far down the road before anything
happens on the floor.
In any case, let's see what we can do.
Now, we'll begin for the record.
The Foreign Relations Committee today continues its
examination of the critical issues surrounding the proposed
expansion of NATO. This morning, the subject for our discussion
will be the cost, the benefits, the burden sharing, and the
military implications of NATO enlargement.
Maybe you recall that during Secretary Albright's recent
appearance before this committee, I mentioned that the issues
that we would consider this morning may very well be the issues
that would determine whether NATO enlargement will succeed or
fail in the Senate.
Now our first panel will consist of the Honorable Walter
Slocombe from the Department of Defense who is here and I have
already greeted him. Mr. Slocombe will discuss the military
implications of NATO and will present the administration's
analysis of how much NATO enlargement will cost.
Now, Mr. Slocombe will be followed by a private panel
consisting of Dr. Richard Kugler of the National Defense
University; Dr. Ivan Eland of the Cato Institute; Mr. Stephen
Hadley, a former Defense Department official during the Bush
administration. By the way, Mr. Hadley is now with the law firm
of Shea and Gardner.
Now, all of these gentlemen have checked the
administration's mathematics, and are here to tell us whether
anything has been missed in putting together the
administration's estimate of how much NATO enlargement will in
fact cost the American taxpayers, as well as how this policy
will benefit the national interests of the United States.
So I say to you, Mr. Slocombe and the other gentlemen who
will follow you, we welcome you, we deeply appreciate your
coming, and we look forward to your comments. You may proceed,
Mr. Slocombe.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. WALTER SLOCOMBE, UNDERSECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Mr. Slocombe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm
honored to have the opportunity to appear before this committee
on behalf of the administration and the Department of Defense
to address the military implications and costs of NATO
enlargement.
I want particularly to express our appreciation for the
fact that the committee has chosen to have these series of
hearings early on as we begin to define the issues and open the
debate on this fundamental question.
Nowhere are American concerns more vital or are efforts
more focused than in the case of Europe. The United States
maintains a commitment to Europe in terms of troops on the
ground, in terms of capacity to reinforce as needed, and in
terms of political engagement in seeking to resolve problems.
America makes this commitment not as an act of charity, but
because the security of Europe is vital to our own security as
events in this century have shown.
As a result of the success of freedom and the collapse of
communism and the end of the cold war, we know have a chance to
build a security system for all of Europe. We need to do so,
for, unfortunately, while the massive Soviet threat has
evaporated, we continue to face problems as well as
opportunities--threats to stability and security can still
arise from old national and ethnic hatreds, from home-grown and
state-sponsored terrorism, from threats from unstable regions
outside Europe, and from the prospect of the threat of weapons
of mass destruction.
In the new European security system we seek to build, the
key instrument is NATO. NATO enlargement is the most
publicized, but not the only part, of a much broader strategy
to create a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. In my
full statement, I outline the other elements of that effort.
Enlargement, which is the focus of this committee's and,
indeed, the country's attention, will serve the common security
interests of all the member NATO--all the member nations of
NATO, including the United States. Adding nations to the
alliance in a gradual and careful way as they meet the
standards for membership will, first of all, foster stability
throughout Europe and the world by providing for stability,
which has historically been a principal source of conflict in
Europe.
Second, it will make NATO stronger by creating a larger
circle of like-minded nations prepared to work together in the
common defense.
Third, it provides an institutional setup for improving
relations among the region's states, both members and non-
members. Indeed it is--the prospect of NATO enlargement has
already had an important positive effect in that direction.
Fourth, it will broaden the number of countries that can
participate in burden sharing within NATO, both in financial,
in manpower, and in strategic terms. It will create a better
environment for trade, investment, and economic growth in
Eastern and Central Europe because it is as true in Europe as
it is in other parts of the world that without basic security
and stability, free economies cannot prosper.
It will help secure the historic gains of democracy in
Central and Eastern Europe by providing the security in which
those newly free societies can flourish. It will help all of
Europe become a stronger partner for the United States in
political, economic, and security affairs.
Thus, the enlargement will serve American interests and
American principles just as it will serve those of all of
Europe, both old and new members, states inside and outside the
alliance.
As you are, of course, aware, at the Madrid Summit this
summer, the NATO alliance, the NATO countries decided to invite
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin negotiations
toward an accession agreement, which we expect to have signed
in December.
The main focus of my testimony this morning is with regard
to the military implications of the accession of those
countries and the associated costs.
With respect to military implications, NATO's first task
now and as an enlarged alliance will be the so-called ``Article
5'' defense of the territory of its members. This core function
will not be diminished with enlargement, or indeed with other
changes in the alliance.
Back in 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept that
recognized the end of the cold war and shifted from the cold
war program of position forward defense to place new emphasis
on flexibility and mobility and an assured capacity for
augmentation.
Applying this concept to enlargement, NATO does not need,
in the existing strategic environment, to permanently station
combat forces of any substantial numbers on new members'
territory. Instead, the military forces of the new members will
be made capable of operating with NATO forces, supplemented by
the capability of current members, to provide appropriate NATO
reinforcements in a crisis if necessary.
Thus, the defense posture associated with enlargement will
apply to those new members the same concept of regional
reinforcement that it applies to current members. Similarly,
NATO has agreed that while new members will be expected to
support the concept of deterrence and the essential role that
nuclear weapons continue to play in the alliance strategy,
enlargements won't--enlargement will not require a change in
NATO's current nuclear posture.
For this reason, the alliance has stated that it has no
intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on
the territory of new members nor does it foresee a future need
to do so. But with respect to this statement as well as the
statement about stationing forces, these positions depend on
current conditions and could, of course, be reviewed where
conditions have changed.
NATO will also, of course, expect new members to be able to
contribute to non-Article 5 missions, including being able to
participate in out-of-area deployments and, indeed, it is
relevant that all three of the countries which have been
invited to join are active participants with forces in Bosnia,
and, indeed, in other operations.
With respect to costs, of course NATO enlargement areas
cost. Security is not free. It is a price well worth paying but
it is not free. Analysis of the financial costs of enlargement
can, I think, usefully be broken into three components.
First, there are the costs to new members; that is, to
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to develop military
forces that are better able to contribute to their own defense,
to the defense of other NATO members, and to other NATO
operations.
Second, there are the costs to current members so that they
can improve their forces' mobility, deployability, and
flexibility--in short, to proceed with the efforts they are
already committed to and needed to meet the defense
requirements of NATO's current membership.
These first two categories of costs are for actions that
the countries concerned would need to take to provide for their
own defense whether or not NATO added members. Indeed, to get
comparable levels of security without NATO enlargement, new
members and, arguably, even current members, would have to
spend more than they will have to spend with an enlarged
alliance.
And finally, there are the costs to both new and old
members of integrating the new members into NATO or building
the links that make the alliance a real working military
alliance.
From one point of view, these direct costs could be
considered the only real costs of NATO enlargement, since they
are the only costs that are uniquely associated with
enlargement--the only costs that would not be incurred if NATO
did not add new members. But we have thought it appropriate to
count all three categories of costs to present a complete
picture of what the requirement will be.
But these direct costs are associated with enhancing
interoperability. They include improvements in communications,
air command and control, logistics, infrastructure, and
conducting the program of exercises necessary to be sure that
this linking system works. As you know, earlier this year the
Department of Defense had prepared and submitted to the
Congress are--an initial analysis of what the costs would be.
It's important to understand the assumptions that lie
behind this or any projections of cost. Our estimated assumed
that while there will be a need for serious defense
capabilities for an enlarged NATO just as there is now, there
is currently no threat of large-scale conventional aggression
in Europe, and that any such threat would take years to
develop.
That is, of course, the same assumption that we make in the
United States for our own national planning and that NATO makes
in planning for the defense of its current members. That
assumption includes a recognition that there is no guarantee in
an absolute sense that that threat could not arise, and that we
have to hedge against the possibility and NATO provides an
important basis for the hedge.
Total costs, as we estimated them for all three categories
aggregate, was $27-$35 billion over the period from now through
2009; that is, 10 years after the planned accession of the new
members.
Let me give you a brief breakdown of how those costs were
allocated. First, new members costs for restructuring their own
national forces. Those costs were estimated at between $10 and
$13 billion over that timeframe or around $1 billion a year.
Those costs amount to some 10-30 percent of the projected
defense budgets for the prospective new members over that
period of time. Now, that is a significant part of the total
budgets for those countries. On the other hand, it represents
the investment that they will need to make in making a
fundamental new direction in their own national defense.
To meet those costs, they will have to increase their
defense budgets to some degree and they will outline plans to
do that. But we and they expect that a substantial part of the
costs will be met by savings from reducing the size of the
three nations' current forces.
I also want to emphasize that all of these costs would be
borne by new members, except to the likely very limited extent
that the American Congress, or indeed, other NATO parliaments,
decided to continue the limited support that we now have for
some of the Central European militaries.
For example, as you know, the United States now provides
about $100 million a year through the so-called Warsaw
Initiative to fund PF--Partnership For Peace countries and to
support their participation in PFP.
These costs for the three new members will be the cost of
moving from their own Soviet-style forces, which were little
more than auxiliaries of the Red Army, to militaries
appropriate for independent democracies in a free alliance.
But it's important to recall that these countries do not by
any means start from zero. Indeed, they have per capita rather
larger militaries than most NATO allies; probably in terms of
just number of people, larger than they need.
What they need to do, and we have made clear the priorities
for this, is first to invest in quality personnel. Make sure
those personnel are trained. Achieve a real degree of
interoperability with NATO, which means upgrading
communications, logistics capability, infrastructure, and
integrated their air defense with that of the alliance as a
whole.
It is certainly the case that each of the invited nations
will have to modernize its equipment in the years ahead. But it
is our view and theirs that acquiring large amounts of high-
tech weapon systems should not be the highest priority.
These countries are already working hard to demonstrate
that they are ready for membership in NATO. Assistant Secretary
of Defense Cramer and Assistant Secretary of State Grossman
are, as I understand it, prepared to testify before this
committee next week. They were scheduled last week and it was
canceled--postponed regarding these preparations, so I will not
go into them in detail beyond noting that each nation
acknowledges the need both to restructure and increase their
defense effort.
The second broad category is the current allies' cost; that
is, the cost to improve deployability. I want to begin by
noting that our cost estimates to date do not anticipate any
added costs to the United States in this category--that is,
ability to deploy--because the United States forces are already
highly deployable and sustainable at long distances.
Their requirement to deploy to meet contingencies in places
like Korea or Southwest Asia is actually more demanding than a
hypothetical crisis in Central Europe. U.S. costs of
enlargement are relatively low because we've already provided
for the force's projection missions that the new NATO requires.
But it is certainly the case that the other members of the
alliance need to improve their capabilities to deploy. Now we
have estimated that the costs of meeting the requirements will
be in the range of $8 to $10 billion, or around $600-$800
million per year.
Now, these are a very modest share of the total defense
budgets of the non-U.S. NATO allies, on the order of 1 percent.
For the most part, they represent efforts already under way to
adapt their forces to new postcold war needs and missions.
These costs would all be borne by current allies and not by
the United States. As this committee is well aware, for decades
now, the United States has made no financial contribution to
NATO allies' defense budgets except for the limited amounts for
loan support to Greece and Turkey.
We believe that our current allies can and should do more
to increase their capability for the sort of mobile, flexible
operations that NATO will need to be ready for in the future.
But it is important to recognize that most of these countries
have already made improvements and are committed to make more,
and detailed examples are set forth in my statement.
Finally, turning to third category, the direct enlargement
costs for linking new and old allies, those were estimated at
about 9 to $12 billion over this period, or about $700-$900
million per year. This, again, is the cost of things like
communications reinforcement, reception infrastructure, and
other interoperability measures.
We estimated that about 60 percent of these costs, or about
$5.5 to $7 billion in total, would be paid for out of the NATO
common budgets over the 10 years following accession. The
remainder would be paid almost entirely by the new members.
Now, this number is particularly important because this is
the only number to which the United States would have to
contribute. As you know, the United States pays approximately
25 percent of each of the three NATO common budgets. We expect
that this relative cost share will stay the same--the ratio of
three European to one U.S. in the period when NATO is meeting
these requirements.
With these assumptions, the U.S. share would be about $150-
$200 million per year. Now, that is simply our share of the
common budgets.
These are, certainly, manageable costs. Obviously, $200
million is a lot of money, but it is only a fraction of a
percentage point of the entire U.S. defense budget, which is
$266 billion this year.
We are still discussing whether or what portion of those
direct costs of enlargement, which would be paid for from
common budgets, will represent a net increase overall in the
common budgets, but whether some can be offset by reductions in
lower priority programs. Now, there will be certainly be some
reprioritizing of projects, and, therefore, less than dollar
for dollar increase. The United States continues to expect that
additional resources will be required.
Having explained the numbers that we provided earlier this
year, I now want to talk about them, the next step, to get more
refined estimates. Our estimates earlier this year were
necessarily preliminary, if only because we didn't know what
nations would be invited to join, and we certainly didn't know
the detail of the steps needed to link them into the alliance.
Immediately after the Madrid decisions, NATO started a
detailed review of the military implications, the miliary
requirements, and the costs of meeting those requirements that
are associated with enlargement.
The present NATO costing effort is highly specific and
focused on individual installations. In an effort to better
understand requirements as well as the current capabilities of
the three invited nations, members of NATO's international
military staff have been conducting cite visits at various
military facilities in the invited countries. They actually go
out and look at the air field, at the rail head, at the
communications' facility, and the air defense radar stations to
identify what changes will be necessary in order to bring those
facilities up to the required standard.
They will then cost these requirements and prepare a
proposed schedule on which they will be met. That work is to be
completed in time for approval at the December NATO
ministerials. This--and those cost estimates based on these
detailed analyses will, therefore, be available to Congress
simultaneous with the signing of the accession agreements and
well before any vote on enlargement.
Based on what we know now, we expect that the NATO cost
estimates will be somewhat lower than those you received from
us in February. First of all, the initial U.S. cost estimate
assessed that four, not three, new members would be admitted,
so there is some reduction simply from that.
Second, and this is important in terms of the debate,
remember that the number which NATO will come up to is
comparable to the $5.5 to $7 billion that we estimated for the
costs to the common budgets. NATO will only be estimating the
costs to the common budgets, not the other categories.
But we also expect that the NATO cost estimates will be
lower because some of the things in these countries are better
than we expected. It is clear that there is a lot for them to
do, but we believe that the additional investment required to
prepare for membership will be less than initially anticipated.
My detailed statement gives some examples of our experiences
showing why this is the case.
In general, we found that the old Soviet-style
infrastructure, while having lots of defects, provides a sound
base on which to build and perhaps, more important, that the
prospective new members have been making good use of the time
and opportunities that the Partnership For Peace and nearly a
decade of freedom has afforded in their ability to improve
their--the capacity of their militaries to work as a part of
the NATO team.
There is on--this is a question of making the estimates.
Then there is the matter of finding the money. Once the
military requirements and cost estimates are agreed, we will
move forward to make good on the commitments taken by--
undertaken by the leaders of the alliance in Madrid that,
quote, ``The resources necessary to meet the costs of
enlargement will be provided.''
At Maastricht earlier this month at the informal Defense
Ministerial, Secretary of Defense Cohen reminded his colleagues
that all of the allies have acknowledged that the admission of
new members will involve the alliance providing the resources
which enlargement will necessarily require.
There was no disagreement on this point. Of course, until
we know the detailed costs and the proposed schedules, we will
not able to determine the net increase in NATO common budgets
as British Defense Minister George Robertson noted last week in
an article published in the American press.
Because enlargement is a high priority for NATO, we may
have to delay some lower priority subjects. As I said, there is
a question whether the enlargements costs to common budget can
be fully offset.
But Minister Robinson added, ``If additional spending is
requiring, Britain will pay its share. We are confident that
that will, in the end, be the position of all the allies. We
will keep you informed over the coming months as this
discussion continues.''
Finally, I want to emphasize that these estimates of the
cost of enlargement relate to capabilities required in the
security environment that we in fact or see. Nation's need
serious defense capabilities, which we have to hedge against
the possibility things turning bad, in which there is no
immediately threat of large-scale conventional aggression and
whether any threat would take years to develop.
Of course, a fundamentally different and far more demanding
set of requirements for defense, in NATO and worldwide, would
arise if trends in Russia or anywhere else developed in such a
way such as to renew a direct territorial threat to NATO
members.
Because such a threat is hypothetical, it's impossible to
estimate with any precision the costs of meeting it. But there
can be no question that those costs would be substantial--they
would be affordable, but they would be substantial. Remember
that just 10 years ago, the United States and most of its
allies were spending nearly twice as much as a share of GNP on
defense as we do today.
There can, however, be no question that if we ever had to
meet such a threat, we could do it more effectively and less
expensively in an expanded alliance than in a Europe still
divided along cold war lines. In such a circumstance which we
do not expect and hope never to see, the added manpower,
military capability, political support, and strategic depth
afforded by NATO enlargement would amply justify whatever
additional costs there were at having additional members within
the alliance's security umbrella.
But perhaps the most important point to be made about cost
is that there would be greater cost and greater risks in not
enlarging. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to
help integrate, consolidate, and stabilize Central and Eastern
Europe, we would risk a much higher price later.
The most efficient and cost-effective way to guarantee
stability is to do so collectively through NATO. That was true
in the cold war; it is true now; it will be true in the future.
The costs of doing so are manageable for all concerned.
Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and
stronger than solely national defense.
A decision to defer enlargement, much less to withhold it
altogether, would send the message to Central and Eastern
Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West.
It would falsely validate the old divisions of the cold war.
The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would be
destabilizing in the region, and would encourage nationalists
and disruptive forces throughout Europe.
NATO would remain stuck in the past, in danger of
irrelevance, while the United States would be seen as
inconstant and unreliable in its leadership, withdrawing from
its responsibilities and its interests in Europe and in the
world.
The years ahead will be challenging ones in Europe in
trans-Atlantic security. NATO enlargement is an essential
feature of adapting the Western military and security
organization to efficiently and effectively meet the challenges
ahead. While there will be costs, they are manageable.
Most important, for the United States, for our allies, for
our partners, the costs--not just the financial costs of a
strong, effective, and engaged North American alliance pale in
comparison to the costs that would be implicated by stagnation,
instability, and failure of leadership in Europe. I appreciate
the committee's attention and I look forward to the chance to
answer your question.
[The prepared statement of the Mr. Slocombe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Slocombe
Thank you. I am honored to be invited to appear before this
Committee to address the security and military aspects of NATO
enlargement. I would like to address first the rationale for NATO
enlargement in the context of the European security framework and then
talk about the military implications of enlargement, including the
aspect of costs, which I know has been of interest to this committee,
the Senate, and the public at large.
I. American Interests in Europe
As Secretary Albright made clear in her appearance before this
Committee, nowhere are American concerns more vital, and our efforts
more concentrated, than in Europe. We will maintain our commitment to
Europe in troops on the ground, in capability to reinforce as needed,
and in political engagement in seeking to resolve problems. America
makes this commitment not as an act of altruism, but because the
security of Europe is vital to our own, as events in this century have
repeatedly shown.
And we have an historic opportunity before us. President Clinton
said recently, ``Taking wise steps now to strengthen our common
security when we have the opportunity to do so will help build a future
without the mistakes and the divisions of the past, and will enable us
to organize ourselves to meet the new security challenges of the new
century.''
Twice before in this century, America had the opportunity to help
build a system of European security. The first time, after WWI, we
foolishly held back from the responsibilities our interests required we
assume. The second time, after WWII, 50 years ago, Western Europe and
the United States together chose a path of reconciliation and
reconstruction through the Marshall Plan, and together moved from
terrible destruction to unprecedented prosperity and security. However,
Eastern Europe and Russia did not participate because of Stalin's
paranoia and relentless expansionism.
We now have a third chance . . . this time to build a security
system for all Europe that will:
<bullet> Solidify the place of the newly free nations in a secure
Europe linked to the U.S.;
<bullet> Maintain U.S. leadership and engagement;
<bullet> Foster growing European integration;
<bullet> Ensure that Russia will play a constructive role,
commensurate with its importance and weight in European
affairs; and
<bullet> Preserve and strengthen NATO as the core instrument of
military security in Europe.
And, unfortunately, we face problems as well as good opportunities.
The end of the Soviet threat, while very welcome, has not meant the end
of threats. Threats to stability and security can still arise from old
national and ethnic hatreds, home-grown and state-sponsored terrorism,
threats from unstable regions outside Europe, and the prospect of the
spread of weapons of mass destruction.
II. NATO in the New Europe
In the new European security system we seek to build, the key
instrument is NATO. NATO is the only effective, continuing multilateral
military alliance in the world. It has risen to the challenge of
providing a critical instrument to promote peace in Bosnia. The best
evidence of NATO's continuing relevance is the eagerness of many
countries to join it--and the determination of its current members to
keep it strong and to shape it to respond to the new challenges and
opportunities we face. Countries want to join NATO because of what it
is--a strong military alliance, with strong U.S. leadership. It will
remain so.
To that end, we have embarked on an historic program to build a new
NATO. NATO enlargement is the most publicized, but not the only, part
of a much broader strategy, to help create a peaceful, undivided and
democratic Europe. That strategy has included many other elements:
support for German unification; fostering reforms in Russia, Ukraine
and other new independent states; assistance to the withdrawal of
Russian forces and nuclear weapons from newly independent states;
negotiation and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty;
and the evolution and strengthening of European security and economic
institutions, including the European Union, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the
Western European Union, and working toward the creation of a European
security and defense identity within NATO.
With regard to NATO itself, NATO enlargement is also part of a much
broader series of steps to adapt the Alliance to the post-Cold War
security environment, including adaptation of NATO's strategy,
strategic concept, command arrangements and force posture;
strengthening its ability to carry out new missions beyond NATO's
territory, as it has in Bosnia, while maintaining its core function of
collective defense; and the creation and enhancement of the Partnership
for Peace (PFP). As part of this broad series of steps, NATO
enlargement aims to help the United States and Europe erase outdated
Cold War lines and strengthen shared security into the next century.
III. NATO Enlargement
The impulse for so many of the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe to wish to join NATO stems from their desire for thorough,
permanent inclusion in the broad Atlantic community and for the sense
of living in the secure neighborhood that NATO has brought to its
current members. They want to be irreversibly part of the West, and we
want to help them in this endeavor.
A. Benefits of Enlargement
Enlargement will serve the common security interests of all current
NATO members. Adding nations to the Alliance in a gradual and careful
way as they meet the standards for membership will:
<bullet> foster stability throughout Europe by providing an
institutional stability for Central Europe, which has
historically been a principal source of conflict in Europe;
<bullet> make NATO stronger by creating a larger circle of like-
minded nations devoted to collective defense, both for
protection of their own territory and for mutual action when
their security is threatened by events outside their territory;
<bullet> improve relations among the region's states--both members
and non-members--as in the historic reconciliation of Germany
and the Czech Republic, and of Hungary and Romania;
<bullet> broaden burden-sharing within NATO;
<bullet> create a better environment for trade, investment and
economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe;
<bullet> help secure the historic gains of democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe by providing the security in which their free
societies can flourish and the hatred of the past be
permanently buried, just as it did for Western European nations
such as Germany, Italy, and Spain; and
<bullet> help all of Europe become a stronger partner for the United
States in political, economic and security affairs. This will
serve American interest and American principles, just as it
will serve those of all of Europe, both old and new members and
states inside and outside the Alliance.
B. The Choice of Prospective New Members
Of course, the process of enlargement must be carefully prepared.
Formal membership in NATO carries with it both political and military
obligations of a special character--what President Clinton has called
``the most solemn security guarantees.'' Enlargement must not, and will
not, dilute the Alliance's military effectiveness, nor its political
cohesion. The broader context of European security, including impact on
Russia, on Ukraine, and on nations that remain outside NATO, must be
taken into account.
Sincere aspiration to join cannot alone be enough for membership.
New members must be ready to accept the obligations of membership. They
must demonstrate a commitment to democracy and the rule of law, to an
open market economic system, to civilian constitutional control of
their militaries, to peaceful resolution of disputes with neighbors, to
respect for human rights and the rule of law, and to a gradual
development of military capabilities that are congruent and
interoperable with NATO systems.
After extensive discussion with allies, with candidate countries,
with members of Congress, and within the Administration, the President
decided this year that the US would support Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic for first round invitations. In Madrid, NATO invited
these three new democracies to begin accession talks to join the
Alliance. This decision was based on our conclusion, shared by the
military and our allies, that the three invitees--Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic--have made sufficient progress on military,
political, economic, and social reforms. They are clearly ready to take
the next steps to becoming full members, accepting all the rights and
responsibilities of membership.
Nine other European states had also declared their desire to join
NATO, and many of them are making excellent progress in preparing
themselves for membership. The United States and the Alliance
recognized the arguments in favor of several other candidate countries,
including Slovenia and Romania. We concluded, however, that the
alliance should extend an invitation now only in the clearest cases,
where there is a broad consensus that the candidate countries have
already demonstrated readiness for membership on all relevant
standards. Inviting accession is a profoundly significant action, which
carries heavy obligations both for new and old members. Where there is
reasonable doubt about whether a nation has yet made sufficient
progress, the prudent course is to defer invitations. This approach is
all the more appropriate, given that the door to membership will remain
open, so that there will be ample opportunities to invite additional
members.
The key non-selects--Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic
states--have naturally all expressed disappointment at their non-
selection. But all have also indicated that, far from abandoning the
course of integration, NATO membership will remain a top foreign policy
goal for them. They are committed to continuing and accelerating
reforms. They are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. In
addition, all aspirants have expressed their intentions to participate
in enhanced PFP and the EAPC.
C. Military Implications
NATO's first task is ``Article 5'' defense of the territory of its
members. NATO's adoption of a new Strategic Concept in 1991 shifted
from the Cold War program of positioned forward defense to place a new
emphasis on enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability
for augmentation when necessary. Consistent with this concept, NATO
does not see a need in the existing strategic environment to
permanently station substantial combat forces on new, members'
territory. Instead, it envisions an effort to make the military forces
of new members capable of operating with NATO forces, supplemented by
the capability of current members to provide appropriate NATO
reinforcements in a crisis.
Thus, the defense posture associated with enlargement will apply to
new members the same concept of regional reinforcement that it applies
to current members, relying on the capability of new members' forces to
operate with and be reinforced by NATO units. The same forces and
capabilities needed to meet today's needs will apply to meeting those
associated with the new members.
Similarly, NATO has agreed that while new members will be expected
to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear
weapons play in Alliance strategy, enlargement will not require a
change in NATO's current nuclear posture. For this reason, the Alliance
has stated that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy
nuclear weapons on the territory of new members; nor does it foresee
any future need to do so.
NATO will also expect new members to be able to contribute to
NATO's non-Article 5 missions, including being able to contribute to
out-of-area deployments.
IV. Costs of Enlargement
Of course, NATO enlargement carries costs. Security is not free.
There are new financial costs to enlarging, but these costs are
affordable. They are modest compared both to our total defense
spending--and to the costs and risks of not enlarging. The most
important costs--like the most important benefits are non-financial.
The United States and its allies will, by enlargement, extend solemn
security guarantees to additional nations. NATO members must provide
the capability, with that of the new members, to back those guarantees.
The Madrid Statement acknowledges that the Alliance will need to find
the needed resources.
A. Categories of Enlargement Costs
Analysis of the financial costs of enlargement can be broken into
three components:
First, there are the costs to new members to develop military
forces to contribute to their own defense, to the defense of other NATO
members, and to other NATO operations. While they currently make some
contribution, in order to be greater producers of security, the new
members must over time re-build, re-equip, and re-train their forces.
They must have smaller, better equipped, better supported, and better
led forces, and those forces must be better able to operate with other
NATO forces.
Second, there are the costs to current members to improve their
forces' mobility, deployability, interoperability, and flexibility--in
short, to proceed with the efforts already committed to and needed for
NATO's current membership.
These two categories of costs are all for actions that the
countries concerned would need to take to provide for their own
defense, with or without NATO enlargement. Indeed, to get comparable
levels of security without NATO enlargement the new members would have
to spend more. Similarly, existing members would need to meet their
commitments to improve their forces' flexibility and deployability
whether or not NATO added members. But with enlargement, the
capabilities that these other costs will fund will be needed all the
more. So it is important that the commitments actually be met, and we
have thought it right to identify the first two categories of costs
that will need to be paid to ensure that an enlarged NATO is able to
meet its obligations.
Finally, there are the costs to both new and old members of
integrating new members into NATO. These direct costs to enlarging
could be considered the only true costs of NATO enlargement, since they
are the costs that would not be incurred if NATO did not add new
members.
These costs are associated with enhancing interoperability in
communications, reinforcement, exercises and air operations. They
include:
Communications:
<bullet> Refurbishment/renovation of new members' existing
headquarters facilities to accommodate a NATO C2 element
(including necessary intel & comms equipment).
<bullet> Extension of communications interfaces to all new member
forces.
<bullet> Education in NATO languages & procedures for new members'
officers.
Air Command and Control:
<bullet> Acquisition of interoperable air traffic control
capabilities and weapons engagement capability.
<bullet> Interoperable aircraft avionics (IFF).
Logistics:
<bullet> Acquisition of interoperable fuel facilities and other
support equipment at reception sites.
<bullet> Host-nation support planning and procedures for arranging
routine logistics support.
Infrastructure:
<bullet> Improvements to new members' airfields, road and rail links,
ports, and staging areas to accommodate NATO reinforcements.
<bullet> Enhanced fuel storage and distribution capabilities.
Exercises:
<bullet> Upgrades to existing exercise facilities to ensure
compatibility with NATO safety standards.
<bullet> Transportation and operating costs for incremental combined
exercises tied specifically to enlargement.
B. Initial U.S. Cost Estimate
As you know, the Department of Defense has prepared a notional
estimate of the costs of enlarging. This estimate was part of the
report, requested by the Congress, that the President submitted to you
in late February of this year.
Our initial estimate assumed that, while there would be a need for
serious defense capabilities for an enlarged NATO, there is currently
no threat of large-scale conventional aggression in Europe, and that
any such threat would take years to develop. This is, of course, the
same assumption that we make for our own national planning, and that
NATO makes in planning for defense of its current members.
Total costs for achieving all three categories were estimated as
$27-35 billion. These costs would be spread over the 13-year time frame
of 1997 through 2009--ten years after the planned accession of new
members.
Now, using the breakdown for these costs which I just outlined for
you, let me give you what we estimated each group would have to bear
for each of the three categories of costs:
1. New Members' costs for restructuring their national forces.
Prospective new member costs for restructuring their militaries
were estimated at about $10-13 billion over that time frame or about
$800 million to $1 billion per year. These costs amount to some 10-30%
of the total current defense budgets of the prospective new members.
New members will be expected to increase their defense budgets to
some degree, and they have outlined plans to do so. But we expect a
substantial part of these costs will be met by savings from reducing
the size of the three nations' current forces. These costs would all be
borne by the new members, except to the limited extent Congress decides
to continue limited support to Central European militaries. (As you
know, the U.S. now provides about $100 million in Warsaw Initiative
funding to all PfP countries combined to support their participation in
PfP.)
These will be costs of moving from their old Soviet-style forces,
which were little more than auxiliaries of the Red Army, to militaries
appropriate for independent democracies. These countries do not start
from zero. Indeed, they have, per capita, rather larger militaries than
most NATO allies. They each are contributing to NATO's force in Bosnia.
They have begun restructuring their forces, which are poorly equipped,
trained, and manned.
We have, since our first analysis, discovered some unanticipated
capabilities in the three invitees; however, as our study continues, we
will, of course, likely also find some deficiencies--especially
regarding personnel, specialized training, communications, and force
modernization. While the three cannot be expected to ``fix'' everything
by 1999, each must have a serious program that lays out a defined path
toward the enhancement of their defense capabilities.
We have told each invitee that its highest priority should be
investing in quality personnel. They must develop effective systems for
recruiting and retaining good troops. Key to this is the development of
an effective NCO corps. The next priority is training, including
English language training, for personnel and equipment are meaningless
without adequate training. The next priority is achievement of a real
degree of interoperability with NATO, including communications,
logistics, infrastructure for reinforcement, and air defense. In all 3
cases, the outcome will be smaller, but more capable forces.
While it is clear that each of the invited nations must undergo
modernization of major weapons systems in the years ahead if it is to
remain a contributor to overall alliance security, acquiring high tech
weapons systems should not be the highest priority.
These three countries are working hard to demonstrate that they are
ready for membership in NATO. Right after the Madrid Summit, Secretary
of Defense Cohen met with the three Ministers of Defense to explain
what they would need to do and to hear their plans. After the Madrid
Summit, Secretary Cohen traveled to Budapest while the President and
Secretary Albright traveled to Warsaw and Prague. We made these trips
not only to congratulate them but to remind them that the journey to
Alliance membership had just begun, not ended.
In the past month, Assistant Secretary Kramer has traveled to each
of the invitees' capitals to discuss their preparations for membership.
He and Assistant Secretary Grossman will testify before you next week
regarding these preparations, so I will not go into them in detail, but
it bears saying that each of these nations wants to be a contributor
to, not just a consumer of, security. They are already contributing to
the security of Europe by restructuring and modernizing their
militaries to operate with NATO, by serving with our soldiers in
Bosnia, and by helping to make a success of the Partnership for Peace.
Each country has some work to do. The Czechs, for example, in their
original DPQ responses to NATO, did not, commit enough of their forces
to NATO missions, but their most recent response commits virtually all
of their forces to NATO. Their future budgets need to allocate greater
resources for defense; they have promised to increase their defense
budget, currently 1.7% of GDP, to 2% by the year 2000. While both
Poland and Hungary have had similar deficiencies they are overcoming
them. Hungary has increased its budget and Poland has an extensive
fifteen year plan. I am encouraged by the rapid Czech response to our
and NATO's constructive criticism during the past few weeks.
2. Current Allies' Costs to Improve Deployability.
Current allies' costs for NATO regional reinforcement upgrades were
estimated at about $8-10 billion, or about $600-800 million per year.
These are a modest share of their total defense budget--less than 1%--
and for the most part, represent efforts already underway to adapt
their forces to new post-Cold War needs and missions.
These costs would all be borne by the current allies. For decades
now, the U.S. has made no financial contribution to Allies' defense
budgets (except for some loans to Greece & Turkey).
It is important to note that our cost estimates to date do not
anticipate any added costs to the U.S. in this category because U.S.
forces are already readily deployable and sustainable. The requirement
to deploy to meet a contingency in places like Korea or Southwest Asia
is more demanding than a hypothetical crisis in Central Europe. US
costs of enlargement are relatively low because we have already
provided for the forces' projection missions that the new NATO
requires.
Both the U.S. and our NATO allies have made big cuts in our defense
budgets since the end of the Cold War. But, using the key indicators of
burdensharing, as set by Congress, most of our NATO allies still make
very substantial contributions to the common defense. For example, more
than two-thirds of the troops participating in SFOR are non-U.S.
forces.
We believe the allies can and should do more to improve their
capability for the sort of mobile, flexible operation NATO will need to
be ready for in the future. But is it important to recognize that most
have already made improvements, and are committed to more. For example,
Britain provides NATO's only rapidly-deployable corps headquarters
committed to NATO and British forces are the backbone of the Allied
Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The U.K. also has the
capability to deploy and sustain a division-sized force of 20-25,000
personnel in a Gulf War-style scenario.
France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more
mobile and easily deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid
Action Force (FAR) designed for rapid response in both European and
overseas contingencies. France also participated heavily in IFOR
efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. With nearly 10,000 troops, France was the third largest
troop contributor, after the U.S. and Britain, and was responsible for
one of the three geographic sectors--and continues to be in SFOR.
Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some
53,000 fully-equipped troops from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The
first units stood up in 1996 and the force will be fully capable in
1998. In general, German armed forces are in the process of re-creating
themselves into a mobile, deployable--rather than static home defense--
force.
The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For
example, the Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both
their transport and air defense capabilities with new procurements such
as: two KDC-10 transport/tankers (the Dutch can now deploy their own F-
16s without reliance on the U.S.); an amphibious-lift ship to make the
marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their F-16 fleet and
their Patriot systems.
3. Costs to Link NATO and New Members.
Turning to the third category of direct enlargement costs for
linking new and old allies, those were estimated at about $9-12
billion, or about $700-900 million per year. This again, is the cost of
items such as communications, reinforcement reception infrastructure,
and other interoperability measures. We estimated that about 60% of
these costs, or about $5.5-7 billion, would be paid for out of NATO
common budgets over the ten years following accession, with the
remainder paid by new members. We further assumed that the U.S. would
pay its current approximately 25% share of the NATO common budget.
In 1997, total NATO common budget spending totaled about $1.8
billion. The total U.S. contribution to the three budgets was about
$485 million, while the allies contributed the other $1.3 billion. We
expect these relative percentage cost shares will stay the same three
European to one U.S.--in the period when NATO is meeting the
requirements of enlargement.
With these assumptions, the U.S. share of the direct costs of
enlargement would be about $150-200 million per year, representing our
share of the NATO common budget that would be applied to the linking of
new and old members.
These costs are manageable. Projected U.S. requirements to meet
direct enlargement common budget costs amount to only a fraction of a
percentage point when compared with total U.S. defense spending ($266
billion in 1997).
Still under discussion is whether that portion of the direct costs
of enlargement which are a shared responsibility and funded from the
common budget will result in an overall increase in the NATO common
budget--or whether some can be offset by reductions in lower priority
programs currently in the common budget. While there will certainly be
some reprioritizing of projects, and therefore a less than dollar-for-
dollar increase, we continue to believe that additional resources will
be required.
C. Ongoing NATO Work to Help Refine the Cost Estimate
As noted, our February estimates were necessarily preliminary, if
only because we did not know what nations would be invited to join, nor
the detail of steps needed to link them to the Alliance. Immediately
after the Madrid decisions, NATO started a detailed review of the
military implications and costs of enlargement, what new members will
bring to the Alliance, and any additional requirements for current
allies. The U.S. has long argued that any NATO cost estimate must be
driven by the military requirements of enlargement. We were successful
in pressing. that argument in the Alliance, and a review of the
military requirements is currently underway by the NATO staff.
These reviews are ongoing at NATO this fall, with recommendations
to be completed in November for consideration by ministers in December.
The invitees worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a
special Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) response as their initial
step into the NATO Defense Planning Process. All NATO allies respond to
the DPQ annually.
The present NATO costing effort is highly specific and focused. In
an effort to better understand requirements as well as the current
capabilities of the invited nations, members of NATO's international
military staff have been conducting site visits at various military
facilities in the invited countries this summer. They visited airfields
and railheads in each country. They checked out communications
facilities and visited air defense radar stations. This month they are
visiting other facilities in each country to try to ensure that the
first facilities they inspected are representative of the condition of
the majority of facilities in that country.
The international staff of NATO will then cost those new
requirements. They will also help determine a schedule by which to meet
requirements. That is part of the work that is to be completed in time
for the December ministerials. This level of detailed information was
obviously not available to us when we did our first cost study, and it
is still being formulated. But cost estimates based on these detailed
analyses will be available to Congress well before any vote on
enlargement.
NATO cost estimates may be lower
Based on what we know now, we expect that the NATO cost estimates
will be lower than those that you received from us in February. First,
the initial U.S. cost estimate assessed four, not three, new members.
Further, the NATO estimate will address only the direct, common-funded
costs, which, as explained above, OSD estimated at $5.5-7 billion over
10 years. National costs borne by each ally or prospective ally are
separate from, and will not be estimated by, the NATO work.
But we also expect the NATO cost estimates will be lower because
some things are better in the invited nations than people thought. As a
result of assessments NATO planners and logisticians have been
conducting, we believe the additional investment required to prepare
each of these nations, their military forces, and their infrastructures
for full NATO membership will be less than initially anticipated.
Let me share some examples of our experiences during these
assessments to show why this is the case.
Interoperability Progress by the Invitees
When the American General heading a small NATO team visiting
Kecskemet Air Base asked his Hungarian host how he might accommodate a
squadron of NATO F-16s, he was surprised by the precision and detail of
the Hungarian response--and the level of installation readiness already
achieved. He commented that the Hungarians had done some excellent
research. He was told it wasn't just research. Hungary had hosted a
squadron of Dutch F-16s for several weeks in 1996, and a United States
Air National Guard squadron was scheduled to arrive the week after the
general's visit. The Dutch and American planes were in Hungary as part
of a series of PfP exercises designed to improve interoperability. Thus
Hungarians are already capable of handling NATO aircraft at some of
their airfields. There is less work that needs to be done--and in
turn--less money to be spent to improve these airfields than we had
estimated earlier this year. This example also shows how PfP has
contributed in direct and practical ways to preparing for NATO
membership.
In another example, an analyst monitoring the NATO Common Fund Cost
Study's progress noted that even though communications and, information
systems requirements were increasing, the prospective costs to the
Czech Republic kept dropping. Upon closer inspection, it turned out the
Czechs had already anticipated requirements for secure and non-secure
digital communications programs and had applied NATO standards to the
national programs they are pursuing on their own. In short, the Czechs
had already spent their own money to fund some projects that we had
assumed would be paid for by NATO as a whole through the common
budgets.
Finally, an American general asked a Polish major familiar with the
details of a particular rail complex whether we could reasonably expect
to transport a NATO armored division through it in one week's time. The
amused major replied by asking the general how many Soviet heavy
divisions he thought they planned on moving through the same location
when trains were going the other way?
These examples demonstrate an important point. When we conducted
our initial cost study, we assumed a very substantial need for
improving military bases and equipment to support interoperability and
reinforcement. As we spend more time on the ground in the countries of
each of the invitees, learning the details of their military forces and
infrastructure, we are gaining a better appreciation for just how well
prepared they were to fight against NATO, and for how much effort they
have subsequently dedicated to preparing to integrate into NATO. Of
course, we will also find deficiencies, but the new members will be
modernizing from a relatively robust foundation. We will not be
building airfields from scratch. In fact, NATO will be inheriting a
great deal of usable infrastructure. Accordingly, the direct costs of
enlargement will likely be less than we originally estimated.
During the Cold War these levels of capabilities would have been
bad news stories, but today they are all good news stories. What I am
attempting to demonstrate is that we are increasingly impressed by the
levels of readiness, understanding, and initial success of the invitees
in working toward NATO interoperability. These capabilities will
contribute to driving down the need for NATO common-funded improvements
once they become members of NATO. These capabilities are generally
higher than we assumed in our February study on the requirements and
costs of enlargement. I'm convinced, as we delve deeper into the
circumstances in these countries, we will discover more examples of
infrastructure capabilities either inherited from the Cold War or built
up over the past three years through the Partnership for Peace.
The NATO staff work I have been outlining for you, when forwarded
to Ministers in December, will provide the basis for a more refined
assessment of the costs associated with NATO enlargement. In order to
support the Congress' review of issues associated with enlargement, we
will, as Secretary Cohen stated in his 16 October letter to Senator
Stevens, provide you with an update based on these NATO efforts in
early 1998.
D. Finding the Resources
Once the military requirements and cost estimates are agreed to in
December, we will move forward to make good on the commitment
undertaken by national leaders at Madrid that, ``the resources
necessary to meet [the costs of enlargement] will be provided.''
In Maastricht, at the informal NATO defense ministerial, Secretary
Cohen led the discussions on this issue. Secretary Cohen reminded his
colleagues that at our defense ministerial in June, we all pledged to
play our full part: (1) in preparing the nations invited to join NATO
for their future roles and obligations as Alliance members; (2) in
providing sufficient resources to maintain the Alliance's ability to
perform its full range of missions; (3) in implementing the Alliance's
decisions to further enhance its relations with partners; and (4) in
acknowledging that, ``the admission of new members . . . will involve
the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily
require.'' These commitments were reaffirmed at the Summit in Madrid,
where our Heads of State agreed: (1) that there will be costs
associated with the integration of new members; (2) that these costs
will be manageable; and (3) that the resources necessary to meet these
costs will be provided.
There was no disagreement on this point in Maastricht. Of course,
until we know the detailed cost and proposed schedule of action, we
will not be able to determine how much net increase in the NATO common
budgets will be needed. And, as British Defense Minister George
Robertson stated last week, ``[b]ecause enlargement is a high priority
for NATO, we may have to delay some lower priority projects.'' But,
Minister Robertson added, ``if additional spending is required, Britain
will pay its share.'' We are confident that will, in the end, be the
position of all the allies.
We will keep you informed over the coming months as this discussion
continues.
E. The Effect of a Greater Threat on Costs
Finally, it is important to understand that these estimates of the
cost of enlargement--and of keeping NATO capable in new conditions--
relate to the capabilities required in the European security
environment that we in fact foresee--one in which nations need serious
defense capabilities, but in which there is no threat of large scale
military conventional aggression and where any such threat would take
years to develop. Of course, a fundamentally different--and far more
demanding--set of defense requirements would arise if trends in Russia
or elsewhere developed in such a way as to renew a direct territorial
threat to NATO members. Such a threat does not exist, nor is there an
expectation that it will reemerge. Moreover, the United States and its
allies would have years of warning and preparation time in the very
unlikely event such a dramatic change in the European security
environment were to occur.
Because such a threat is hypothetical, it is not possible to
estimate with any precision the costs of meeting it. But there can be
no question that the cost of responding to such a threat would be
substantial. Just ten years ago, for example, the United States and
most of its Allies were spending nearly twice as much of GDP on defense
as today.
There can, however, be no question that, if we had to meet such a
threat, we could do so more effectively and less expensively in an
expanded alliance than in a Europe still divided along Cold War lines.
In such circumstance, the added manpower, military capability,
political support and strategic depth afforded by NATO enlargement
would amply justify whatever additional cost there were in having
additional members in the Alliance.
Perhaps the most important point to be made about the costs of
enlargement is that there would be greater costs and risks to not
enlarging. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to help
integrate, consolidate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we
would risk a much higher price later. The most efficient and cost-
effective way to guarantee stability in Europe is to do so collectively
through NATO. The costs of doing so are manageable for all concerned.
Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and stronger
than national defense. A decision to defer enlargement, much less to
withhold it altogether, would send the message to Central and Eastern
Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West. It would
falsely validate the old divisions of the Cold War. The resulting sense
of isolation and vulnerability would be destabilizing in the region and
would encourage nationalist and disruptive forces throughout Europe.
NATO would remain stuck in the past, in danger of irrelevance, while
the U.S. would be seen as inconstant and unreliable in its leadership
and withdrawing from its responsibilities in Europe and the world.
V. Conclusion
The years ahead will be challenging ones in European and
Transatlantic security. NATO enlargement is an essential feature of
adapting the Western military and security organization to efficiently
and effectively meet the challenges ahead. While there will be costs,
they are manageable. More important, for the United States and its
allies and partners, the costs--and not just financial costs--of a
strong, effective and engaged North Atlantic Alliance pale in
comparison to the costs that would be implicated by stagnation,
instability and failure of leadership in Europe.
Senator Hagel (presiding): Mr. Slocombe, thank you. We
appreciate your appearing here this morning. Chairman Helms
went to vote, if you wondered what was going on up here.
Mr. Slocombe. He explained.
Senator Hagel. I know you are no stranger to this. He will
be back, and in the interest of time, I will proceed with
questions and then ask Senator Feinstein for her questions.
Mr. Slocombe, in light of the news this morning about the
present--or at least it appears to be a present shakeup in the
Czech government, have we anticipated problems that might occur
with the three new invited nations into NATO--government
problems, financial problems? And if we have anticipated those
problems, for example, on the financial assistance side, if one
of these new nations is unable to finance its share of its
membership, what is plan B?
Mr. Slocombe. I think that whatever shape of the
governments in any of these three coun--the short answer to
your question is yes, we have looked at the political stability
of these three governments. One of the requirements was that
any country that was going to be seriously considered for an
invitation would have to have clearly established a democratic,
stable system.
And that is certainly true for these three. It's true for
other countries in Central Europe, but that was a necessary but
not a sufficient condition. I think it is clear that any
conceivable government in any of these three countries will be
dedicated to NATO membership and to paying the costs that are
necessary to do that.
Now, they may have economic ups and downs. The possibility
of occasional blips in the economic structure is not confined
to Central and Eastern Europe. But I think the base--their
basic commitment to NATO membership and to paying the costs
will be met.
The problems in the Czech Republic--and I have to confess,
Senator, that in the time that I had been getting up here,
whatever's happened in the Czech Republic has happened. I can't
comment in any detail. There have been some special issues in
the Czech Republic and I think they have had a wakeup call and
they understand they need to make a stronger effort. We expect
they will make that.
Senator Hagel. Let me delve into this a little more
specifically. Would members, current NATO members, do you
believe, step up their assistance in order to cover the nation
or two or three invited nations if there was a shortfall or a
problem in their commitment to financially support their
involvement in NATO?
Mr. Slocombe. We have made clear from the beginning that on
the whole, NATO is a club in which you pay your own dues. The
United States has had a modest program for all of the
Partnership For Peace countries, although a large part of it
goes to these three countries, to support participation in the
Partnership For Peace.
A number of the other European countries have small
programs of their own that work on particular focused areas.
But except for that very limited and very focused effort, there
is no contemplation by anybody that there will be financial
assistance to meet the basic defense budgets of any of these
countries.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Congressional Budget Office and the RAND Corporation,
as you know, both estimated NATO expansion costs, but came up
with dramatically different numbers. How would you explain the
differences? If the major difference is in the threat
assumption, what threat assumptions underlie the
administration's projections?
Mr. Slocombe. The answer to that question differs for the
two studies. The CBO study, at least its big number--the $120
billion, which gets all the attention--assumed a dramatically
larger threat and assumed that we would need to recreate in
Central Europe the sort of forward positional defense which we
had in the middle of Germany during the cold war.
Obviously, if you make that assumption, the costs are going
to be very substantially higher--whether they're $120 billion,
for all I know, could be low. But it is a--that is an
assumption about a threat which does not exist now, which there
is no prospect of existing in the future in the sense of any
indications, and which even if you make the most pessimistic
possible assumptions about Russia, could not exist without
years of warning.
The--I'm sure you're aware, the committee is aware, that
the Russian army--leaving aside the geographic problem--the
Russian army is in a state of considerable trouble, and to put
it mildly, is not sitting on the border of Poland or--Poland is
the only country that would be relevant here--threatening
anybody. That's the main difference for the assumptions in the
CBO study.
I also want to be clear, and I understand that the
principal researcher on the CBO study is also the man who did
the recent study for Cato. He also has very different views
about what you would need to do to meet the current threat. It
has essentially to do with the level of current threat and the
response.
Now, with respect to the RAND study, that--those numbers
are obviously a lot closer to the ones which we reached